Russian occupation authorities have constructed a sophisticated propaganda machine on the Zaporizhzhia region’s occupied territories, combining technical censorship, legal intimidation, and a coordinated network of local outlets, federal media giants, social platforms, and government channels to control what residents see, hear, and believe.
The front line cuts through the Zaporizhzhia region in more ways than one. While artillery duels rage across fields and villages, an equally calculated battle unfolds in the information space. Russian forces control about 74.8% of the region’s territory, according to DeepState, but controlling what residents think requires constant, expensive effort.
Zaporizhzhia differs from the occupied Kherson region, where authorities established what Insight News Media documented as a sealed information environment. Here, the regional capital remains under Ukrainian control, and the front line cuts directly through the region itself. This geographic reality creates a more immediate information competition, forcing Moscow to build something more aggressive than simple propaganda: a multi-layered ecosystem where specialized occupation outlets, trusted federal brands, social networks, and official government channels work in coordinated lockstep.
Alona Hryshko, an analyst at NGO Internews-Ukraine, has studied how this system operates. During an online training organized by the EU Representation in Ukraine, according to Internews Ukraine, she identified six core methods Russian propaganda employed in the Zaporizhzhia region: fabricating fake stories, manipulating information, changing language and discourse, distorting facts, inverting reality, and weaponizing social media platforms like Telegram.
Invading Russian forces took advantage of what Hryshko calls a media vacuum. When the occupation began in February 2022, many print publications ceased operations. Online media weakened as journalists fled or went underground. Russian authorities moved systematically into this void, displacing pro-Ukrainian publications, blocking Ukrainian media broadcasting, and giving propaganda outlets full access to the regional media market.
The scale of investment reveals Moscow’s priorities. Russia allocated 146.3 billion rubles, approximately $1.77 billion, for state media and propaganda in its 2026 federal budget, a 28 percent increase from pre-war 2021 levels, United24 reports. Komsomolskaya Pravda, which operates in the occupied Zaporizhzhia region, received 438.8 million rubles in specific allocations.
The propaganda system operates through four distinct but interconnected tiers, each serving specific functions while reinforcing the others. Understanding this architecture reveals not just what messages residents receive, but how the system creates an illusion of independent confirmation. The structure works from ground level upward, with local outlets establishing presence, federal brands providing credibility, social media creating the appearance of grassroots consensus, and government sources supplying the ultimate authority that all other tiers amplify.
At the foundation sit specialized outlets created specifically for occupation purposes. These platforms position themselves as regional news sources but function as propaganda infrastructure, seamlessly blending military reports with coverage of schools, municipal services, and cultural events. The genius of this tier lies in its normalizing effect. When the same outlet reporting supposed Russian military victories also covers school appointments and utility services, occupation begins to feel like ordinary governance rather than foreign military control.
Bloknot-Zaporozhie leads this category, founded by LLC Bloknot Donetsk under director Alexey Vasilyevich Plotnikov, with Maria Aleksandrovna Rumyantseva as acting editor. The outlet exemplifies how local platforms operate across multiple narrative streams simultaneously. On a single day in February 2026, the site published a military briefing stating, “The ‘Dnieper’ troop grouping continues its offensive in the direction of Zaporizhzhia; Magdalinovka, Primorske, and Zapasne have been liberated,” alongside a story with the headline, “A fragment was flying toward her when she was doing homework: details of artillery shelling of a house in Vasilievka revealed.”
The juxtaposition is deliberate. Military advances framed as “liberation” sit beside stories of Ukrainian “aggression” targeting children, creating a narrative where Russian forces rescue territory while Ukrainian forces terrorize civilians. The consistent use of “liberated” rather than “occupied” or “captured” represents systematic language manipulation, shaping perception at the most basic linguistic level. The emotional emphasis on a child doing homework when shelling occurred mirrors a pattern that cascades from the top of the propaganda pyramid, as we will see.
Another February 2026 article claimed, “Ukrainian Armed Forces shelled the Zaporizhzhia NPP with an American M777 howitzer.” The accusation accomplishes multiple objectives through mirror-image distortion of reality. It portrays Ukraine as recklessly endangering a nuclear facility, emphasizes Western weapons to suggest NATO complicity, and inverts the actual situation where Russian forces occupy the plant and have repeatedly been accused by international observers of militarizing it.
