Moscow has built a sophisticated four-tier propaganda ecosystem in occupied Kherson, where specialized local outlets, federal media brands, social media networks, and official government channels work in coordinated lockstep to create the illusion of independent confirmation while all amplifying the same centrally produced narratives.
Nearly four years after parts of Ukraine’s Kherson region fell under Russian occupation, residents of the left-bank territories are living inside an increasingly sealed information environment. Russian authorities and their local proxies have constructed a system of near-total media control, combining intimidation, technical restrictions, and heavily financed propaganda structures. Kherson-based investigative outlet MOCT has documented how the result is not just censorship, but the gradual creation of a parallel reality where alternative viewpoints struggle to survive. Insight News Media’s investigation reveals the mechanisms behind this ecosystem and how it functions to shape perception in occupied territory.
This system relies on both hard pressure and softer, more insidious methods. Terror and intimidation sit alongside newspapers, television, messengers, and tightly managed online spaces. Over time, the effect compounds, and the informational gap between occupied Kherson and the rest of Ukraine grows wider.
Anatomy of propaganda: Four-tier media ecosystem
There is a complex, interconnected system of propaganda behind the budget numbers and satellite dishes. Russian authorities have constructed a four-tier media ecosystem in the occupied Kherson region, each level reinforcing the others while targeting different audiences and serving distinct functions. Understanding this architecture reveals not just what messages residents receive, but how messages become compelling through repetition, seeming diversity, and the illusion of independent confirmation.
Breaking the blockade: Frontline propagandists
At the foundation of the system sit the specialized local occupation media, purpose-built propaganda platforms that present themselves as regional news sources. Tavria TV, the multimedia company broadcasting on channel 21, describes itself as “the only media company in Kherson region combining three mass media: TV channel Tavria, radio channel Tavria, network publication Tavria.” The branding is deliberate. By adopting “Tavria,” the imperial-era name for the region, these outlets telegraph their ideological purpose before broadcasting a single word.
The content they produce operates on several narrative levels simultaneously. On its website, Tavria TV explains its mission in language that reveals the core propaganda framework: “Under martial law conditions, we manage to break through the information blockade that the Ukrainian side is trying to create.”
- https://tavria.tv/tv/about/
The victim inversion is complete. Invading Russian forces, having physically seized territory and imposed media restrictions, portray themselves as liberating residents from Ukrainian informational oppression.
This framing permeates daily coverage. When reporting on military actions, Tavria TV consistently employs specific terminology designed to shape perception. Ukrainian forces become “militants of the Kyiv regime” or simply “the enemy.” Russian military advances are invariably described as “liberation.” A typical report demonstrates the pattern: “Militants of the Kyiv regime over the past 24 hours inflicted 73 strikes with barrel artillery on civilian infrastructure of the left bank of Kherson region. As a result of AFU shelling in Kairy, one civilian was wounded. In Dneprany [Note: Russian spelling; the settlement is Dnipriany in Ukrainian transliteration – ed.], the enemy struck residential quarters and the area of the local administration.”
- https://tavria.tv/news/accidents/vsu-za-sutki-vypustili-73-snaryada-po-grazhdanskoj-infrastrukture-hersonshhiny/
The report accomplishes multiple propaganda objectives. It presents Ukrainian forces as deliberately targeting civilians, a war crime allegation made routine through repetition. The specific number of strikes, 73, lends the appearance of factual reporting while the surrounding context ensures those facts serve a predetermined narrative.
Tavria TV also specializes in expert predictions that frame Ukrainian defeat as inevitable. In October 2025, the outlet broadcast Russian military analyst and propagandist Vasily Dandykin stating: “The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation may complete the liberation of the territory of the Donetsk People’s Republic by spring 2026. In his opinion, the Kyiv regime has two options: agree to Russia’s conditions and withdraw troops from the DPR territory, or continue the confrontation, which will lead to further advance of the Russian army.”
- https://amp.tavria.tv/news/dandykin-rossiya-mozhet-osvobodit-dnr-do-vesny-2026-goda/
The prediction operates as propaganda regardless of its accuracy. It presents Ukrainian military collapse as a certainty requiring only a timeline, not a question mark. The “two options” framing eliminates Ukrainian victory as a possibility. Residents hearing this message repeatedly, from figures presented as military experts, absorb not just information but a sense of futility about resistance.
