As Norway gets ready for a possible Russian military invasion in the Arctic, the country is also fighting a complex hybrid campaign that includes propaganda networks, agents of influence, and election interference. This is a multi-faceted attack that is similar to Moscow’s larger plan to break up NATO’s unity.
When defense planning meets reality
Norway is developing contingency plans to counter a potential Russian military incursion into its northern territories, driven by Moscow’s strategic interest in protecting its substantial nuclear arsenal on the Kola Peninsula. General Eirik Kristoffersen, Commander-in-Chief of the Norwegian Armed Forces, told the Guardian that Norwegian defense planners are actively considering scenarios where Russia might attempt to seize portions of northern Norway to secure its nuclear capabilities stationed near the border.
But the military dimension tells only part of the story. As Russia wages its full-scale war against Ukraine, Norway finds itself targeted by a sophisticated hybrid campaign that combines the threat of conventional military action with propaganda outlets, agents of influence manipulating public sentiment, academic infiltration, and attempts to interfere in democratic elections. This multifaceted pressure campaign mirrors patterns emerging across NATO’s northern flank, where Moscow seeks to fracture Western unity and normalize Russian dominance over its perceived sphere of influence.
The shift is stark. Just fifteen years ago, Norway and Russia resolved a nearly four-decade maritime boundary dispute through patient diplomacy. Today, that cooperative spirit has been completely shattered by Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, replaced by what Norwegian security services describe as the most serious threat environment since the Cold War.
Different kind of calculation
Kristoffersen emphasized that Russia’s potential objectives in Norway differ fundamentally from its territorial ambitions in Ukraine or other former Soviet states. Rather than outright conquest, the concern centers on limited territorial operations designed to create a buffer zone protecting Moscow’s nuclear assets. The Kola Peninsula hosts a critical concentration of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces, including ballistic missile submarines, land-based missile systems, and nuclear-capable aircraft that would be essential in any potential NATO conflict.
“We don’t take that off the table, because it’s still an option for Russia,” the general stated, explaining that preparing for worst-case scenarios simultaneously enhances Norway’s ability to counter sabotage and hybrid warfare threats.
Despite these preparations, military-to-military contacts between Norway and Russia continue, particularly regarding search and rescue coordination in the Barents Sea. Kristoffersen has proposed establishing a direct military hotline between the two capitals to prevent dangerous misunderstandings from escalating. He noted that Russian military behavior in the Arctic has been notably less aggressive than Moscow’s actions in the Baltic region, attributing some airspace violations to navigational errors potentially caused by Russia’s own GPS jamming systems affecting their aircraft.
“When we talk with the Russians, they actually respond in a very professional and predictable way,” he observed. This pragmatic approach reflects Norway’s recognition that even amid profound strategic tensions, certain functional cooperation remains necessary in the harsh Arctic environment where search and rescue operations can mean the difference between life and death.
From diplomatic triumph to strategic rupture
The current tensions stand in sharp contrast to the diplomatic breakthrough achieved just over a decade ago. For nearly forty years, from 1974 until 2010, Norway and the Soviet Union, later Russia, negotiated over their maritime boundary in the Barents Sea. The disputed area covered 176,000 square kilometers, equivalent to 12 percent of the entire Barents Sea and 45 percent of Norway’s total land area. The fundamental disagreement centered on principles: Norway advocated for a median line approach under international law, while the USSR insisted on a sector line extending directly north from their land border.
Unable to resolve the dispute, the two countries established a temporary “Grey Zone Agreement” in 1978 to regulate fishing in the contested waters. This arrangement required annual renewal, creating persistent uncertainty for both countries’ vital fishing industries while placing a moratorium on oil and gas exploration in the disputed area.
The breakthrough came unexpectedly in April 2010, when Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg announced that negotiators had reached agreement. The treaty, signed in Murmansk on September 15, 2010, divided the disputed area nearly equally and entered into force on July 7, 2011. According to the American Society of International Law, the agreement put an end to “nearly four decades of extensive on-again, off-again negotiations” and opened the door to coordinated exploitation of hydrocarbon resources in the region.
At the time, the settlement was celebrated as evidence that even complex territorial disputes could be resolved peacefully through patient diplomacy and mutual compromise. Russian officials portrayed it as proof that Moscow could be a responsible, rules-based player in the international arena. Norwegian authorities saw it as removing a major obstacle to economic development in the High North.