Zonews.ru operates as perhaps the most sophisticated propaganda hub in the region. The site blends military updates with administrative announcements, cultural programming, and practical information that residents need for daily life. This comprehensive approach ensures that people seeking utility bill payment deadlines or school schedules encounter pro-Russian framing as the unavoidable context for practical information.
The site published a December 2025 article marking Day of Heroes of the Fatherland that stated, “Day of Heroes of the Fatherland is an important day when we honor heroes who showed courage and bravery in defense of their Motherland, and we remember the heroic deeds of those who gave their lives for our future. We are united by respect and the example of today’s heroes. This gives strength on the path to Victory.”
The capitalization of “Victory” treats ongoing war as an inevitable triumph. The conflation of historical heroes with current participants in what Russia calls its “special military operation” represents a systematic distortion of history to legitimize present aggression.
Zonews.ru also amplifies military messaging with reports like one from February 2026 stating, “In two weeks of February, despite harsh winter conditions, formations and military units of the united troop grouping liberated 12 settlements. More than 200 square kilometers of territory came under our control.”
The same article added that “The Ukrainian army, suffering significant losses that it cannot replenish, is placing its main bet on increasing the number of strike drones.” This represents distortion and fabrication, presenting Ukrainian forces as desperate and collapsing regardless of actual battlefield dynamics.
Berdyansk-gazeta.ru focuses heavily on municipal normalization, covering administrative functions with bureaucratic precision designed to naturalize Russian governance. A February 2026 announcement stated, “From February, Yulia Sergeevna Khoroshilova has been appointed as head of State Budgetary Institution General Education Organization of Zaporizhzhia region ‘Secondary School No. 10’ of Berdyansk city.” The article noted that “Yulia Sergeevna knows school life from the inside well and understands the principles of implementing innovations in education.” The mundane language makes occupation administration appear as routine governance, making Russian control feel permanent through sheer bureaucratic normalcy.
Completing this tier are novosti-zp.ru, vzaporozhye.ru, za-media.ru, news-berdyansk.ru, and za-inform.ru. Each presents regional angles on centrally coordinated messaging. When the same narrative about Russian military success, Ukrainian aggression, or administrative normalization appears across seven apparently independent local sources, residents encounter what feels like regional consensus rather than coordinated propaganda.
The second tier wraps occupation narratives in the credibility of established Russian federal media brands. When residents encounter Komsomolskaya Pravda or Pravda network outlets reporting on regional events, they see not occupation propaganda but nationally recognized media with decades of history and presumed editorial standards. This tier transforms local claims into nationally validated facts.
The Pravda network, operated by the Russian company TigerWeb, has run hundreds of automated news aggregators since 2014, targeting over 83 countries by translating and reposting Russian state content. In the Zaporizhzhia region, this network operates through melitopol-news.ru and zp-news.ru, systematically republishing content from central Russian sources while presenting it as regional coverage.
The automated systems ensure that narratives originating in Moscow appear to emerge from multiple regional sources. A typical republished article showed Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov stating, “This is a bacchanal, this man, in this case Rutte, is abusing and grossly violating his functional duties, because we know that not all NATO members take such a rabid position. Not everyone wants to continue spending money on arming Ukraine.”
Lavrov’s attack on NATO Secretary General Rutte appears in Zaporizhzhia through what looks like regional reporting but actually represents direct republishing from central Russian state media, creating the impression that regional outlets independently confirm Moscow’s narrative about Western divisions and declining support for Ukraine.
Komsomolskaya Pravda, one of Russia’s largest tabloids, maintains a VKontakte presence specifically for Zaporizhzhia audiences. The outlet received 438.8 million rubles in 2026 federal budget allocations, part of the massive investment Moscow directs toward propaganda infrastructure. When Komsomolskaya Pravda reports on regional events, occupation narratives receive validation from a brand that many residents have encountered since childhood.
