The Belarusian media landscape today resembles a battlefield for influence over public opinion. Russia is actively seeking to strengthen the presence of its propaganda platforms in a supposedly “allied” country, exploiting the structural weaknesses of the local media market.
Based on data from SimilarWeb and Ahrefs for the first half of 2025, covering the traffic of news websites most frequently visited by Belarusians, all media outlets can be divided into three main groups: pro-government, opposition/independent, and Russian propaganda platforms. International independent media form a separate but marginal segment. The findings clearly indicate that the threat of disinformation from the Kremlin’s propaganda machine—already sanctioned by the European Union—continues to grow.
This analysis demonstrates that pro-Lukashenka media dominate Belarus’s online news sphere, controlling nearly 60% of the audience. Independent outlets retain about one-quarter of readership, which signals a persistent demand for alternative sources of information. Meanwhile, Russian state-controlled media continue to exert significant external malign influence, with a share comparable to that of independent media.
Data collected and analyzed from SimilarWeb and Ahrefs reveal a profound imbalance in the Belarusian media environment. More than half of all visits to news websites go to pro-government outlets, while international independent media remain marginal players. The figures below reflect average monthly traffic over the past six months.
Pro-government channels dominate the information sphere. Nearly 60% of all visits go to resources under direct state control, reflecting the strength of Lukashenka’s propaganda apparatus inside the country.
Independent and opposition outlets maintain a resilient presence. Despite censorship and blocking, they generate over 23% of total news traffic, showing a notable level of trust in alternative sources of information—particularly among younger audiences.
Russian propaganda remains a powerful force. With a 17% share of readership, Russian state-funded media continue to shape public perception, spreading disinformation and war propaganda aligned with the Kremlin’s agenda.
International independent media (Russian-language versions of BBC and Euronews) hold just 0.43% of the audience. Their marginal presence is due to both targeted blocking and limited coverage of issues most relevant to Belarusians.
Overall, the data confirm that Belarus’s online media space remains heavily controlled by the regime, while being highly vulnerable to external information attacks. Nonetheless, the sustained traffic of independent outlets underlines the continued demand for alternative voices in Belarusian society.
An analysis of the news websites most frequently visited by Belarusians reveals a media environment split into four distinct categories based on editorial policy: pro-government outlets, independent or opposition media, Russian state propaganda platforms, and international independent publishers. Among these, pro-government media loyal to Lukashenka’s regime remain the dominant force.
Pro-government outlets continue to be the most influential group within Belarus’s media landscape, capturing nearly 59% of total online news traffic. This dominance highlights the regime’s ability to control the national information agenda and limit the visibility of alternative narratives.
Websites such as Belnovosti, Smartpress, Belta, and SB consistently top the traffic rankings. Beyond simply reporting news, they serve as vehicles for shaping public opinion and reinforcing state-sanctioned narratives, particularly among older generations—the demographic that forms the backbone of their audience.
Interestingly, pro-government media maintain a more balanced gender distribution among their readership compared to other categories, enabling them to sustain a broad social base. Nevertheless, their growth trajectory has stalled. Audience expansion has effectively plateaued, suggesting that while these outlets retain dominance, their capacity to attract new, younger readers is diminishing.
These media outlets focus on relaying the official stance of Lukashenko’s government. The data shows that pro-government media outlets remain in the lead but are gradually losing momentum and trust, especially among younger audiences.
Independent and opposition outlets collectively attract more than 10 million monthly visits (23.35% of total traffic), underscoring the persistent demand in Belarusian society for alternative and reliable sources of information. While heavily constrained by censorship and political repression, these platforms continue to command about a quarter of the country’s online news audience.
The leaders in this category—Charter97, Zerkalo, and Nasha Niva—draw much of their strength from younger readers, particularly men aged 25 to 34, who actively seek independent news. Yet despite this loyal base, their audience growth has stalled, signaling deeper structural challenges.
The stagnation of opposition media cannot be explained solely by government blocking or persecution. A significant part of the problem lies in the absence of effective digital strategies. Most outlets have failed to transform themselves into competitive online brands capable of leveraging SEO and digital marketing to expand their reach. Their social media presence has provided partial relief from direct censorship, but the efforts have not been dynamic or innovative enough to compete with well-resourced pro-government media.
