“You Don’t Need to Pay Influencers in Serbia”: Fact-Checker Ivan Subotić on How Russian Propaganda Thrives for Free

Ivan Subotić is the editor-in-chief at the Serbian portal FakeNews Tracker and collaborates with the Novi Sad School of Journalism on media literacy programmes and media reporting analysis. 

In an interview with Insight News Media, Ivan Subotić talked about the strong influence of Russian propaganda in Serbia, how the local media system supports these narratives, and the serious challenges fact-checkers face trying to combat misinformation in this environment.

– Serbia is often described as one of the countries where Russian propaganda has found fertile ground. When talking about recent times, why do you think Serbia has been so receptive to these narratives?

Serbia is definitely a disinformation hub, and specifically a Russian disinformation hub in the heart of the Balkans.

There is a historical sentiment towards Russian people. At certain times in history, for example in the 18th and especially the 19th century, Serbia was fighting for its independence. In some of those wars against the Turks, sometimes the Ottoman Turks, sometimes also against Austria-Hungary, the Habsburg monarchy, we received help from the Russians. That’s one of the reasons, but also here people have a lot of love for all Slavic peoples.

So, it’s not just about Russians, but also about Poles, Czechs, and Belarusians. Since everything started in Ukraine, not just three or four years ago but back in 2014, there has been a lot, a lot of disinformation. Moreover, there are not as many Ukrainians here as Russians.

But generally, all Slavic people are well accepted here, and a typical Serbian wouldn’t be able to tell if someone is Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian, or some other nationality from Eastern Europe.

– Would you say that Russian propaganda is mostly focused on this Pan-Slavism narrative?

Not so much actually. It’s not about Pan-Slavism anymore, and it’s also not fertile ground here for Pan-Slavism because of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was a Pan-Slavic project, but you know what happened in the ’90s. We are not together anymore. There was a big war, and there are still ethnic tensions among Serbs, Croats and other nationalities that are mainly Slavic.

– What are the most popular narratives that you notice that are coming from Russia to Serbia?

Russian narratives are more focused on Ukraine, the EU, and Western countries, including America, especially when the Biden administration was in power, and now a little less since Trump is seen as a better option for Putin.

When we talk about narratives about Ukraine, there is always disinformation about neo-Nazi groups. There is also disinformation about Zelenskyy as a person. 

Here, all of Ukraine is perceived through some kind of disinformation about Volodymyr Zelenskyy. It’s about some kind of corruption that he engaged in or didn’t engage in, or whether he has an Israeli passport, or if he has a villa in Miami, or lots of money. 

Those are the main narratives, but Russian disinformation is not only about Ukraine — it also includes anti-European, anti-NATO, and anti-United States narratives.

So when they spread this kind of disinformation, you also hear that not only is Zelenskyy a Nazi guy, but also Ursula von der Leyen or some other European politicians, mainly from the Baltic region. They’re not liked here because they’re a bit more progressive, while our politicians are more conservative. 

Russian propaganda focuses on anti-LGBT messages, anti-Western politics, anti-liberalism, and those kinds of things. It’s more about ideology.

– Is Russian disinformation also used to undermine domestic issues in Serbia, focusing on internal politics? Or is it mostly concentrated on topics outside of Serbia?

It is mostly focused on something that is outside of Serbia, but we have some examples that are also focused on domestic politics.

For example, our propagandistic media use Russian propaganda to justify what politicians here are doing or what they are writing.

For example, the Russian Secret Service helped our Secret Service track protesters and undermine some stories that were published here about the protests. So they use the FSB to say, “Oh, the FSB said that, so it must be true.” 

They are using the FSB as a credible source, even though we know that the FSB is engaged in creating disinformation.

Sometimes it is used for domestic politics, and sometimes it is not. For example, in the last few months there has been very little news from Russian media and from Russia. 

Why? Because we have a problem in the energy sector, related to the sale of our domestic energy company that deals with gas and oil, which is Russian-owned. Because of that, we are at risk of secondary sanctions, and we already experience discomfort while buying gas at some gas stations, since we can’t pay with credit cards that are VISA, Mastercard, etc.

