A significant wave of Russian disinformation in Poland erupted within hours of the September drone incursion into Polish airspace, according to a new report from Google’s Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG).
The campaign, which spread rapidly across social media and fake online news outlets, aimed to sow division within Europe, undermine NATO’s credibility, and erode public support for Ukraine.
Google analysts revealed that the Kremlin’s digital propaganda apparatus responded with “unprecedented speed and coordination,” suggesting that Moscow’s information warfare ecosystem has become increasingly agile in exploiting geopolitical crises, the report said.
The Russian drone incursion into Poland in September triggered immediate speculation across social media. Within hours, pro-Russia networks began circulating claims that the drones had been launched by Ukraine or NATO, attempting to shift blame away from Moscow.
GTIG’s analysis concluded that while the speed of the propaganda response does not prove a direct connection between the drone operation and the disinformation campaign, it does confirm the tight synchronization between Russia’s military and influence operations.
“Influence actors throughout the pro-Russia ecosystem have honed their activity to be responsive to major geopolitical developments,” the Google report notes.
The messaging patterns observed closely followed Russia’s established playbook—portraying itself as a victim of Western aggression while depicting NATO and its allies as reckless warmongers.
The GTIG report identifies a sophisticated network of actors and channels driving Russian disinformation in Poland, many of which have been active since Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Among the most prominent are
Each network has a specific function. Doppelgänger creates inauthentic media outlets in Polish, German, and other European languages, replicating the design of well-known news sites to spread manipulated stories. Portal Kombat, on the other hand, is a distribution engine that connects hundreds of domains to increase visibility and engagement.
NDP, meanwhile, acts as a trusted local source, masquerading as an independent political journal while routinely publishing anti-NATO and anti-Ukrainian narratives.
The core objective of this disinformation wave, according to Google, was to undermine public trust in official Polish institutions and fracture European unity over support for Ukraine.
The content promoted several false or misleading narratives:
This pattern mirrors the Kremlin’s long-standing “fog of war” strategy—blending real events with fabricated details to confuse audiences and weaken institutional credibility.
Google’s researchers stress that the aim is not simply to persuade but to flood the information space with enough conflicting narratives that citizens begin doubting all sources, including verified ones.
The Google Threat Intelligence Group underscores that Poland has become one of the primary targets of Russia’s hybrid operations due to its strategic role as a NATO frontline state and key supporter of Ukraine.
Moscow’s tactics in Poland have evolved since 2022, shifting from crude fake news stories to highly localized psychological operations, leveraging cultural and linguistic familiarity to increase authenticity.
This is part of what analysts call the “refinement phase” of Russia’s influence strategy—less reliant on centralized propaganda channels and more dependent on distributed, semi-autonomous networks of influencers, bots, and pseudo-journalistic outlets.
The report warns that NATO countries, particularly those bordering Russia or Belarus, will remain “high-priority targets” for Russian-aligned influence activity for the foreseeable future.
The events in Poland are part of a wider European trend. Similar Russian information campaigns have been documented in Germany, France, and the Baltics, often using the same Doppelgänger infrastructure.
In Germany, copycat websites imitating Die Welt and Spiegel were used to publish pro-Kremlin talking points. In France, fake versions of Le Point and Le Monde appeared during the 2024 elections.
According to Google’s research, this pattern shows “a scalable and adaptable model of disinformation,” capable of being deployed quickly in response to any political crisis, military escalation, or domestic unrest.
Google’s Threat Analysis Group and Mandiant division have stepped up efforts to identify and dismantle disinformation networks linked to the Kremlin. The company now collaborates closely with European cybersecurity agencies and the EU’s Digital Services Act enforcement team to share intelligence on coordinated inauthentic behavior.
Google has also expanded its fact-checking partnerships across Central and Eastern Europe, promoting media literacy programs and AI-powered content verification tools.
However, the tech giant acknowledges that AI-generated deepfakes and new content amplification techniques are making detection increasingly complex.
Experts say combating disinformation is not solely a technological challenge but also a societal one. Public awareness, critical thinking, and transparent communication from institutions remain essential defenses.
European initiatives such as the European Democracy Shield and the upcoming Centre for Democratic Resilience are expected to reinforce these efforts by integrating government, civil society, and private-sector expertise.
In Poland, the government has pledged to increase funding for independent media monitoring, while educators push for stronger digital literacy programs in schools.
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