The outlet’s February 2026 coverage of Soviet-Afghan War commemorations demonstrates how federal brands operate. The report stated, “Employees of the investigative department of Russia’s Investigative Committee for the Zaporizhzhia region honored the feat of compatriots at the monument to internationalist soldiers.”
The language accomplishes multiple objectives simultaneously. It frames Soviet veterans, who included Ukrainians, Georgians, Armenians, Uzbeks, and other Soviet nationalities, as specifically Russian “compatriots.” It presents “Russia’s Investigative Committee for the Zaporizhzhia region” as an established fact, normalizing Russian state structures in occupied territory. And it does all this through a nationally recognized media brand rather than an obvious occupation outlet, lending the claims credibility they would not otherwise possess.
Melitopol-mv.ru rounds out this tier’s presence, providing another channel through which federal messaging reaches regional audiences while appearing as local coverage.
The third tier weaponizes social media, primarily through Telegram channels that create the illusion of grassroots discussion and community consensus. These platforms present themselves as spaces where residents share information and opinions organically. In practice, they function as rapid distribution networks for content produced by the first and second tiers, amplifying centrally coordinated messages while making them appear to emerge from popular sentiment.
The bloknot_zo channel extends Bloknot’s reach into mobile messaging, where residents increasingly consume news. Riamelitopol and zpvestnik present themselves as regional news channels but systematically amplify content from lower tiers while adding the velocity and perceived authenticity of social media.
Riamelitopol demonstrates how this tier coordinates with others on specific narrative campaigns. An April 2025 post about Victory Day preparations stated, “Work is underway in the villages of Kutuzovka, Zamozhnoye, Novonikolaevka, Kurushany, and Zaporizhzhia to honor the memory of heroes and prepare memorial sites for the holiday.”
The message coordinates with broader propaganda system efforts around major Russian holidays, ensuring that cultural events celebrating Russian identity receive simultaneous coverage across all platforms.
Another post connected regional programming to federal initiatives: “In the Zaporizhzhia region, the ‘Zaporizhzhia Heroes’ program continues for participants and veterans of the Special Military Operation, similar to the presidential ‘Time of Heroes’ program.”
By explicitly linking regional efforts to Putin’s federal program, the channel creates vertical integration of the heroization narrative, making occupation activities appear as local implementation of national policy rather than imposed propaganda.
The channel also amplified education messaging, announcing, “The exact dates of anti-terrorist drills in schools have been announced. The Ministry of Education reported that all-Russian anti-terrorist drills will take place in schools on April 29-30.”
The casual presentation of Russian federal education ministry authority over occupied schools normalizes Moscow’s curriculum control while framing it as routine safety measures rather than systematic re-education.
When the same military claim appears on Bloknot-Zaporozhie, gets amplified by zonews.ru, receives federal validation through Komsomolskaya Pravda, and then circulates through three Telegram channels presented as independent community sources, residents encounter powerful psychological reinforcement. The apparent diversity of confirmation is an illusion created by organizational structure. What looks like multiple independent sources reaching similar conclusions is actually a single coordinated system speaking through different channels, each designed to reach different audiences and create the impression of organic consensus.
At the pyramid’s apex sits the occupation administration itself, providing the ultimate source from which all other tiers draw authority. This is where narratives originate before cascading down through the other three tiers. When lower-tier outlets quote occupation officials or reference government decisions, they all draw from this single source, creating an illusion of independent confirmation when they are actually amplifying centrally produced messaging.
The official website zo.gov.ru declares on every page that the entire Zaporizhzhia region, including territories under Ukrainian control, constitutes Russian Federation territory. This assertion, made without legal foundation or international recognition, appears as an established fact rather than a contested claim simply through constant repetition across official channels.
Yevgeny Balitsky, the Russian-appointed occupation head, operates a personal Telegram channel where he produces the master narratives that all other tiers then amplify. Balitsky has openly admitted to expelling Ukrainian families who refused to support occupation and making what he called extremely harsh decisions against civilians, yet his channel presents him as a concerned regional leader focused on education, development, and protecting residents.
