Russia’s war in Ukraine increasingly runs on a blunt exchange: money up front, myth on television. Recruiters promise a quick payout, a “short mission”, and a heroic narrative; state media packages it into a single storyline where doubts are treason and losses are either invisible or sanctified.
And then, in many Russian invading units, the contract soldiers are used as assault infantry (‘cannon fodder’) in Ukraine. And this role under Ukrainian drone strikes ensures a short life expectancy.
A recently (mid-January 2026) captured Russian soldier quoted in Ukrainian reporting (a video published by the 122nd brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces) describes the mechanics in plain terms: large signing bonuses, staged propaganda scenes, and even “markings” for men with serious illnesses who are still pushed into assault roles.
He explains how Kremlin propaganda and large payments are driving Russian men to war in Ukraine. Russian authorities immediately pay 2.5 million rubles to those who sign a contract, which is approximately $25,000, according to a Russian prisoner captured by the 110th Brigade of the Ukrainian Forces in the Donetsk region.
Considering that up to 40,000 men sign contracts with the Russian army every month, according to sources listed below, it turns out that the Kremlin spends $1 billion monthly only on one-time payments to contract soldiers like the one captured by the Ukrainian forces in mid-January.
That testimony of the Russian PoW fits a broader pattern visible in open-source numbers: Russia recruits tens of thousands of people monthly and loses comparable numbers monthly, while keeping its propaganda machine well-funded.
Below is what recent public sources can actually support, and where the fog starts.
Deputy Security Council chair Dmitry Medvedev said Russia recruited about 417,000 contract soldiers in 2025, plus more than 36,000 who joined volunteer formations.
If you spread 417,000 across 12 months, that is about 34,750 contract soldiers per month.
Medvedev also claimed that roughly 450,000 people signed contracts in 2024 (plus 40,000 so-called volunteers). This suggests that, according to his perspective, there would be approximately 37,500 contract soldiers per month in 2024.
Ukraine’s military leadership has publicly described Russia’s force growth at 8,000 to 9,000 contract soldiers per month (a “net growth” framing rather than total sign-ups, depending on context).
Separately, reporting that cites U.S. and Western intelligence has often put Russian enlistment around 25,000 to 30,000 per month in earlier periods of the war.
The realistic open-source range today is roughly 25,000 to 40,000 new contract soldiers per month, depending on the month, the method, and whether a source is counting “net growth” or gross inflow.
No side publishes verifiable, real-time totals, so estimates diverge. Still, several recent public trackers converge on “tens of thousands monthly.”.
Ukrainian Defence-linked reporting has cited an average of about 1,130 Russian casualties per day in December 2025, up from about 1,030 per day in November (source). That implies roughly:
Other UK Defence Intelligence summaries estimated Russian 2025 casualties at over 300,000 killed and wounded by mid-October 2025, showing the scale of attrition across the year, not just in winter.
Separately, the BBC Russian and Mediazona verified at least 152,142 Russian military deaths by late November 2025, based on named open-source evidence. This is a lower bound, not a full count, but it anchors the discussion in confirmed fatalities.
The cautious takeaway: monthly Russian casualties (killed + wounded) have plausibly sat in the ~30,000 to 40,000 per month band in late 2025, sometimes higher during heavy offensives, meaning recruitment can “keep up” on paper while still grinding down units in practice.
Here, the data is clearer because it shows up in budget lines and reports on state allocations.
Russia’s draft budget for 2025 allocated 137.2 billion rubles for “state propaganda” (often reported under “media” spending), roughly $1.4 billion at the rates used by those reports.
For 2026, reporting on Russian budget planning indicated 106.4 billion rubles planned for state TV channels, described as a sharp increase compared with 2025 TV funding in that coverage.
An analysis by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) has shown that in 2026, the Kremlin plans to reduce spending on defence and social payments to the military while sharply increasing funding for state propaganda.
ISW‘s analysis of the draft Russian federal budget for 2026–2028, submitted by the government to the State Duma in September, shows that in 2026 Russia plans to allocate around 17 trillion rubles (US$183 billion) to the defence sector.
In 2026 Russia plans to reduce “military” spending by around 200 billion roubles (US$2.4 billion) compared with 2025. Despite this, the Kremlin is set to significantly increase funding for state television propaganda. In 2026 the Russian government plans to spend 106.4 billion roubles (US$1.28 billion) on state TV channels, one and a half times more than in 2025 (US$69.1).
While the overall share of expenditure in the budget will slightly decrease (from 41% in 2025 to 38% in 2026), a closer look at individual items reveals the Kremlin’s true priorities. Russia’s defence will be allocated 12.9 trillion roubles (US$155 billion) in 2026, compared to 13.5 trillion in 2025.
You can argue about exchange rates and what sits “off-budget” (regional spending, online influence operations, security-service information activity), but the direction is stable: Russia is spending well over a billion dollars per year on state media and propaganda infrastructure in federal planning alone.
The recruitment pitch is not only patriotic, it’s transactional. A big upfront payment can erase debt, fund a car, and cover rent for a family that has never had savings. When a captured soldier says, “They pay 2.5 million rubles immediately,” the number matters less than the psychology: the state creates a rush of relief that temporarily defeats fear.
Propaganda then does the quieter work: it normalises the idea that dying quickly is either unlikely, noble, or somehow profitable for the family. And when reality leaks through, the machine has tools, staged “flag” videos, recycled hero stories, and selective grief to drown it out.
That’s why the math is so bleak: if monthly recruitment is 25,000–40,000 and monthly casualties are in the same order, the system can run without another mass mobilisation, at least for a while, even if individual recruits “do not live long”.
This model is not limitless. Signing bonuses rise, then regions cut them, and other regions raise them again. Medvedev’s own numbers suggest recruitment dipped from 2024 to 2025.
Meanwhile, casualties remain stubbornly high in periods of intensified Russian assaults across the front lines, and verified Russian losses keep climbing even when the totalitarian regime tries to blur them.
The Kremlin propaganda budget helps delay the political cost, not remove it. You can buy silence for a time; you can’t buy back demographic reality. When combined with the impact of the sanctions and economic issues, Russia is on the verge of an implosion and a catastrophe, both of which are considered inevitable.
Picture: A screenshot from a recent video posted by the 110th brigade of the Ukrainian armed forces showing a convertible made from a Russian Ural truck, full of invading soldiers, which the Russian army used to assault Ukrainian positions, with a commentary claiming that “Ukrainians destroyed the Russian ground forces, and now unprofessional and poorly trained soldiers are sent to fight.” This video shows later on how all those assault soldiers were eliminated with FPV drones and artillery strikes.
How many contract soldiers does Russia recruit per month?
Open sources support a broad range, roughly 25,000–40,000 monthly, depending on definitions and the period.
How many Russian casualties occur per month?
Late 2025 estimates citing UK Defence Intelligence-linked reporting imply around 31,000–34,000 casualties per month (killed + wounded).
How much does Russia spend on propaganda?
Public budget-linked reporting puts 2025 “propaganda/media” allocations at about 137.2 billion rubles (often translated as ~$1.4B).
Are signing bonuses really that high?
Bonuses vary by region and period, but multiple reports describe huge one-off payments used to attract recruits, especially in poorer regions.
Why does recruitment keep going despite losses?
Because the system blends financial desperation with constant narrative management and avoids politically risky mass mobilisation as long as inflow roughly matches attrition.
Ivan Subotić is the editor-in-chief at the Serbian portal FakeNews Tracker and collaborates with the…
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