That optimism now seems to belong to a different era. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 fundamentally transformed the bilateral relationship, turning what had been a manageable mix of cooperation and competition into outright confrontation.
Arctic neighbors in the age of confrontation
Relations between Norway and Russia at the beginning of 2026 are extremely tense and cold, driven primarily by Russian aggression against Ukraine. As a NATO member, Norway has fully supported Ukraine, joined all EU sanctions against Russia, and condemned the occupation of Ukrainian territories. Norwegian authorities have provided substantial military and humanitarian assistance to Kyiv and ceased virtually all military cooperation with Moscow.
Russia remains the primary security challenge for Norway. The Norwegian Armed Forces’ leadership explicitly considers the risk of Russian invasion scenarios, particularly focused on protecting the nuclear arsenal on the Kola Peninsula. The Arctic region has become increasingly militarized as Russia strengthens its military presence in the north while simultaneously prosecuting its war against Ukraine.
According to research documented by Insight News Media, opinion surveys from Finnmark, Norway’s northernmost county that borders Russia, show that Norwegians overwhelmingly believe Russia has destroyed the good-neighborly relationship that existed for decades. Cooperation at the level of “people-to-people diplomacy” has drastically declined. Cultural exchanges, civil society contacts, and cross-border initiatives that once characterized the relationship have largely frozen.
The Svalbard archipelago adds another dimension to the geopolitical tensions. Russia maintains a presence in Barentsburg, one of the settlements on Svalbard, which carries significance for Moscow’s strategic calculations regarding control over the North Atlantic. Ongoing disputes about the extent of Norwegian jurisdiction in maritime zones around the archipelago periodically surface, though these have been managed without major incidents so far.
Despite the overall deterioration, some pragmatic contacts persist. Fisheries management in the Barents Sea requires ongoing coordination to prevent overfishing of shared stocks. Border control cooperation continues at the functional level. Search and rescue arrangements remain in place because Arctic conditions make such cooperation a practical necessity rather than a political choice. These contacts, however, represent bare minimum functionality, not any warming of the underlying relationship.
Norway’s Kremlin-scripted media ecosystem
While military preparations capture headlines, Norway faces an equally sophisticated threat in the information domain. A detailed analysis by Insight News Media revealed how two Norwegian-language websites, Derimot.no and Steigan.no, function as distribution nodes for Kremlin-aligned narratives, generating over 220,000 visits monthly combined.
These outlets present themselves as “alternative media” offering perspectives allegedly suppressed by mainstream journalism. In practice, according to the Insight News Media analysis, they systematically amplify Russian state messaging about the Russia-Ukraine war, NATO expansion, and European politics. The pattern is consistent and revealing.
Both websites routinely deny or distort Russian atrocities in Ukraine. Coverage of the Bucha massacre, where Russian forces killed hundreds of Ukrainian civilians, exemplifies the approach. Rather than reporting the well-documented evidence gathered by Ukrainian authorities, international journalists, and human rights organizations, these outlets frame the killings as a “staged provocation” by Ukraine itself. They question why photographic evidence appeared several days after Ukrainian forces retook the town, suggest the massacre was orchestrated to justify Western support for “neo-Nazis” in Kyiv, and cast doubt on victim identification without offering any serious alternative explanation.
The terminology these sites employ reveals their alignment. They consistently use “Special Military Operation” rather than war or invasion to describe Russia’s full-scale military assault on Ukraine. They refer to Ukraine’s democratically elected government as the “Kyiv regime,” a delegitimizing label that implies illegitimacy and foreign control. They deploy the term “Novorossiya,” an imperial Russian concept used to justify claims on southern and eastern Ukraine. These are not neutral word choices but identity markers that signal whose narrative framework is being adopted.
Source laundering represents another critical tactic. Both Derimot.no and Steigan.no regularly cite and republish content from Russian state media outlets operating under EU sanctions, including RT, Sputnik, RIA Novosti, and TASS. These sources are presented as straightforward journalism rather than instruments of state propaganda. When Norwegian readers encounter claims about the Russia-Ukraine war or NATO activities, they often trace back to Russian official sources that have been passed through a Norwegian-language filter.
