A vote in Chisinau with consequences for Europe
On September 28, Moldovans will elect a new parliament—a vote that will determine far more than the country’s domestic trajectory. Moscow is waging a hybrid offensive in Chisinau aimed at reshaping Moldova into a political outpost of the Kremlin.
The threat extends beyond Moldova’s borders: a compromised government in Chișinău would create vulnerabilities for Ukraine’s southern flank and deal a direct blow to the European Union’s policy of enlargement and integration.
For Russia, Moldova represents the vulnerability of the EU’s eastern frontier. Despite Ukraine’s remarkable battlefield resilience, Moldova continues to face political manipulation, disinformation, and vote buying.
Moscow’s strategy involves transforming the parliament into a powerful tool capable of impeding EU enlargement from within, rather than relying on military might.
The Kremlin’s electoral toolkit: Dodon and the “Patriotic Bloc”
Igor Dodon, former president and leader of the so-called Patriotic Bloc, remains the Kremlin’s most visible bet. Although his party amended its statutes last year to include EU integration as an official goal, local experts point to extensive Russian financing and coordination.
This “pro-European mask” is meant to reassure voters and Brussels alike, while in reality a Dodon-led coalition would block reforms and quietly freeze accession talks.
The paradox is striking: Dodon campaigns on competence and pragmatism, promising to “do Europe better than PAS,” yet his record is widely recognized. His presidency was marked by pro-Moscow rhetoric, cozy ties with the Russian Orthodox Church, and repeated scandals over Russian funding. Moscow sees Dodon as a safe vehicle to paralyze Moldova’s European course while maintaining plausible deniability.
The Shor network: Russia’s money machine in Moldova
The Kremlin’s most innovative tool is the so-called Shor network, created by fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor, now in Moscow. This scheme distributes cash directly to Moldovan voters through Russian Promsvyazbank cards, which are linked to Russia’s Ministry of Defense. Moldovan authorities have attempted to dismantle the system by conducting thousands of searches during the campaign, yet its scale remains alarming.
Estimates of its reach vary. According to government sources, the network may connect to 300,000 Moldovans, but even a smaller number of 70,000 to 80,000 voters could significantly influence the outcome of a close election.
The Kremlin controls how and when this network mobilizes, potentially deciding in the final hours whether to support Dodon, boost Victoria Furtună’s “Great Moldova,” or assist Ion Ceban’s struggling bloc. Such leverage provides Moscow with both flexibility and deniability.
Furtună and the “Great Moldova” project
Victoria Furtună’s Moldova Mare is one of the Kremlin’s boldest experiments. Her platform is openly anti-Ukrainian, calling for territorial claims on the Odesa region and a “Greater Moldova.” Normally, such rhetoric would be considered political suicide. With Shor’s funding and Russia’s propaganda machine, the party has gained visibility and threatens to mobilize nationalist resentment in poor rural regions.
The existence of such a party demonstrates Moscow’s dual strategy: it aims not only to weaken Moldova’s pro-European government but also to sow discord with Ukraine. For Kyiv, the entry of Moldova Mare into parliament would be more than just an irritant; it would legitimize anti-Ukrainian narratives in Chisinau and complicate regional security cooperation. For the EU, this situation would create an unpredictable and openly hostile actor within the legislature of a candidate country.
“Democracy at Home”: a Trojan horse in unionist disguise
The populist Democrația Acasă brandishes Romanian tricolors and unionist slogans, calling for unification with Bucharest. Its partner across the border is the Romanian AUR party of George Simion—himself dogged by accusations of Kremlin sympathies.
Romanian investigative journalists have linked the Moldovan leader Vasile Costiuc to contacts with Russia’s FSB, raising alarm that the group is no genuine unionist movement but a Russian Trojan horse.
If Democrația Acasă crosses the threshold, it is expected to align with Dodon’s bloc. This is a particularly dangerous scenario for the EU, as it would allow Moscow to use “unionist language” as camouflage for Kremlin influence. For Brussels, the emergence of such hybrid actors makes it harder to distinguish genuine pro-European forces from hidden spoilers.
Ion Ceban’s collapse: a setback for Moscow’s balancing act
Until recently, Ion Ceban’s Alternativa bloc was positioned as the centrist force capable of building bridges between pro-Europeans and pro-Russians. With his popularity as mayor of Chisinau, Ceban offered Moscow a subtle “hybrid” option: a politician attractive to moderate voters but willing to accommodate Russian interests.
But Romania’s decision to ban Ceban from the EU and publicly brand him pro-Russian has devastated his image. For voters seeking a “third way,” Ceban is no longer a viable option. Ironically, his downfall undermines Moscow’s flexibility—without Alternativa, the Kremlin must rely more heavily on overtly pro-Russian or compromised projects, exposing its hand more clearly to Moldovan society and Brussels.
A hybrid coalition rather than an open pivot to Moscow
If pro-Russian forces succeed, they are unlikely to declare a pivot away from the EU. Instead, they will continue to speak the language of European integration—but with the aim of slowing it down to a crawl. This tactic mirrors Russia’s approach in other countries: infiltration and obstruction, rather than frontal confrontation.
The danger for Brussels is not dramatic declarations but institutional sabotage. A Dodon-Furtună-Costiuc coalition could weaken anti-corruption reforms, stall EU negotiations, and turn Moldova into a semi-paralyzed candidate state.
For the EU, which has tied Moldova’s accession prospects to Ukraine’s, such an arrangement would amount to handing Moscow a veto on the entire enlargement process.
Why Moldova matters for Ukraine and the EU
For Ukraine, Moldova’s stability is vital. Chisinau is a key corridor for exports and imports, especially given Russia’s strikes on Black Sea ports. A Moldovan parliament hostile to Sandu could disrupt this role, complicate logistics, and undermine sanctions enforcement. For Kyiv, the risk is not just political but also economic and military.
For the EU, the stakes are strategic. Enlargement has become the Union’s most important geopolitical tool. The EU’s credibility in managing its eastern neighborhood will crumble if Moldova becomes part of Moscow’s orbit.
Worse, a pro-Russian Moldovan government could serve as a spoiler inside EU structures once accession advances, much as Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has done from within. This situation would give the Kremlin leverage over Europe’s decision-making from within.
A test of Europe’s resilience
The September 28 elections in Moldova are not a local affair. They are a critical battle in Russia’s hybrid war against Europe. With relatively small investments—such as money networks, propaganda, and proxies—Moscow seeks to capture Moldova “through the ballot box.” If successful, this strategy would weaken Ukraine, block EU enlargement, and fracture Europe’s eastern frontier.
For Brussels and Kyiv, the challenge is clear: defending Moldova’s democratic choice is not charity, but a necessity. The cost of losing Moldova to hybrid capture would be far higher than the price of safeguarding its elections today.
