“Russia is very much engaged in nurturing and further building positive attitudes towards itself in Slovenia,” says Dr. Dejan Verčič, Professor and Head of the Centre for Marketing and Public Relations at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana.
In this interview with Insight News, Dr. Verčič discussed the main goals of Russian information operations targeting Slovenia and the presence of Russian propaganda in the country.
— In your opinion, what are the main goals of Russian information operations targeting Slovenia?
I think that the key targets are the attitudes of the Slovenian population towards several objects, actually.
First of all, on one side, towards Russia itself. Then towards the Slovenian government, Slovenian authorities, and the partnerships in which Slovenia operates — meaning the European Union, NATO, the West as a whole, and the United States in particular. And only then Ukraine сomes into the game.
My view is that, to understand Russian information operations, it’s much better to think in the concepts of classical propaganda research than disinformation research. Because the notion of disinformation is binary — either some news is true or it is false, and everybody’s then just looking for this correct or wrong information.
If we are talking about propaganda, then we are talking about a very broad space — going from white propaganda on one side, which is basically very favorable, very correct, very truthful communication and whatever is going on, to black propaganda completely on the other side.
And I think that if we want to understand — at least how I see what is going on in Slovenia — it’s extremely important to look at the whole space.
Russia is very much engaged in nurturing and further building positive attitudes towards itself in Slovenia. First of all, there is an undercurrent communication concerning panslavism: “We are all Slavs, so we should all stick together. We have no quarrels from history. So why are we starting to argue about things, when we know that somehow we, as Slavs, do not really belong to the West?” So, this is where it starts.
Building on that is a very extensive cultural diplomacy, which has been going on forever. Russia has a very good communication infrastructure, very good communication artifacts, and very good artists that they can export all the time. And there is a whole network around that, which exists also in Slovenia — not only in Slovenia.
Then this panslavism has, particularly for Slovenia, a very dangerous or nearly invisible line going from Russia to Serbia and Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to Slovenia.
It’s actually coming in two different ways. Particularly, I would say that the majority of the financial infrastructure and buildup is actually going that way — not directly from Russia — which is opening serious security questions now in Slovenia. So, we have this Russian, so to say, narrative.
Then we have, on the other side, a narrative which, I would say, is building on the legitimation of neoliberalism as they are using it today, which, on the other side, is building a case for illiberal democracies — Russia, Hungary, you can bring in China, Turkey, and so on and so forth. But still, it starts a political debate where a lot of people are starting to debate where we position ourselves in this new geopolitical game.
And only after that, and on the basis of that, comes Ukraine into the game. And it comes into the game very softly in the sense that there is this reorganization of the global economic order where we have to start thinking about whether we have funds to support Ukraine, whether we have funds to buy arms for Ukraine, whether we have enough funds to accept Ukrainian immigrants, and so on and so forth. So, I will say that if you’re talking about the objectives, I would say it’s very subtle. It’s not direct.
Of course, we have some media platforms, websites, and individuals who are openly forwarding Russian propaganda, but I would say their effect is negligible compared to these major themes which are actually played long-term.
I would say that propaganda research, or now strategic communication, is a much more productive space to think about what is going on.
— If we talk about the period before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, do you recall any mentions of Ukraine in Russian propaganda targeting Slovenia, or did these only emerge after the full-scale invasion?
It’s interesting now to analyze backwards and think about it, but it seems to me that around the time of the invasion of Crimea, Russian operations started to upgrade themselves.
And I even know some people who, in Russia, are working in strategic communication, and since I’m organizing conferences in the field, I’ve met some of them visiting Slovenia. I even know that they were having educational courses for people at the embassy, but my best guess would be also outside of it.
There are things which happened in the past for which you cannot prove — or there is no proof, no evidence — that they were done with a propaganda purpose, but let me give you a few cases.
There is an operational Slovenia–Russia Friendship Society which exists in Slovenia and was built up. Then there is a parliamentary friendship group with Russia in the parliament.
