A Re:Baltica investigation says pro-Kremlin media and social media channels used unrelated security incidents in the Baltics to build a narrative that Latvia and other Baltic states were helping Ukraine attack Russia.
Pro-Kremlin media and social media channels escalated a disinformation narrative in May that portrayed Latvia and the wider Baltic region as participants in Ukrainian attacks against Russia, according to an investigation published by Re:Baltica on June 4, 2026.
The investigation said the campaign followed a series of unrelated incidents that had already raised public concern in the region. These included emergency alerts about Ukrainian drones entering Baltic airspace, a drone hitting an empty oil depot near Latvia’s border with Russia, one drone being shot down by NATO air forces in Estonia, shelter orders in Vilnius, and power outages in Latvia, according to the report.
Re:Baltica said those developments were not part of a single Russian influence operation. Its central finding was that pro-Kremlin actors used the uncertainty around separate events to connect them into one narrative: that Ukraine was attacking Russia, the Baltics were helping, NATO was providing cover, and Moscow was being pushed toward retaliation.
SVR claim gave authority to an existing narrative
According to Re:Baltica, the narrative began circulating before a May 19 statement by Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service, known as the SVR. The SVR claimed Ukrainian military personnel had arrived in Latvia to prepare strikes against Russia and that Moscow knew the coordinates of relevant “decision-making centres.”
Re:Baltica reported that pro-Kremlin channels had already been circulating claims since late March that the Baltic states had supposedly “opened their skies” to Ukrainian drones. The SVR statement, the investigation said, gave those claims the appearance of official backing.
The report said the claim was first amplified by Russian propaganda channels and state-affiliated outlets, including TASS, Readovka, Voenkory Russkoy Vesny, Solovyov, Skabeyeva and ANNA News. It was then picked up by channels aimed at Baltic audiences, including Baltnews, Sputnik Lithuania, Sprats in Exile, The Latvian Bump, Shadows of the Baltics, Baltic Anti-Fascists and The Baltic Bridge.
Narrative reached the U.N. Security Council
The campaign moved from social media and pro-Kremlin outlets into formal diplomatic language when Russia’s ambassador to the United Nations, Vasily Nebenzya, warned Latvia that “NATO membership will not protect you,” according to Re:Baltica.
Nebenzya claimed Ukrainian drone units had been deployed at military facilities in Ādaži, Sēlija, Lielvārde, Daugavpils and Jēkabpils, and said a Russian “retaliatory strike” would therefore be unavoidable, the investigation reported. The Baltic states rejected the allegations as false and filed formal diplomatic protests, according to Re:Baltica.
The supplied material does not include independent evidence supporting Russia’s claim that Ukrainian drone units were deployed from Latvian territory. It presents the claim as part of a broader propaganda narrative.
Telegram and TikTok pushed war framing
Re:Baltica said Russian television hosts and pro-Kremlin Telegram commentators increasingly used martial language. On Solovyov Live, commentators framed any drone allegedly launched from Latvian or Estonian territory as effectively a Latvian, Estonian and therefore NATO drone, regardless of who made it.
The investigation said TikTok translated the same narrative into more everyday formats, including clips from Russian state television, videos warning of an imminent attack on the Baltics, claims that Latvia was becoming a “bargaining chip” and even tarot readings about who was behind the drone incidents.
According to Re:Baltica, the range of explanations presented in these channels was narrow: either Ukraine was responsible, or Ukraine was acting with Latvia’s permission.
Older anti-Latvian themes were revived
The report also found that the drone narrative was combined with older Russian propaganda themes, including claims about a “fascist Latvian state,” a “Russophobic government” and alleged persecution of Russian speakers.
One episode focused on Latvia’s ambassador to the U.N., Sanita Pavļuta-Deslandes. Re:Baltica reported that Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova took the ambassador’s remarks about Russian disinformation out of context and linked them to pro-Kremlin claims about events in Starobilsk. Zakharova then invoked Salaspils, the Nazi-era camp in Latvia, in a statement quoted by Re:Baltica.
Re:Baltica said its review of Telegram traffic around Pavļuta-Deslandes suggested an amplification chain rather than a broad spontaneous reaction. Of almost 30 posts identified, roughly half were reposts, and the largest dissemination hub was Alexey Stefanov, a former Riga journalist now reporting for Russia’s sanctioned international propaganda platform, RT, according to the investigation.
Latvia’s domestic politics became part of the narrative
The report said pro-Kremlin channels also tied the drone story to Latvia’s government crisis. On TikTok and Telegram, commentators claimed Latvia’s government had decided to “jump from a sinking ship” to avoid becoming a target of Russian retaliation, according to Re:Baltica.
The appointment of former military officer Raivis Melnis as defence minister was also framed by those channels as part of an effort to facilitate Ukrainian drone operations through Latvian airspace, the investigation said.
Analyst: the theme is not new
Mārtiņš Hiršs, a disinformation researcher, said Russian propaganda had spread false claims about provocateurs allegedly being trained in the Baltic states as far back as 2014.
Hiršs told Re:Baltica that Ukrainian drones entering Latvian airspace should not be read as a sign of Russian strength. “Quite the opposite — they are a sign that Ukraine has become stronger and is carrying out strikes over much greater distances,” he said, according to the report.
Analysis
The Re:Baltica investigation describes a familiar pattern in influence operations: isolated events are connected into a coherent but misleading storyline, then repeated across official statements, state media, Telegram channels and short-form social platforms.
The strongest documented point in the supplied material is not that Russia’s claims are true, but that the claims moved through an identifiable escalation chain. A narrative that began with Telegram and TikTok posts was later reinforced by an SVR statement and repeated in the U.N. Security Council. That gave fringe or platform-based messaging a more formal diplomatic frame.
The campaign’s strategic function was to change how the public interprets risk. Instead of presenting Russia as the source of threats to the Baltics, the narrative suggested that Latvia’s support for Ukraine was the real danger. That framing could weaken public confidence in NATO protection, reduce support for Ukraine and increase suspicion toward Baltic governments.
Re:Baltica’s investigation shows how pro-Kremlin disinformation around drones evolved from scattered claims into a broader narrative targeting Latvia and the Baltic states. It documents how the disinformation campaign was amplified, formalized and used to portray Russian threats as defensive rather than coercive.
The central finding is that the campaign sought to recast the Baltics from bystanders into participants in the war, while using fear of retaliation to pressure public opinion and democratic institutions.