Alongside Tavria TV, a network of occupation-run websites including herson.news, bloknot-herson.ru, newskherson.ru, and kherson-news.ru produces high-volume daily content. Bloknot Kherson, part of a pan-Russian tabloid network, brings sensationalist formatting to occupation narratives. In January 2026, Bloknot featured political scientist Yury Dudkin, quoted in Russian occupation media, declaring: “In the directions of Chernihiv, Kharkiv, the Kramatorsk-Sloviansk agglomeration, the Zaporizhzhia agglomeration and so on, in 2026 there will simply be fierce battles, that’s definite. I also have no doubt that Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson will be lost by Ukraine this year.”
- https://bloknot-herson.ru/news/novosti-svo-ukraina-ne-uderzhit-kherson-kharkov-i–1936726
The claim is remarkable for its sweep. Dudkin predicts not just the fall of occupied territories but major Ukrainian cities including Kherson, the regional capital that remains under Ukrainian control. The prediction serves propaganda purposes whether or not it materializes.
Bloknot Kherson also specializes in detailed attack statistics that create a sense of overwhelming threat. A January 2026 report on the Oleshky district stated: “From January 10 to 16, 2026, the Aleshki district [Note: Russian spelling; the settlement is Oleshky in Ukrainian transliteration – ed.] was once again in the zone of targeted strikes. According to district head Ruslan Khomenko, the enemy systematically strikes civilian infrastructure using artillery, mortars, and UAVs. The result of the week: 1,211 attacks. Of these, 618 were barrel and mortar artillery on Aleshki. At least 593 more drone strikes.”
- https://bloknot-herson.ru/news/bolee-1200-snaryadov-i-dronov-pritselno-udarili-po-1939760
The numerical precision creates an appearance of comprehensive documentation while framing Ukrainian military actions as a deliberate campaign against non-combatants.
Moscow’s credibility: Federal media moves in
The second tier of the propaganda ecosystem brings established Russian federal media brands into the occupied Kherson region. Komsomolskaya Pravda and Moskovskiy Komsomolets, major Russian tabloids with decades of brand recognition, now operate local Kherson editions. This represents a significant escalation in propaganda sophistication. When residents read Komsomolskaya Pravda Kherson, they encounter occupation narratives wrapped in the credibility of a nationally recognized media brand.
Komsomolskaya Pravda Kherson excels at legitimization narratives, presenting Russian occupation as a popular choice that brought unprecedented development. On the third anniversary of the 2022 referendum, the outlet published a commemorative piece stating: “Three years ago, during the referendum, the residents of Kherson region made a historic choice. Their voice was firm and confident: 87.05% of participants voted for reunification with Russia. This decision became a natural return to common roots, centuries-old history and cultural unity.”
- https://www.herson.kp.ru/daily/27721/5148298/
The referendum, conducted under occupation without international observers and widely condemned as illegitimate, is presented as a “historic choice” with the precise figure 87.05% lending statistical authority.
The outlet pairs these macro-level narratives with carefully curated personal testimonials. In the same anniversary coverage, Alexandra Shpilyaeva, identified as a widow of an SVO (“special military operation” – Russia’s term for its war in Ukraine – ed.) fighter, coordinator of the regional fund Defenders of the Fatherland, and a fourth-year university student, provides her perspective: “After the referendum in Kherson region, it was like taking a breath of fresh air. So many opportunities opened up at once! My daughter travels in summer. Doctors started coming to us, even from Moscow. Under Ukraine we survived, but now we live! The region is being transformed, and I believe that things will only get better.”
- https://www.herson.kp.ru/daily/27721/5148298/
The testimonial is propaganda architecture in miniature. Shpilyaeva’s multiple roles create a sympathetic figure whose endorsement carries emotional weight across several dimensions. The before-and-after framing, “survived” under Ukraine versus “live” under Russia, encapsulates the transformation narrative in a memorable phrase.