An August 2025 post on his channel exemplifies how he creates emotional content that cascades through lower tiers: “The President pays enormous attention to our region. We are building schools, doing renovations, and our children will be proud of the Zaporizhzhia region. Every day of our lives we dedicate to the future of our children. We will be equal among equals, worthy among the worthy. This is how it should be. We stood for this and will continue to stand. I wish us victory, honest labor for the good of our Motherland, and in the name of our children.”
The language represents pure emotional manipulation through what Hryshko identifies as fabrication and distortion. Balitsky frames Russian occupation as “our Motherland” while emphasizing children’s education and future. The phrase “every day of our lives we dedicate to the future of our children” establishes children as the emotional center of occupation legitimacy. This narrative then appears in modified form across all lower tiers: zonews.ru covers school construction, berdyansk-gazeta.ru reports on education appointments, riamelitopol announces education ministry directives, all reinforcing the same message that Russian administration serves children’s interests.
Another August 2025 post demonstrates how Balitsky creates inversion narratives that lower tiers amplify: “Seven people were injured as a result of shelling of the Dneprorudnensky iron ore plant by armed formations of Ukraine. At the moment of the attack, a concert event was taking place in the assembly hall of the plant, in which children and creative groups were participating. Fortunately, there were no casualties among children, however, seven local residents received injuries of varying severity.”
The framing accomplishes multiple propaganda objectives. It uses “armed formations of Ukraine” rather than “Ukrainian Armed Forces,” dehumanizing language designed to delegitimize Ukraine’s military. It emphasizes children’s presence at the attacked location to maximize emotional impact. It portrays Ukrainian forces as deliberately targeting civilians at cultural events. Within hours of this post, the narrative appeared across lower tiers: bloknot-zaporozhie.ru published stories about children endangered by Ukrainian strikes, zonews.ru amplified the civilian casualty angle, and Telegram channels spread the message to mobile audiences. What appears to residents as multiple independent sources confirming Ukrainian aggression is actually coordinated amplification of a single official narrative.
A September 2024 post marking the start of the school year shows how Balitsky establishes themes that resonate through the entire system: “Before our children, all roads are open, all opportunities for obtaining quality education, for development and growth, and every day of education will be filled with new discoveries, achievements, and victories… I thank teachers for their loyalty to the profession, for their desire to sow what is good, reasonable, and eternal.”
This message serves as the master narrative for child re-education. Within weeks, zonews.ru covered Russian teachers relocating to occupied territory, berdyansk-gazeta.ru reported on school administrative appointments, riamelitopol announced all-Russian education ministry initiatives, and Komsomolskaya Pravda provided federal validation through coverage of educational achievements under occupation. Each tier adds its voice, creating the impression that multiple independent observers all confirm that Russian education brings opportunity and quality.
Official channels like zapobl, glava_brd, and berdyanskru complete this tier, providing additional official voices that lower tiers can quote. Viktor Yemelyanienko, Chairman of the Legislative Assembly, provided zonews.ru with a quote that appeared across multiple outlets within hours: “On behalf of all Zaporizhzhia residents, I want to thank the warriors who are heroically liberating the territory of the Zaporizhzhia region. There is much work ahead to restore the liberated settlements and return residents to peaceful life. Despite all efforts of the Ukrainian junta, we will restore Zaporizhzhia as part of the Russian Federation, and we will do this in the near future.”
The statement uses “Ukrainian junta” to delegitimize Ukraine’s elected government, frames Russian military advances as “liberation” and “restoration,” and presents permanent Russian control as inevitable fact. When this quote appears on zonews.ru, gets picked up by bloknot-zaporozhie.ru, circulates through Telegram channels, and receives validation through federal media outlets, residents encounter what feels like broad consensus. They may not realize that all these apparently independent confirmations trace back to a single official source at the top of a carefully constructed propaganda pyramid.
This four-tier system operates with remarkable coordination. Official government statements cascade through local media that give them regional context, get weaponized on social media that creates the appearance of grassroots support, and receive validation from federal media brands that lend national credibility. The result is an echo chamber that appears as organic consensus rather than coordinated manipulation. Residents encounter the same narratives about Russian military success, Ukrainian aggression, administrative normalization, and cultural legitimacy from what seem like multiple independent sources, unaware that they are hearing a single voice speaking through a carefully architected system of amplification.