Then in Ljubljana operates a forum for Slavic cultures. And there is a center for Slavic cultures as well. So there are all kinds of things which can be used. Let’s put it that way.
I have no evidence or proof that I could say that they are directly used or that they were formed for this purpose. But my best guess would be, particularly since I know some people from these circles, that a lot of them are playing today the function of what would be called useful idiots. I’m absolutely certain that several of them are Russian agents. Now, at what level and in what capacity is a completely different question.
As you know, we had an example of a quite famous Russian intelligence couple who were arrested in December 2002 in Ljubljana — Artem and Ana Dulcova. They were essential later for that famous exchange of agents between East and West, but they were operating in Ljubljana for five years before they were arrested.
So, we can assume that Ljubljana is at least a small logistic hub for Russia, particularly because Slovenia is at the intersection of north-south and east-west roads.
Slovenia is a member of the EU and NATO on one side, but on the other side, as an ex-Yugoslav country, we have very good relations throughout the whole Balkans, which is also used during the whole war as a kind of blackmail territory for Russia.
— When talking about traditional media such as print, online, and TV, how would you assess the presence of Russian propaganda there?
I would say that there are attempts from the Russian side to get their messages through the mainstream media, but they are not very effective because it’s simply too obvious — it’s not working well.
What I have seen lately is that they are starting to use alternative media. By alternative media, I don’t mean digital media; I mean alternative traditional media like small TV stations.
For example, I saw just recently a major push from a small religious television station which is basically linked more towards the Vatican than Moscow, but still. So they are looking for outlets which are smaller where they could come through, and probably they are also using money or whatever they get through.
And in social media, they exist — they have some websites, small websites, which again were originally financed more from Belgrade than from Moscow. That’s why I’m always saying it’s that line coming through: Moscow — Belgrade, Belgrade — Ljubljana.
And through that, they’re spreading classical information from Sputnik or RT, although neither of them operates here anymore. They have influencers on social media who are narrating their stories. Let’s, let’s put it that way — so they do exist.
But I wouldn’t say that they’re particularly effective on that side, although there is this strong push.
Historically, they’ve been building close relations with some politicians in Slovenia who received high medals from Putin himself, and so on and so forth in the past. So, they definitely have players also within the political system.
And actually, we are six months away from the next parliamentary elections, and one of the presidents of a newly formed party — who, among other things, has served as a minister in several positions in previous governments — was directly asked publicly whether he’s receiving funds from Moscow.
He, of course, said no, but if those types of questions are asked openly, you can imagine what the situation is.
— You also mentioned Sputnik, which is now banned in the EU. However, are there cases in Slovenia where some media were banned by the government, for example, for sharing propaganda?
No.
— Do you have any laws or regulations that can control this?
Not really, not that I am aware of. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs formed a working group which is monitoring fake news that could be dangerous.
They have been activated several times when it became obvious that there were attacks from Russia towards the local political system or just attempts to create panic or distrust in the government. There is also a broader group which works, I think, in the Office of Government Communication. But legally, no.
— You study strategic communications — from that perspective, how would you assess Slovenia’s resilience to propaganda, especially Russian propaganda or foreign disinformation campaigns?
I would say medium to low. If you closely monitor and analyze public opinion data on how Slovenians feel about their government, particularly how they feel about their alliances with NATO and even more with the United States, you can see narratives trying to revive the historic non-alignment of ex-Yugoslavia.
As you know, during the Cold War, Yugoslavia was supposedly between East and West, and so there was this idea of non-alignment — that we don’t want to mess with the East, we don’t want to mess with the West. We are going to be something different in the middle.
This idea is still very strong, and there is a lot of, I would say, Russian work on building this narrative.
So, for that reason, I would say there is a lot of sympathy from that perspective towards Russia, building, as I said, on panslavism, then on this exceptionalism that we are neither East nor West. And in the future, it could become dangerous.
— You mentioned that some Russian narratives reach Slovenia via Serbia and Belgrade, but what about Hungary? Since Slovenia also borders Hungary, and Russian propaganda is strong there, how does that influence Slovenia?