Komsomolskaya Pravda Kherson also provides detailed coverage of Russian federal investment. Senator Igor Kastyukevich outlined the scale: “Kherson region has not seen such volume and scale of construction and restoration work in modern history. Only 28 billion rubles were allocated for road repairs! The development program for historical regions became unprecedented for Russia and, on the president’s orders, amounted to more than a trillion rubles per year starting from 2022.”
- https://www.herson.kp.ru/daily/27721/5148298/
The numbers, 28 billion rubles for roads and over a trillion rubles annually, create an impression of massive investment regardless of whether residents see corresponding improvements in their daily lives. The claim is unfalsifiable in occupied territory.
The outlet also emphasizes mortgage programs as proof of normalization. By February 2026, it was advertising the program directly: “Kherson residents can take advantage of a unique measure of state support, a preferential mortgage program with a rate of up to 2% per annum. The program is valid until December 31, 2030. Maximum amount up to 6 million rubles.”
- https://www.herson.kp.ru/daily/27758/5205399/
The mortgage narrative serves multiple functions. It signals stability and long-term Russian commitment, programs extending to 2030 imply permanent Russian control. It creates a material incentive for collaboration, residents who take these mortgages become financially invested in Russian administration.
The federal media outlets also excel at atrocity propaganda, presenting Ukrainian military actions during significant dates as evidence of deliberate cruelty. On New Year’s Eve 2025, Komsomolskaya Pravda Kherson reported: “Kherson region governor Vladimir Saldo reported a monstrous strike that occurred during New Year’s celebrations. According to his data, as a result of a drone attack on the village of Khorly, 24 people died, including a child. The strike was carried out by three UAVs almost at midnight. The targets were a cafe and hotel on the Black Sea coast, where people gathered to celebrate 2026. One of the drones was equipped with an incendiary mixture, which made the attack especially monstrous.”
- https://www.herson.kp.ru/daily/27747.5/5192833/
The outlet then amplified the emotional impact by quoting Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova: “The khokhols burned 25 people alive right in a Kherson cafe, to the chimes of the clock. I recognize non-brother Kolya. They are not just war criminals, they are sadists, worthy of their spiritual fathers, the Gestapo.”
- https://www.herson.kp.ru/daily/27747.5/5192833/
The statement deploys extreme dehumanization. “Khokhols,” an ethnic slur for Ukrainians, appears in an official Foreign Ministry statement. The comparison to the Gestapo activates deep historical trauma in Russian cultural memory.
Follow-up coverage extended the holiday attack narrative. In early January 2026, the outlet reported: “Pre-New Year and New Year days became a time of intensified attacks by Kyiv militants on the civilian population of Aleshki district. Right on the first day of the new year a child was killed. For the period from December 27, 2025 to January 3, 2026, the criminal regime of country 404 continued targeted attacks on our municipality. In total, the enemy inflicted 769 strikes on Aleshki district in seven days.”
- https://www.herson.kp.ru/daily/27747.5/5193954/
The reference to “country 404” reduces Ukraine to an internet error code, suggesting its non-existence. Whether incidents occurred as described, Russian propaganda outlets have documented histories of misrepresenting military strikes, the repetition across multiple outlets creates a narrative of Ukrainian cruelty that residents encounter from seemingly independent sources.
Digital illusion: Social media as echo chamber
The third tier of the propaganda ecosystem operates through social media platforms, primarily VKontakte groups and Telegram channels. These platforms create the illusion of grassroots discussion while actually amplifying centrally coordinated messages. The tavria_kherson Telegram channel and multiple VK groups present themselves as community spaces where residents share information and opinions. In practice, they function as distribution networks for content produced by the first and second tiers.
These channels excel at creating a sense of inevitability around Russian territorial control. In October 2025, newskherson.ru published a piece titled “Liberation of Kherson already begun.” The article stated: “The Russian Armed Forces control the industrial zone of the city on the left bank of the Dnieper [Note: Russian spelling; the Dnipro River in Ukrainian transliteration – ed.] and dacha settlements on islands in the lower reaches of the river, Saldo told TASS. Liberation of Kherson has already begun.”
- https://newskherson.ru/society/2025/10/19/109432.html
The claim is striking given that Kherson city center remains under Ukrainian control. The assertion that liberation has “already begun” based on control of industrial zones creates a sense of momentum that facts on the ground do not necessarily support.