Before the propaganda ecosystem can function effectively, Russian authorities must prevent residents from accessing competing information. The technical blockade operates on multiple fronts.
In five cities across occupied territory, Melitopol, Berdyansk, Bilmak, Dniprorudne, and Tokmak, the invading Russian forces seized control of multichannel television frequencies that previously belonged to Zeonbud, a Ukrainian digital television operator. Through these seized frequencies, Russian authorities broadcast eight channels: Pervy Kanal, Rossiya 1, Rossiya 24, Rossiya K, NTV, Pyaty Kanal, Match, and Karusel, plus three radio programs.
Internet control proves more complex. The Russians employ massive VPN blocking campaigns. In the Luhansk region, Russian authorities blocked fifty VPN services in a single week, according to RBC-Ukraine. Similar operations unfold across the occupied Zaporizhzhia region. Enforcement includes phone inspections, with invaders checking devices belonging to adults and schoolchildren, searching for VPN applications or evidence of accessing Ukrainian websites.
Legal intimidation reinforces technical barriers. In April 2025, occupation courts sentenced a Ukrainian woman to fourteen years in a penal colony after she transferred funds to support the Armed Forces of Ukraine, where her son serves. The charge was treason.
Svitlana Zalizetska, a Ukrainian journalist from Melitopol who has written about life under Russian occupation for over two years, described how occupiers conduct surveillance on all journalists in an interview with the EU External Action Service. Many quit their profession entirely, even after fleeing to Ukrainian-controlled territory, because threats follow them.
Print media forms another crucial layer. When the occupation began, Russian forces targeted existing newspapers directly. Melitopolski Vidomosti, a local holding that operated a printing house in Melitopol, saw its head and journalists kidnapped by the Russian military, according to the Institute of Mass Information. Those who survived were fired. The holding ceased operations.
Russian authorities then replicated established Ukrainian brands. Novyi Den, a district newspaper in Melitopol with a century of history, ceased publication in March 2022. Occupiers copied its brand, logo, colors, design, and layout, the National Union of Journalists of Ukraine reports. They employed the same tactic with Zaporizka Pravda, the 107-year-old regional newspaper.
New occupation newspapers joined these zombie publications. Zaporozhsky Vestnik, a weekly newspaper, is printed in Simferopol, Crimea, at JSC Tavrida Publishing House. It has a circulation of 200,000 copies, distributed across occupied territories since at least mid-2022, the Institute of Mass Information writes. Articles carry no author bylines. No editor-in-chief is listed.
Komsomolskaya Pravda, the federal propaganda newspaper that received 438.8 million rubles in 2026 budget allocations, circulates alongside Tavricheskiy Vestnik, another occupation publication announced by Melitopol authorities in July 2022.
The coordinated system produces specific narratives that appear across all four tiers simultaneously, each outlet adding its voice to create the impression of independent confirmation.
The first narrative frames Russian military success as inevitable while portraying Ukrainian forces as failing and desperate. Military briefings saturate local outlets with claims of territorial gains, consistently using the word “liberated” rather than “occupied” or “captured.” Reports emphasize square kilometers of territory supposedly coming under Russian control while describing Ukrainian forces as suffering irreplaceable losses and resorting to desperate measures. This language manipulation shapes perception before residents even consider the claims’ accuracy.
The second narrative inverts aggressor and victim, portraying Ukraine as a terrorist and Russia as a defender. When Ukrainian forces conduct military operations against occupation positions, Russian media systematically report them as deliberate attacks on civilians. Stories emphasize children endangered by strikes, residents injured while attending cultural events, and civilian infrastructure damaged. The repetition from multiple apparent sources creates the impression that Ukrainian forces deliberately target non-combatants, inverting the reality of Russian military occupation and the presence of military installations in civilian areas.
The third narrative focuses on normalization and integration, presenting life under occupation as returning to normal with Russian institutions functioning effectively. Administrative coverage dominates this messaging. Outlets report school appointments, utility service announcements, currency exchange rates, and municipal functions with bureaucratic precision. Residents seeking practical information about utility payments or school schedules encounter pro-Russian framing as an unavoidable context. The mundane language makes occupation appear as ordinary governance rather than foreign military control. Financial incentives like Russian mortgage programs and employment opportunities receive prominent coverage, designed to signal stability and create material stakes in continued Russian administration.
