The Mediapart investigation has ignited wide discussion in Europe, revealing how coordinated influence operations targeted France’s Jewish and Muslim communities.
This article explores what French intelligence uncovered, how these tactics evolved, and why they matter for institutions monitoring geopolitical and societal risk.
A Coordinated Campaign to Amplify Social Tensions
The Mediapart investigation highlights how Russian operators exploited existing social fractures to weaken France’s internal cohesion. Drawing on confidential intelligence materials, journalist Matthieu Suc explains that the Kremlin aimed to portray France simultaneously as anti-Semitic and Islamophobic, thereby fueling mistrust between vulnerable communities, RFI wrote.
Using Divisive Symbols to Stir Social Anxiety
Several events provide evidence of the Kremlin’s early focus on the Jewish community:
- October 2023: More than 250 Stars of David appeared on the façades of homes across the Paris region.
- May 2024: “Red palms” were painted on the Wall of the Righteous at the Holocaust Memorial.
These two actions, occurring months apart, show a long-term pattern of symbolic vandalism designed to provoke emotional reactions and spark public outrage.
Escalation Toward Dual-Target Destabilization in 2025
By 2025, tactics had evolved into simultaneous attacks on both Jewish and Muslim communities:
- May 31, 2025: Several synagogues, a restaurant, and the Holocaust Memorial were covered in green paint.
- September 9, 2025: Ten pig heads were deposited outside nine mosques in the Paris region, some marked with “MACRON” in blue paint.
French prosecutors rapidly identified these actions as attempts “to sow turmoil within the nation,” signaling a political and psychological warfare campaign designed to incite hatred between two religious communities.
The Operational Network Behind the Events
Eastern European intermediaries have become the Kremlin’s new proxy model.
According to the Mediapart investigation, Russian intelligence has shifted away from direct involvement. Instead, it relies on intermediary networks in Serbia, Moldova, and Bulgaria, enabling deniability and reducing operational exposure.
Matthieu Suc describes a three-tier structure:
- A supervisory officer in Russia is responsible for issuing strategic instructions.
- The European coordinator is responsible for managing recruitment, financing, logistics, and task distribution, all without having to enter France.
- Untrained but willing individuals are executing actions on the ground.
The decentralized approach hinders the detection of operations until they inflict symbolic damage.
The Savic and Ivanov Cases
The May and September 2025 actions were tied to Serbian national Alexander Savic, who remains on the run. Messages sent through Telegram, Viber, and Zangi coordinated the vandalism, while executors used cars with Serbian plates to cross borders immediately after completing the tasks.
Another operation—the “red palms” attack—was connected to Bulgarian citizen Nikolai Ivanov, later detained in Croatia and sentenced in France. Authorities noted identical methods across events, confirming a unified strategy rather than isolated acts.
Why France Became Russia’s Top Target
France’s strong political and military support for Ukraine made it a strategic target for Russian destabilization.
Over the past two years, President Emmanuel Macron has taken an increasingly firm stance toward the Kremlin, reinforcing France’s leadership role in European security.
From Moscow’s perspective, inflaming internal tensions in France offers a cost-effective way to weaken a key geopolitical opponent.
Reinforcing Societal Resilience Through Awareness
Matthieu Suc points out a critical insight: Russia intervenes where tension already exists.
Exploiting pre-existing political, cultural, or religious debates makes interference harder to trace and easier to amplify—especially in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which already heightens emotions across Europe.
The Mediapart investigation demonstrates how targeted psychological operations can escalate polarization in democratic societies.
Identifying influence patterns early and strengthening community cohesion are essential steps for France—and for any nation facing external interference.
