Before the EU imposed sanctions on Euromore in April 2026, the platform’s content had already found a willing audience across the continent, amplified by a network of fringe, far-right, and pro-Kremlin outlets operating in at least five European countries.
The reach of Euromore’s material was not accidental. The same narratives, often the same interviews with the same figures, appeared within days across outlets in France, Spain, Germany, the Czech Republic, and the United Kingdom. What emerged was not a loose collection of like-minded websites independently arriving at similar conclusions, but a recognisable distribution pattern: Euromore produced the content, and a set of ideologically aligned platforms carried it further, each adding local packaging to Kremlin-aligned messaging.
The EU Council’s decision to sanction Euromore on April 21 described it as an “unofficial media relay” within the Kremlin’s information architecture, one that “amplifies, recycles and legitimises Russian narratives and disinformation targeting European audiences”. The sites that carried its content played precisely that amplification role.
The clearest example of Euromore functioning as a cited source comes from France, where at least three platforms republished or directly referenced a Euromore interview with Douglas McGregor, a retired US Army colonel and former senior Pentagon adviser. In the interview, McGregor claimed that the United States had spent eight years building the Ukrainian army “specifically to attack Russia” and that Washington had prevented a peace settlement in 2022.
Observateur Continental, a French-language outlet with a consistently pro-Kremlin editorial line, published the article under the title “How the United States Prepared the Ukrainian Army for War With Russia”, naming Euromore explicitly as the source and reproducing the interview’s claims at length:
Jeune Nation, a French far-right nationalist movement with documented sympathies toward Russia, published the same material under a slightly different headline, again citing Euromore by name and linking directly to the original interview on its platform:
Réseau International, one of France’s largest pro-Russian aggregator sites, and Newsnet.fr carried versions of the same article:
The French case is instructive precisely because of its transparency. These outlets did not attempt to disguise the origin of the content. Euromore was named as the source and treated as a credible authority. For readers unfamiliar with the platform’s background, nothing in the presentation suggested they were reading material produced by a Brussels-based outlet funded by a Russian state influence operation and later sanctioned by both the UK and the EU.
A second Euromore interview, this time with Larry Johnson, a former CIA analyst, followed an identical distribution pattern across Spain and the Czech Republic. In the interview, produced jointly with PolitWera, a pro-Kremlin Telegram channel that has conducted joint broadcasts with Euromore, Johnson claimed that the United States “wanted to destroy Russia” through a network of American biolaboratories in Ukraine, which he alleged were linked to the CIA, the Pentagon, and USAID.
In Spain, Geoestrategia.eu, which presents itself as a publication of the Instituto Español de Geopolítica, embedded the interview’s claims within a broader analytical piece on Ukraine negotiations. The article cited the Euromore interview directly, reproducing Johnson’s assertions about biolaboratories as substantive evidence:
In the Czech Republic, Infokuryr.cz published what amounted to a translated summary of the same interview, naming Euromore and PolitWera as the source in its opening paragraph and presenting Johnson’s claims without any editorial qualification:
The parallel publication across two countries of the same interview, drawn from the same Euromore source, is a small but telling illustration of how the platform’s content functioned. A single piece of content, once produced, required no further coordination to travel. The network of receptive outlets was already in place.
The German case demonstrates the amplification effect most starkly. A single article titled “Threat Liars, War Mongers and Brain-Dead Sluggers”, written by two German authors and published in March 2025, appeared across at least eight separate German-language websites within a short period. The article argued that warnings about a Russian military threat to Western Europe were deliberate propaganda fabricated to justify rearmament and suppress opposition. Buried within it was a direct reference to a Euromore article quoting former NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, used to support the claim that NATO itself did not believe Russia posed a genuine threat.
The eight platforms that carried the article were:
Several of these sites are well-documented nodes in the German-language pro-Kremlin media ecosystem. Publikumskonferenz, for instance, presents itself as a media watchdog monitoring public broadcasters but regularly publishes content aligned with Russian foreign policy positions. Seniora.org, based in Switzerland, has a long record of carrying anti-NATO and anti-Western material. The rapid spread of a single article across nine distinct URLs, each adding to the content’s apparent reach and legitimacy, is a textbook example of how fringe ecosystems function as force multipliers.
The most serious case in this network involves a site operating under the name London Times Live, whose URL and branding are designed to evoke associations with the historic British newspaper The Times. The site is in fact an unrelated platform with no connection to that publication. Its actual tagline is “UrbanObserver”, and its content consists overwhelmingly of republished material from RT and other Russian state-backed outlets.
In December 2024, London Times Live published an extensive article alleging that Ukrainian nationalists linked to President Volodymyr Zelenskyy were planning assassination attempts against Donald Trump. The piece sourced its claims to the “Foundation to Battle Injustice”, a Russian-linked organisation that has been identified by independent researchers as a vehicle for Kremlin disinformation. Within the article, Euromore was cited as a credible source for claims about Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó’s statements on the attempted assassination of Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico:
This case represents a qualitatively different level of activity from the others. In France, Spain, and the Czech Republic, outlets cited Euromore to lend credibility to anti-Western narratives. In the German ecosystem, Euromore’s content was woven into domestic political argumentation. Here, Euromore appeared as one component in a fabricated story designed to threaten a sitting head of state and delegitimise a wartime government. The platform’s name, by this point already carrying a degree of recognisability within pro-Kremlin information circles, was being deployed as a credibility marker within a disinformation operation of a different order entirely.
What the geographic spread of Euromore’s content reveals is not a tightly coordinated operation with a single command structure but something in some ways more difficult to counter: an ecosystem of ideologically compatible outlets, operating independently, that collectively function as a distribution network. No central editor had to instruct Observateur Continental to cite Euromor or Infokuryr.cz to translate the Larry Johnson interview, or eight German sites to carry the same article. The infrastructure for amplification was already in place. Euromore produced content; the network moved it.
The EU’s sanctions on Euromore remove the platform from the legal economy of the European information space. But as the distribution pattern documented here makes clear, the outlets that carried its content remain active. The narratives Euromore helped to circulate, about US responsibility for the Russian-Ukrainian war, about Western biolaboratories, and about fabricated threats to political figures, did not originate with Euromore and will not end with its designation. What the sanctions expose is one node in a network that extends, in various forms, from Brussels to Bratislava, from Paris to Prague.
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