The fourth narrative claims the Zaporizhzhia region has always been culturally and historically Russian, with Russian language and culture now being restored after years of alleged suppression. Soviet commemorations receive coordinated coverage across all tiers, with particular emphasis on Victory Day and anniversaries of Soviet figures like Lenin. Ukrainian children participate in activities honoring these occasions, serving the broader claim that these territories belong to Russian civilizational space. Soviet history gets reframed as specifically Russian heritage, disconnecting it from the broader multinational Soviet context that included Ukrainians, Georgians, and other peoples.
The fifth narrative attacks Ukrainian government legitimacy, claiming President Zelenskyy’s government is corrupt, illegitimate, and controlled by the West. The Pravda network’s automated republishing systems ensure that anti-Ukrainian government narratives from Russian state media reach Zaporizhzhia audiences through apparently regional sources. Official statements consistently use delegitimizing language, referring to the “Ukrainian junta” and “armed formations of Ukraine” rather than Ukraine’s elected government or Armed Forces. Ukrainian policy decisions get framed as complaints or failures rather than legitimate governance, with headlines and framing subtly undermining Ukrainian leadership’s credibility through linguistic choices alone.
The sixth narrative emphasizes Western betrayal and failure, suggesting the West is abandoning Ukraine, Western weapons prove ineffective, and NATO promises are empty. Russian officials’ statements about divisions within the alliance and declining Western support appear in regional outlets, creating the impression that even local observers confirm international backing is crumbling. Predictions about peace negotiations consistently frame Ukrainian territorial concessions as inevitable, whether through claims that Ukraine will surrender regions voluntarily or that Russia might generously accept a ceasefire along current lines.
These six narratives rarely operate in isolation. A single day’s propaganda output combines military victory claims, accusations of Ukrainian terrorism, normalization content about school appointments or utility services, cultural events celebrating Russian identity, criticism of Ukrainian leadership, and Western betrayal themes. When residents encounter variations of the same narrative on Bloknot-Zaporozhie, then zonews.ru, then through Telegram channels like riamelitopol, and then see it validated by Komsomolskaya Pravda’s federal brand, the accumulated weight becomes difficult to resist. The apparent diversity of sources confirming identical claims creates psychological reinforcement that single-source propaganda cannot achieve.
The systematic targeting of children represents the most disturbing element. Russian authorities have constructed a re-education infrastructure involving schools, youth organizations, commemorative events, and direct military propaganda.
On April 2, 2025, occupation authorities appointed Alexander Mikhailovich Kalyagin as Minister of Education and Science for the occupied Zaporizhzhia region. Kalyagin previously held a high position in the Russian Federation’s Ministry of Education, signaling Moscow’s direct control over what Ukrainian children learn.
Russian teachers from distant regions receive incentives to relocate. Oksana Vasilyevna Bukholtseva, a physics teacher from Severobaikalsk in Buryatia, moved to occupied Tokmak in November 2023 and became director of local school number five. Vzaporozhye.ru profiled her, quoting her explanation: “When the so-called special military operation began, my first thought was that our guys are there, our students. Then I learned that in Donetsk they mobilized all male teachers fit for military service. Since physics teachers are mostly men, I went to replace them.”
The casual acknowledgment that occupation authorities mobilized male teachers to serve as cannon fodder reveals the cost of Moscow’s education colonization.
The content taught centers on military glorification. Schools hold events honoring participants in the so-called “special military operation.” Youth organizations like Yunarmiya and Movement of the First recruit children for military-patriotic activities. Za-inform.ru covered a meeting where Balitsky presided over the Movement of the First regional council. The organization conducts Zarnitsa 2, military-tactical games where children simulate combat operations.
The propaganda begins in preschool. Zonews.ru reported on events at kindergarten Lisichka, where staff told young children about heroes of the Great Victory, conflating Soviet World War Two veterans with current Russian soldiers.