Hungary has the function of financially supporting media buildup. Here we enter a very complicated area in Slovenia because if you look at the whole political spectrum, let’s look at it from another perspective, as I said: liberal and illiberal. And here you bring Hungary in as illiberal.
Hungary invested in some Slovenian media, including television, and owns it. Hungary also owns one of the two largest banks in Slovenia. It also has its own oil company mall operating in Slovenia, and so forth.
So Hungary is quite a serious player in Slovenia, but this line is linked to a political party, SDS (the Slovenian Democratic Party – ed.), which is led by Janez Janša, who was among the first three top European politicians to come to Kyiv when the aggression started.
So I would say that they are in a very complicated position. On one side, they are close Hungarian allies on this illiberal side, but I wouldn’t say that they are pro-Russian. That’s why these small nuances are important, and the situation gets very, very complicated.
So Hungary, as such, I wouldn’t say that Russian propaganda is coming through narratives except on the issue of liberal and illiberal democracies.
— If you were to assess the situation in the whole Balkans very generally, which country do you think is the weakest and the main target of Russian propaganda right now?
Since ever, it’s Serbia which is not even a target — it’s a close ally. They support Russia although they live on European subsidies. I would say they are a special case. If you ask me about the weak spot, I would say Bosnia and Herzegovina. But the most dangerous player, and I would say actually nearly Russian territory in the Balkans, is Serbia.
— Could you please explain a bit about Bosnia?
Bosnia is a failed state as far as I’m concerned, which was formed at the end of many wars that were going on after the collapse of Yugoslavia, and where in the end an agreement was signed that basically appeased the situation in the country by dividing it into two parts.
One part is Croatian-Bosnian, and the other one is Serbian, Republika Srpska. Now, Republika Srpska operates as a country on its own — they try to operate that way.
Luckily, there are still enough American and British soldiers close by, so they are not prepared to play two dangerous games. But I would say that Republika Srpska is probably the most corrupt part of the whole Balkans at the moment, and there are all kinds of money flows going through it — from cleaning drug money from major drug trafficking operations from Latin America to Europe, to all kinds of farm deals and that kind of stuff.
And for that reason, Bosnia and Herzegovina has never really been stabilized. It doesn’t have a functional federal government. And under some unlucky circumstances, it could easily be ignited again into a new war, and if that happened, it would be very hard not to get Croatia and Serbia involved, which would again make a complete mess.
— I just wanted to ask you again to assess why Russia’s strategic communications remain so strong. Why do they still have such a significant impact in the EU?
If you ask me that question, I would say we all have to go back to Trotsky. For Trotsky, culture is a continuation of politics by other means. And everything already started in the 1920s. There was a large buildup linked to the notion of permanent revolution at that time. And the infrastructure which was built was never completely dismantled, so to say.
So, I see a continuation from the 1920s to 2020, so to say. They invested 100 years of research and hard work to build up a massive network which, when Russia (USSR – ed.) collapsed, maybe disappeared for a couple of years, but later on they rebuilt it together. So, I would say they have a lot of knowledge.
They have a lot of people. They have networks they have built over the past 100 years. They can use them whenever they are needed. And actually, when I was talking to some Russian people who clearly admitted — I mean, they openly say, “Look, I was a KGB operative there 50 years ago. Okay, then the country collapsed. I didn’t know what to do, then I went to that university, that university, that university. And now I’m here working on this.”
So, they have operatives — you know, their investment in that sense is much more committed than anything I have seen anywhere in the world.
The United States had a much smaller operation, which was excellent — that was the United States Information Agency, which was dismantled after the end of the Cold War. It was part of the so-called Clinton peace dividend. And they dismantled this huge, much younger, but still very good infrastructure they had.
Then they were faced with wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Al-Qaeda, and so on and so forth. And now everybody admits that was one of the biggest strategic mistakes the United States has ever made. Russians never did anything like that.