The Mediapart investigation has ignited wide discussion in Europe, revealing how coordinated influence operations targeted France’s Jewish and Muslim communities.
This article explores what French intelligence uncovered, how these tactics evolved, and why they matter for institutions monitoring geopolitical and societal risk.
The Mediapart investigation highlights how Russian operators exploited existing social fractures to weaken France’s internal cohesion. Drawing on confidential intelligence materials, journalist Matthieu Suc explains that the Kremlin aimed to portray France simultaneously as anti-Semitic and Islamophobic, thereby fueling mistrust between vulnerable communities, RFI wrote.
Several events provide evidence of the Kremlin’s early focus on the Jewish community:
These two actions, occurring months apart, show a long-term pattern of symbolic vandalism designed to provoke emotional reactions and spark public outrage.
By 2025, tactics had evolved into simultaneous attacks on both Jewish and Muslim communities:
French prosecutors rapidly identified these actions as attempts “to sow turmoil within the nation,” signaling a political and psychological warfare campaign designed to incite hatred between two religious communities.
Eastern European intermediaries have become the Kremlin’s new proxy model.
According to the Mediapart investigation, Russian intelligence has shifted away from direct involvement. Instead, it relies on intermediary networks in Serbia, Moldova, and Bulgaria, enabling deniability and reducing operational exposure.
Matthieu Suc describes a three-tier structure:
The decentralized approach hinders the detection of operations until they inflict symbolic damage.
The May and September 2025 actions were tied to Serbian national Alexander Savic, who remains on the run. Messages sent through Telegram, Viber, and Zangi coordinated the vandalism, while executors used cars with Serbian plates to cross borders immediately after completing the tasks.
Another operation—the “red palms” attack—was connected to Bulgarian citizen Nikolai Ivanov, later detained in Croatia and sentenced in France. Authorities noted identical methods across events, confirming a unified strategy rather than isolated acts.
France’s strong political and military support for Ukraine made it a strategic target for Russian destabilization.
Over the past two years, President Emmanuel Macron has taken an increasingly firm stance toward the Kremlin, reinforcing France’s leadership role in European security.
From Moscow’s perspective, inflaming internal tensions in France offers a cost-effective way to weaken a key geopolitical opponent.
Matthieu Suc points out a critical insight: Russia intervenes where tension already exists.
Exploiting pre-existing political, cultural, or religious debates makes interference harder to trace and easier to amplify—especially in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which already heightens emotions across Europe.
The Mediapart investigation demonstrates how targeted psychological operations can escalate polarization in democratic societies.
Identifying influence patterns early and strengthening community cohesion are essential steps for France—and for any nation facing external interference.
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