Another challenge is structural dependency on external funding. Reliance on donor grants often fosters a reporting-oriented culture rather than a product-driven, long-term approach to audience growth. As a result, opposition outlets risk becoming locked in survival mode, unable to invest in brand development or digital innovation.
Despite working in exile and under constant pressure, these outlets remain influential symbols of resilience. They continue to appeal to younger, more critical segments of the population. However, censorship, limited resources, and the lack of systematic digital promotion strategies prevent them from expanding their readership in a meaningful way.
Russian state-controlled media occupy the third-largest segment of Belarus’s news market, accounting for 17.2% of traffic (7.4 million visits per month). They remain a central channel of external influence, saturated with disinformation and Kremlin-driven war narratives.
Among these, Sputnik, Komsomolskaya Pravda (KP), RIA Novosti, and Lenta exert the greatest impact. Sputnik.by alone generates well over 5 million monthly views, ensuring that a significant share of Belarusians are primarily exposed to the Russian interpretation of world events. This illustrates how deliberately the Kremlin is expanding its digital presence in Belarus to shape public opinion in what it officially calls an “ally.”
The widespread reach of these websites highlights how deeply Russian narratives are embedded in Belarus’s online information ecosystem. Kremlin-controlled media rely heavily on organic search traffic and referral channels, which make them highly visible to Belarusian audiences even without direct promotion.
Perhaps the most alarming trend is the dominance of Russian outlets in Google search results. According to Ahrefs data:
RIA receives over 330,000 visits from search engines, and Lenta receives over 230,000 visits per month. This means that when searching for information about the world and their own country, Belarusians are more likely to see Russian narratives.
This shows how Kremlin media dominates the information competition for the Belarusian audience. It’s important to note that even sanctions and restrictions from the EU haven’t lowered their visibility in search results, because Google’s algorithms rank these sites.
We identified the main search queries with the word “news” based on Ahrefs data and found that RIA receives the largest share of search traffic—20%, and Lenta—7.2%. The Belarusian publication Belta ranks only third with 6.5%. They are followed by the Russian-sanctioned Izvestia and Sputnik.
Opposition media, on the other hand, are virtually absent from search results. Only Zerkalo gathers about 1% of traffic.
International players like the BBC and Euronews demonstrate relative success in queries about “world news,” thanks to the authority of their domains and effective search optimization. But these remain exceptions rather than competitors to Moscow’s vast digital infrastructure.
The analysis of Belarusian user queries reveals that the most popular searches are associated with international events, Russia’s war in Ukraine, the economy, and political news. Crucially, however, it is Russian propaganda platforms that consistently rank as the leading destinations for these searches.
Independent Belarusian media struggle to gain visibility due to limited SEO expertise, modest marketing budgets, and the blocking of their websites inside the country. This leaves them structurally disadvantaged. Consequently, Russian state-controlled outlets often attract Belarusians actively seeking independent perspectives.
This reliance on search is critical: organic traffic remains the most stable and enduring source of readership, as it reflects genuine user intent. Securing top positions in Google results therefore translates into near-monopolistic control over what information users encounter. The Kremlin exploits this dynamic with precision, embedding its narratives directly into the most popular searches.
Ahrefs data confirm a troubling trend: Russian propaganda websites dominate Belarus’s information space at the search level, while opposition outlets remain marginalized. This reflects a systematic and long-term Kremlin strategy to entrench disinformation in Belarus and gradually shape the country’s political and social discourse in Moscow’s favor.
Data from the Ahrefs platform for the first half of 2025 reveals that Belarusians are highly active in searching for news via Google. Combined, queries related specifically to news topics exceed 1 million searches per month.
The core problem is that Russian outlets capture the majority of search traffic. Google’s algorithms consistently rank RIA.ru and Lenta.ru higher than Belarusian independent sites, largely due to their enormous content volume, consistent publication frequency, and well-developed SEO strategies.
As a result, even when Belarusians search for local or international news, they are disproportionately directed to Russian sources. This creates a dangerous dynamic of informational dependency, where Kremlin propaganda becomes the default news provider for a significant portion of the population.
The intensification of Russian media activity in Belarus is not accidental—it reflects a deliberate geopolitical strategy. The Kremlin has grown increasingly dissatisfied with Lukashenka’s refusal to openly back the war in Ukraine or commit Belarusian troops to combat. State media in Belarus have largely avoided framing the invasion positively, which clashes with the central message of Russian propaganda.