In March 2025, Children’s Rights Commissioner for the President of the Russian Federation Maria Lvova-Belova visited occupied districts. The International Criminal Court indicted her for war crimes alongside Putin for the forced deportation of Ukrainian children. Her visit and coverage on occupation administration websites demonstrate that child re-education policy operates under direct Kremlin supervision.
The systematic effort to erase Ukrainian national identity in children through forced cultural replacement, compulsory participation in Russian state activities, and indoctrination in Russian imperial ideology fits patterns that international legal experts have identified as cultural erasure in occupied territories.
Beyond sustained narratives, Russian propaganda employs targeted information-psychological special operations designed for specific short-term effects.
One recurring theme suggests Ukraine plans to abandon the Zaporizhzhia region in peace negotiations. This psychological warfare reached its most direct form when Russian forces dropped leaflets on Ukrainian positions containing fabricated claims about territorial surrender under Trump-mediated talks. Bloknot-zaporozhie.ru amplified this, ensuring even soldiers who did not see physical leaflets would hear about their message.
Another operation category focuses on sabotaging Ukrainian mobilization. Bloknot-zaporozhie.ru regularly publishes stories about men fleeing territorial recruitment centers, designed to spread panic and encourage draft evasion.
Russian propaganda also manufactures scandals targeting Ukrainian leadership. An April 2025 operation focused on Zaporizhzhia’s mayor with accusations about expensive shoes, aiming to provoke public anger and create internal divisions.
In May 2025, Russian media reported the detention in the city of a man in Nazi uniform holding a grenade. The incident fit perfectly into Russia’s narrative about Ukrainian Nazism, timing conveniently before the May 9 Victory Day commemorations. The suspect circumstances and strategic timing suggested a staged provocation designed for propaganda amplification.
Despite sophistication and resources, evidence suggests this ecosystem operates from weakness rather than strength. The hundreds of millions of rubles flowing into the system annually, the need for four distinct tiers, and the aggressive operations against competing information all reveal an artificial reality that cannot sustain itself without constant expensive reinforcement.
The very existence of the blockade demonstrates the problem. If Russian narratives were compelling on merit, why block alternatives with such aggressive technical and legal measures? The massive VPN campaigns, phone inspections targeting even schoolchildren, and prosecutions of people who donated to Ukrainian forces reveal fear that residents will choose differently if given genuine choice.
Staffing presents another weakness. Recruiting teachers from distant Russian regions demonstrates that occupation authorities cannot find sufficient local collaborators. The admission that male teachers in Donetsk were mobilized and sent to fight reveals the human cost, draining exactly the personnel needed for effective administration.
The Institute of Mass Information has tracked systematic problems in occupation media operations. Quality remains low despite investment. The content is repetitive and formulaic. The anonymity of articles in newspapers like Zaporozhsky Vestnik, where no authors or editors are listed, suggests difficulty finding journalists willing to attach names to propaganda work.
Most fundamentally, the propaganda fails because it asks residents to deny lived experience. When Russian media report that life improved under occupation, residents know their conditions before the invasion and now. When propaganda claims Ukrainian forces deliberately target civilians, residents observe where military installations are located. When outlets celebrate Russian culture being restored, Ukrainian residents remember that Russian language and culture faced no suppression before occupation.
The sophistication of the propaganda machine testifies to its necessity rather than success. In territories where residents welcomed occupation, such infrastructure would be unnecessary. The four-tier system, the technical blockade, the legal intimidation, and the massive spending all exist because hearts and minds were not won but must be battered into submission daily.
The information war continues because Russian authorities understand they have not won it. Unlike the sealed environment in the Kherson region, Zaporizhzhia’s occupied territories face constant competition from Ukrainian media across the front line. Every new propaganda outlet launched, every frequency seized, every VPN blocked, and every journalist intimidated represents another admission that occupation cannot sustain itself through genuine support but requires an expensive apparatus of coercion and manipulation.
The hundreds of millions of rubles flowing annually into this system measure not Russian strength but Russian weakness. They quantify the cost of maintaining an alternative reality that residents refuse to accept without constant reinforcement. That cost will continue rising as long as the truth remains just a phone call or illegal VPN connection away.
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