The domestic angle makes this propaganda particularly effective. These outlets don’t simply defend Russia; they attack Norwegian politicians and policies. Aid to Ukraine is portrayed as money wasted while Norwegians struggle with their own problems. Politicians supporting Ukraine are labeled as “traitors” serving foreign interests rather than Norwegian citizens. This approach transforms foreign policy debates into questions of national identity and betrayal, making rational discussion more difficult.
Steigan.no, run by former communist leader Pål Steigan, blends anti-establishment rhetoric with pro-Kremlin positions on Ukraine. Derimot.no, operated by retired psychologist Knut Lindtner, similarly positions itself as offering truth that mainstream media allegedly hides. Both sites have been extensively documented by Norwegian researchers as problematic sources amplifying Russian disinformation, yet they continue to reach substantial audiences among Norwegians skeptical of traditional media and political elites.
Provocation dressed as patriotism
The information war extends beyond websites into physical spaces and personal influence. A case documented by The Barents Observer illustrates how Russia uses local activists as instruments of influence while maintaining plausible deniability.
In the border town of Kirkenes, a Russian woman known as “Svetlana” has orchestrated repeated provocations centered on World War II commemoration. Since 2023, she has organized so-called “seas of flowers” at a Soviet-era monument, presenting these displays as spontaneous expressions of respect for Red Army soldiers who liberated northern Norway from German occupation in 1944.
The reality is more calculated. In 2023, after the mayor of Kirkenes chose not to invite Russian diplomatic representatives to official commemorations and later moved a Russian wreath that had been placed atop the Norwegian wreath, Svetlana appeared at the monument to “correct” the situation. She framed the mayor’s actions as disrespectful Russophobia and quickly attracted media attention.
What followed revealed the orchestrated nature of the operation. Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow issued formal statements condemning the mayor and summoned Norway’s ambassador to protest what Russian officials called an “act of vandalism.” Pro-Kremlin youth activists staged supportive demonstrations outside the Norwegian embassy in Moscow. The incident was amplified across Russian state media as evidence of growing anti-Russian sentiment in Norway.
Yet Svetlana is hardly the isolated, concerned citizen she presents herself as. After her first “sea of flowers” operation, she was invited to the place of honor at the Victory Day military parade in Murmansk, standing alongside the regional governor and high-ranking Northern Fleet officials. This level of recognition reveals her actual status and connections.
Professor Kari Aga Myklebost of UiT The Arctic University of Norway, writing in The Barents Observer, explains that this represents Russia’s increasing reliance on non-state actors for influence operations. These individuals allow the Kremlin to project power while maintaining deniability. They appear as ordinary citizens expressing patriotic sentiments, making it difficult to characterize their actions as state operations even when the coordination is evident.
The pattern extends beyond flowers. The makeshift memorial to Alexei Navalny outside Russia’s consulate in Kirkenes has been repeatedly vandalized. A car displaying “Stop War in Ukraine” messages has been damaged multiple times. Anti-war posters at a local cultural center are routinely torn down. Each incident appears small and potentially attributable to random vandalism, but the cumulative effect creates a narrative of Russians under threat in Norway, which Moscow then amplifies.
When academics aren’t who they claim
Russian influence operations also target the academic and expert communities that shape policy discussions. A case disclosed by the Center for Countering Disinformation of Ukraine, reported by Ukrainian National News, reveals the sophistication of these efforts.
Artem Kureev, a sanctioned Russian propagandist, infiltrated the planning process for an “Arctic 2050” event at Nord University in Norway using a false identity. The timing was significant because the event coincided with Russia’s scheduled chairmanship of the Arctic Council, making it especially important for Moscow to project an image as a constructive Arctic partner while minimizing attention to military activities in the region.
Kureev’s background demonstrates the link between propaganda and intelligence services. He has worked for Russian special services for more than a decade, organizing trips for foreign journalists to Russian-occupied territories in Ukraine, building pro-Russian contact networks across Europe, and creating ostensibly expert platforms to promote Kremlin messaging. His propaganda project “African Initiative” operates under international sanctions specifically because of its role in Russian influence operations.