Moscow has therefore moved to bypass Minsk’s cautious stance and directly target Belarusian audiences. Its efforts focus especially on readers of pro-government outlets, who are considered more receptive to gradual shifts toward Kremlin narratives.
Russia’s information campaign in Belarus serves several purposes:
This strategy underscores a broader reality: the Kremlin views Belarus not as a sovereign partner but as an information battleground, where propaganda tools are used to realign public opinion in favor of Moscow’s long-term political and military objectives.
Despite enjoying high levels of credibility worldwide, international independent outlets account for less than 1% of the Belarusian audience. State-imposed blocking and inadequately tailored or timely coverage for local audiences contribute to their limited reach.
Although their influence in Belarus’s digital information space remains marginal, the role of these platforms as alternative and trustworthy sources of news is critically important. They provide a counterweight—however small—to the dominance of both state-controlled and Russian propaganda channels.
The result is a polarized media environment: on one side, the overwhelming dominance of pro-government and Russian-backed outlets; on the other, a resilient but constrained segment of independent media, much of which operates in exile.
According to SimilarWeb data, the largest shares of traffic to Belarusian news websites come from search engines and direct visits. In both of these categories, pro-government and Russian media hold the upper hand. By contrast, opposition outlets rely heavily on social media traffic, which remains limited due to blocking and platform restrictions.
Generational divides are evident: young audiences lean toward opposition media, while older generations remain more loyal to pro-government and Russian sources.
Audience demographics reveal a clear divide between pro-government and opposition media in Belarus. State-controlled outlets attract a disproportionately older readership, while opposition and independent outlets appeal more strongly to younger and middle-aged users.
This distribution highlights two distinct audience cores. Opposition media attract younger, digitally active readers aged 25–34, supported by a smaller but significant share in the 35–44 demographic.
These users tend to be more critical of regime-aligned content and rely heavily on search engines and social networks to access independent news. While this group plays a key role in shaping alternative discourse, limited resources prevent opposition outlets from scaling their reach further.
By contrast, pro-government media dominate among audiences aged 55 and older, sustaining trust among those accustomed to traditional sources and narratives. Their readership is broader and more demographically diverse but heavily skewed toward older generations.
The result is a generational gap in news consumption: younger Belarusians gravitate toward opposition outlets, while older citizens remain loyal to pro-government and Russian media. This divide illustrates how information preferences are shaping two parallel realities in Belarus—one rooted in state propaganda, the other in the search for independent perspectives.
As of 2025, Belarus’s media landscape remains under the iron grip of the Lukashenka regime. State-controlled outlets and loyalist propaganda platforms dominate the information field, forcing independent opposition media to operate under relentless blocking, censorship, and exile. These restrictions severely limit their capacity to expand, innovate, or compete on equal terms.
Pro-government outlets still command the largest share of the audience, yet their growth has stalled. Opposition media, while resilient, remain limited to a loyal but stagnant readership due to political repression, weak digital promotion strategies, limited branding efforts, and insufficient engagement tools.
The greatest emerging threat, however, is the expansion of Russian propaganda. Kremlin-backed outlets already dominate search traffic on Google and Yandex, steadily reshaping what Belarusian users see when they look for news. This is not a natural outcome of market competition but a deliberate, systematic information offensive designed to shift public opinion and deepen Belarus’s political dependence on Moscow.
Russian state propaganda is steadily displacing both independent and state-aligned Belarusian outlets, capturing a growing share of the media market. If unchecked, this trend could profoundly alter public sentiment inside the country, aligning it more closely with the Kremlin’s narratives and long-term geopolitical objectives.
Lukashenka upholds authoritarian control domestically, while foreign forces undermine Belarus’s information sovereignty. This dynamic exposes the vulnerability of authoritarian systems that monopolize the domestic press but cannot shield themselves from external propaganda more powerful than their own.
In short, the Belarusian media space is entering a new phase where the struggle for information control is no longer just between the regime and the opposition—it is increasingly dictated by the Kremlin. The outcome of this battle will not only shape the future of independent journalism in Belarus, but also shape the country’s political trajectory and sovereignty.
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