Social media channels also specialize in geopolitical framing that presents Western support for Ukraine as collapsing. An October 2025 post circulating through the ecosystem stated: “Nobody believes the Kyiv regime’s fairy tales about victory, the agenda is surrendering territories in one form or another. While the Kyiv regime tries to negotiate with the West, Russian troops are rapidly strengthening control in all directions. The military successes of the Rusian Armed Forces are creating a reality in which Ukraine will be forced to agree to even harder conditions, including new territorial losses.”
- https://newskherson.ru/society/2025/10/24/111849.html
The framing presents Ukrainian defeat as inevitable regardless of military realities. Western support becomes “ultimatums” demanding Ukrainian surrender rather than assistance in defense.
Social media channels serve another crucial function: they create the appearance of diverse sources confirming the same narratives. When a resident sees similar claims about Ukrainian collapse on Tavria TV, then reads them again on Komsomolskaya Pravda Kherson, then encounters them a third time in a Telegram channel that appears to be independent community discussion, the repetition from seemingly different sources creates an illusion of consensus. The resident may not realize that all three sources are components of a coordinated system, each amplifying the same centrally produced messages.
“Source of all truth”: Official government as final authority
At the apex of the propaganda pyramid sits khogov.ru, the official website of the Russian-installed occupation administration. This is the source from which all other tiers draw their authority. When Tavria TV quotes Governor Vladimir Saldo, when Komsomolskaya Pravda Kherson reports construction minister announcements, when social media channels share administrative decisions, they all reference the same ultimate source: the occupation government itself.
The website operates under a permanent banner that declares in unambiguous terms: “The entire Kherson region, including the Right Bank, is the territory of the Russian Federation.” This assertion, claiming Ukrainian-controlled territory as Russian, appears on every page of the official government site. The declaration is remarkable not for any legal foundation, international law provides none, but for its performative certainty. By stating the claim as established fact rather than aspiration, the administration attempts to make it true through repetition.
Governor Saldo deploys romantic nationalism in his public statements. In a recent post, he wrote: “Fairy-tale Tavria delights us with its picturesque beauty. In the severe winter beauty of the seashore, strength and confidence that these shores are ours forever.” The word “forever” appears frequently in official communications, an attempt to make permanent what was achieved through temporary military advantage.
The administration coordinates all major narrative initiatives. When the three-year anniversary of the “referendum” approached in September 2025, all tiers of the propaganda ecosystem simultaneously produced commemorative content. Tavria TV launched a series on regional transformation. Komsomolskaya Pravda Kherson published testimonials and investment figures. Social media channels amplified both with additional commentary.
This coordination reveals the ecosystem’s true nature. What appears to be multiple independent sources confirming similar narratives is actually a single source, the occupation administration, speaking through multiple voices. The apparent diversity of confirmation is an illusion created by organizational structure.
Closed media landscape by design
Studying the media situation in the temporarily occupied territories of Kherson region is itself a challenge. Many of the channels used by Russian authorities are inaccessible from Ukrainian-controlled areas, particularly television and radio broadcasting. In right-bank Kherson, Russian TV signals are largely absent, while FM radio can only be picked up sporadically under favorable conditions.
As a result, analysis relies on what can be accessed: open online platforms and administrative documents issued by occupation authorities. These sources reveal a clear priority. Russian efforts focus on print media and television, with digital tools playing a supporting, but growing, role.
Several Ukrainian district newspapers seized in 2022 continue to be published as propaganda outlets. Alongside the regional paper Naddnipryanska Pravda, the occupiers maintain titles such as Kazovska Zorya, Chornomorets, Holoprystanskyi Visnyk, and Oleshkivskyi Visnyk. Their design is strikingly uniform, with near-identical layouts and messaging, suggesting centralized production rather than independent editorial work.
Television, satellite control, and enforced loyalty
Control over television remains a cornerstone of Russian influence. Throughout 2025, occupation authorities intensified the dismantling of satellite dishes capable of receiving Ukrainian broadcasts. These antennas, derisively called “gorynychs” by Russian officials, are systematically removed and replaced with Russian equipment.