The Norwegian case shows how Russian operatives seek vulnerable platforms to advance influence. Academic conferences, research collaborations, and expert dialogues offer opportunities to shape narratives in environments that value openness and free exchange of ideas. By presenting themselves as legitimate scholars or organizers rather than intelligence operatives, these actors exploit the very openness that characterizes democratic societies.
Elections in the crosshairs
Norway held parliamentary elections in September 2025 amid explicit warnings from Norwegian security services about heightened risks of Russian interference. While the full extent of any interference attempts during those elections remains under investigation, the threat Norway faced was both real and part of a documented pattern across Europe.
Research by the Atlas Institute for International Affairs found that Russia or Russian-linked actors targeted at least sixteen NATO allies with information operations in 2023 and 2024, with many of these campaigns directly associated with national elections. The examples span the continent: the Macron email leaks in France, disinformation campaigns in Moldova where Russia attempted to influence a crucial EU referendum, operations in Croatia, Bulgaria, and Georgia targeting electoral processes, and narrative manipulation in Czechia and Turkey.
The tactics have evolved significantly. According to Norwegian Defense Research Establishment studies cited by the Atlas Institute, interference operations have become more complex by incorporating artificial intelligence and other new technologies. More importantly, they now operate over longer timeframes, working to penetrate and shape public narratives gradually rather than through last-minute interventions.
Norway presented a particularly attractive target for several reasons. As NATO’s “eyes and ears” in the North, Norway plays a crucial strategic role in alliance defense. Russia perceives Norway as an “unfriendly country” that has aligned firmly with Western sanctions and support for Ukraine. Previous incidents, including a 2020 cyberattack on the Norwegian parliament that Oslo officially attributed to Russia, demonstrated Moscow’s willingness to target Norwegian institutions.
The objective of election interference typically isn’t to rig votes for specific candidates, though that remains a possibility. More often, the goal is changing discourse and narratives to create long-term destabilizing effects. By amplifying divisive issues, promoting extreme voices, and sowing doubt about democratic processes themselves, foreign interference can weaken democratic resilience over time.
Coordinated assault
Norway faces an unprecedented convergence of threats across multiple domains simultaneously. The military dimension involves real defense planning for potential invasion scenarios in the far north, driven by the strategic importance of Russia’s Kola Peninsula nuclear forces. The information dimension encompasses sophisticated propaganda infrastructure operating in Norwegian language through ostensibly independent websites that systematically amplify Kremlin narratives. The human dimension includes agents of influence who manipulate historical memory and public sentiment through provocations designed to appear spontaneous. The democratic dimension features documented attempts to interfere in electoral processes. The strategic dimension reflects Russia’s broader effort to fracture NATO unity and establish acceptance of sphere-of-influence thinking in Europe.
These are not isolated incidents but coordinated elements of a comprehensive hybrid strategy. Russia has demonstrated across multiple European countries that it can operate simultaneously across all these domains, adapting tactics to local contexts while maintaining consistent strategic objectives.
The historical irony is profound. The cooperative relationship symbolized by the 2010 Barents Sea treaty, achieved through nearly four decades of patient negotiation, has been completely reversed in just over a decade. What was once a model of how neighboring states with different political systems could manage disputes peacefully has been replaced by confrontation, suspicion, and active hostility driven by Russia’s choice to wage war against Ukraine.
Norwegian authorities face the challenge of maintaining vigilance across all these threat vectors simultaneously. Military preparedness remains essential given the geographic realities and Russian capabilities. Information resilience requires public awareness about propaganda techniques and source reliability. Protection against influence operations demands understanding how agents operate and what narratives they promote. Safeguarding democratic processes necessitates both technical cybersecurity and broader efforts to strengthen civic literacy about disinformation.
Nordic and Baltic cooperation offers Norway crucial support in meeting these challenges. When countries share intelligence, coordinate responses, and build common situational awareness, they make Russian operations more difficult and attribution more reliable. Finland and Sweden joining NATO strengthens this cooperation, creating a united front across Russia’s northwestern border.
The experience Norway is navigating offers lessons for other NATO members facing similar multifaceted Russian pressure. The threats are real, sophisticated, and persistent. But they are also identifiable, documentable, and ultimately manageable through coordinated effort and sustained vigilance. Norway’s response, combining military readiness with information resilience and democratic safeguards, provides a model that other allies can adapt to their own circumstances.