Background: It was recently reported that negotiations are underway between the Russian company Gazprom and the Hungarian national company MOL. The Russian side is considering selling its stake in NIS (Naftna Industrija Srbije), which is a key player in Serbia’s fuel market. The Serbian leadership supports this move, as it would help avoid pressure from Western secondary sanctions. According to the Hungarian company’s statement, MOL will purchase 56.2% of Gazprom’s shares in Serbia’s Naftna Industrija Srbije (NIS), which was sanctioned by the US in October because most of its shares are owned by Russia.

This creates an uncomfortable situation for Serbian tabloids, because now Russia is actually the bad guy, and they cannot really push their usual propaganda. 

So they just stay quiet and do not talk about how Russia treats us in that story. They are quiet when something is not good for their domestic propaganda.

Of course, there are Russian media here, like Sputnik and RT, and they do their propaganda. But I’m not sure how much we even need them, because we already have domestic tabloids that are pro-Russian. They deliberately use Russian sources, translating news from TASS or from other agencies and media like Izvestia. They basically transfer those narratives from Russian media for free.

– Could you please describe the media system in Serbia? Specifically, how much of the media is controlled by one company, the government, or the ruling party, and what percentage of media outlets would you consider independent? 

The media are very, very, very polarised. Most of the media are state-affiliated. For example, you don’t have a single television channel with a national frequency, meaning one that can be seen across the whole country, that is not state-affiliated in some way.

All of them are propagandistic. The only exception is one cable provider that has a few independent channels; we’re talking about TV here, but now that cable operator is being sold. So we don’t know what is going to happen next year. Overall, the media situation in Serbia is very problematic.

When we talk about online media, we do have a few very good investigative portals. We have four portals that do fact-checking. There is also a lot of independent and good media in the online space.

But most people here are older, and they still watch TV, and that is a bit of a problem.

When it comes to print media, we have two independent newspapers and six or seven daily papers that are not independent and are, in some way, state-affiliated.

Radio doesn’t really matter, because all they mostly do is play music, but they are also mostly state-affiliated.

And almost all state-affiliated media spread pro-Russian narratives. There are a few state-affiliated outlets that are somewhat more pro-EU than the others, but they will not openly debunk Russian propaganda or anything like that. They will just stay quiet. They won’t take that propaganda and spread it, but they also won’t really talk about it.

And almost everyone else will talk about it. We have a famous quote from one of the editors of the best-selling tabloid in Serbia. He said, “When I put Putin’s head on the front page, I know I’ll sell about 40% more papers that day, so I’m doing it.”

It’s a combination of sentiment, money, and geopolitics — that’s why we have so much Russian propaganda here. It’s a real problem because in the Western Balkans region, almost all of us understand each other. We speak slightly different languages, but everyone can understand one another.

So, Serbia kind of works as a disinformation hub, where Russian propaganda is translated and then spread to Croatia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and maybe even a bit to Macedonia. Their language is a little different, but older people understand Serbian, so it’s easily translated. Kosovo too.

– In various European countries like Czechia, Poland, and Slovakia, there are whole proxy Russian ecosystems. Russia creates many different media outlets, both big and small, that often repost each other’s content. Do you observe a similar network of Russian disinformation media in Serbia that works in a coordinated way?

Russia Today and Sputnik are definitely working in a coordinated way. We also have Pravda. We also had a kind of strange portal called Russia Beyond. It was more focused on pop culture and Eastern European topics. I don’t think it’s active anymore, but that’s basically it.

Read also: Hundreds of Websites Cite Russian Pravda Network, New Research Finds

In our law we actually don’t have state ownership, because the media are not formally or fully owned by the state. For some outlets there are direct links to the state, but not for all of them. Still, when you analyse the propaganda, you can clearly see who is who, and most of them are state-affiliated. That’s basically it. I don’t really see coordinated media groups, except for this.

I think Telegram is a big problem because there are a lot of groups spreading Russian disinformation there. And there’s not much defence against it, because fact-checking portals or media experts don’t really do much on Telegram; they don’t use it much. 

But I think most experts here, and regular people too, aren’t aware of how many people actually get their information from Telegram.

We also have a TV show called Aktuelnosti in Serbia. It’s with national coverage, so it can be seen all across the country. It’s basically two or three hours of Russian propaganda taken straight from Telegram channels. 