The replacement systems broadcast the so-called Russkiy Mir package, which includes up to 20 federal Russian channels, nine regional outlets linked to the so-called “DPR” and “LPR”, as well as channels from Crimea, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia. Entertainment channels complete the offering, blending war narratives with films, serials, and children’s programming.
Residents are required to pay for these entertainment packages, though free installations of Russkiy Mir equipment were officially scheduled to conclude by November 2025.
At the same time, Russian authorities are pushing the adoption of MAX, a Kremlin-backed messenger developed by VK and launched in 2025. Intended as a replacement for Telegram, MAX integrates messaging, government services, payments, and identity verification. Installation has been mandatory in the Russian Federation and occupied territories since September 2025. The app lacks end-to-end encryption and transmits user data to security services, reinforcing surveillance alongside propaganda.
Propaganda budgets are rising sharply
Financial documents show that Moscow is not easing its grip. In 2026, occupation authorities allocated more than 590 million rubles, roughly 7.7 million U.S. dollars, to information and propaganda structures in left-bank Kherson. This figure, approved by the occupation regional Duma in December 2025, marks a significant increase over previous years.
In 2025, around 426 million rubles were allocated for propaganda. As in earlier years, final spending may rise further following mid-year budget revisions.
Key recipients include the television and radio company Tavria, which will receive 90.9 million rubles in 2026. While well below the record 330 million planned in 2024, the funding remains sufficient to sustain one of the main propaganda outlets in the region.
The largest increase went to the Information Center of Kherson Region, responsible for publishing occupation newspapers across the territory. Its budget rose from 105 million to 290 million rubles, underscoring the importance placed on print propaganda.
Youth-focused structures also received substantial funding. The Youth Center Patriot is set to receive 64.3 million rubles, while the pro-Kremlin Young Guard of United Russia will receive another 60 million. Occupation authorities do not disclose detailed spending programs, keeping much of this activity opaque.
Subtle shifts under rigid control
Despite the expanding budgets, observers inside and outside the region note subtle changes. According to journalist Oleg Baturin, Telegram channels and occupation-linked online media became more critical of local occupation authorities in 2025. Some genuinely oppositional channels publish leaked documents and expose corruption among collaborators, attracting growing audiences.
These materials are often more interesting to read than the dull, Soviet-style official content, Baturin said, noting that public engagement in comment sections has increased.
Journalist Margarita Dotsenko points to a rise in video content and podcasts, linked to the opening of a new Tavria studio. While technically more polished, she says the content remains saturated with propaganda, frequently contrasting a decaying West with an idealized Russia led by a great president.
At the same time, staffing problems are evident. Media analyst Vyacheslav Husakov observes that Tavria’s output has become more primitive despite technical upgrades. Russian media workers rarely stay long, and local collaborators increasingly attempt to leave for Russia.
Fragile monopoly
Print media quality has not significantly improved. Since 2024, previously independent editorial offices have been merged under the Information Center of Kherson Region. In September 2025, editor-in-chief Yevhen Belyi was unexpectedly replaced by former Kherson journalist Tetyana Nazarenko. Content remains overwhelmingly propagandistic, with occasional additions focused on Stalin, the Second World War, and so-called Great Patriotic War narratives.
Despite systematic investment, Russia’s information monopoly in occupied Kherson remains brittle. Growing critical channels, staffing shortages, and public fatigue undermine the effectiveness of propaganda, forcing authorities to pour ever more money into maintaining control.
As regional media expert Serhiy Nikitenko notes, Russia is constructing a closed information space through financial injections, technical restrictions, and relentless messaging. Yet even under occupation, this artificial reality requires constant reinforcement, revealing its inherent weakness. The four-tier propaganda ecosystem, for all its sophistication and coordination, ultimately depends on coercion and isolation to function. Where residents can access alternative information, where they can compare official claims to lived experience, where they can communicate with family and friends outside occupied territory, the carefully constructed narratives begin to crack. The hundreds of millions of rubles flowing into propaganda infrastructure each year are not a sign of strength but of fragility, the cost of maintaining an alternative reality that cannot sustain itself without constant, expensive reinforcement.