You have three or four people in the studio talking about it, with big maps of Ukraine, analysing every village, whether it’s taken and by whom, and their only source is Telegram.

I can’t say if those things are mostly true or mostly false, but you can clearly see that the narrative is strongly pro-Russian. The guests are also very problematic — some of them are ex-war criminals from the Balkan Wars, convicted criminals. Some were even prosecuted at The Hague for war crimes.

And after that, they come on this show to talk about Serbian nationalism and, of course, Russia and Ukraine.

Those people are the same ones who don’t believe COVID is real, who think it’s some kind of conspiracy. They’re the same people who are pro-Trump, pro-Putin, and silent about Gaza.

It’s a problem I think is global, especially in Europe. Every country has a certain percentage of these people. In Serbia, that percentage might be higher than in Estonia, but I think most countries face this issue, and that percentage is growing.

– Do you have any data on how many people are currently using Telegram in Serbia?

No, we don’t have that. I would really like to have it, but we don’t. I think it’s mostly ignored by those marketing agencies that usually do this kind of research. Maybe some data exists, but I don’t know about it; I think there isn’t any.

– In some European countries, Russia uses local actors like bloggers who are paid to promote pro-Russian views. Because these individuals are seen as locals, their messages are easier for people to believe. Are there similar cases in Serbia?

I don’t think so. As I said about the media, it’s the same with bloggers. I don’t think anyone really has to pay someone in Serbia to say pro-Russian things, because they already say them. Ok, maybe some people have received money.

But if I were Putin, I would say that would be wasted money, because there are already a lot of people here who want to go to Ukraine and fight on the Russian side. I actually know one guy who wants to do that.

People here are so delusional that even things like this happen. So you don’t have to pay influencers — you already have them, and they’ve been doing it for free for years.

– Do you recall how Ukraine was portrayed in Serbia from the Russian perspective before 2022?

Of course. There have always been pro-Russian narratives. Obviously, there was a huge surge after 2022, but even before that you would see Putin on front pages.

Before the war, there were a lot of articles spreading disinformation, like Russia discovering a vaccine for cancer, or Russia making some major technological breakthrough, or things like that. 

You also had magazines like Russian Doctor, where the whole magazine is about Russian “natural medicine”, herbs, and similar things. Those kinds of publications have been coming out regularly, on a monthly basis, for years.

When you add ‘Russian’ as a kind of prefix to something in Serbia, it is perceived as ultimately good by at least 60% of people, especially when it comes to medicine, health, and that kind of stuff.

Because there is this kind of weird sentiment that everything that is Russian is natural. ‘Mother Russia’ is a common saying here in Serbia. But everything that comes from the West is seen as artificial, some kind of new chemical stuff that is ultimately bad for you. It is drugs, it is LGBT, it is paedophilia, and things like that. Those kinds of narratives exist here.

When you look at Russia, it is associated with tradition, family, and those kinds of natural cures for everything. And when you look at the West, it is all about narratives of wrongdoing.

But you can’t really blame Serbian people, because we experienced NATO aggression. How can you expect someone here to love NATO when, only twenty years ago, they bombed us, and they did it without the approval of the United Nations? It was clear aggression.

– I can imagine how difficult it must be to work as a fact-checker in Serbia today. Could you describe what it is like to work under these media conditions?

It’s a problem because trust in the media here is so low. You publish an article showing that a tabloid lied about something, and people react like, “Wow, what news — everyone knows tabloids lie.”

The situation is so problematic because there are hardcore groups of people who believe tabloids, and it is very hard to change their minds. They have been fed propaganda for fifteen years, they are older, and they don’t really have the capacity to change their views on certain topics.

It’s been fifteen years of propaganda under this ruling party, and before that, in the 1990s, it was the same kind of propaganda. Something changed for a few years in the 2000s, but it was mainly the same thing again.

It’s very hard, and we are working hard to reach the public. There are also fewer people who are really media-literate, and they already know what is a lie and what is not. So between those two groups of people, it’s very hard to push any kind of story and for someone to actually care enough to share it or to talk about this information.

The problem is so big that maybe we need something more than fact-checking portals and just saying that they are lying, because everybody already knows they are lying — but we have to do something more than that.