Russia Weaponises NATO Membership, History and Sanctions in Information War Against Finland, Government Warns

Russia has intensified its information influence operations against Finland, deploying narratives around NATO membership, economic sanctions, and historical grievances in a coordinated effort to fracture Finnish society and shift the country’s foreign policy, according to a new government overview published by Finland’s Prime Minister’s Office.

The overview, released on March 12 and based on publicly available sources, is produced at least once a year by the Prime Minister’s Office to track foreign information influence directed at Finland from outside its borders. Russia dominates the picture.

According to the overview, Russia’s discourse about Finland grew “more derisive and hostile” in 2025 compared to the previous year. The document attributes this shift primarily to Finland’s role within NATO — particularly its contribution to building and deploying military capabilities on Finnish soil — and to President Alexander Stubb’s visible presence in international security discussions. The overview notes that Stubb has consistently emphasised Ukraine’s sovereignty and held Russia accountable for its illegal military actions — and that “Russia has reacted to this with mockery and aggression in an attempt to downplay President Stubb’s position”.

Hardened Rhetoric as a Signal of Weakness

The Finnish government draws a direct line between Russia’s escalating messaging and its deteriorating strategic position. “Russia tends to harden its rhetoric towards its opponents as its own situation becomes more difficult,” the overview states, adding that Russia’s ability to persuade Europe “is very limited at the moment, leaving it little alternative to threats and attempts to exert pressure.”

The document points to a convergence of pressures: a bleak economic outlook, the domestic effects of the war of aggression, and Ukraine’s strikes on Russian oil infrastructure. “Russia’s aggressive rhetoric, accusations and demands reflect this situation,” the overview notes, “which can also be seen in Russia’s attitude towards Finland.”

Historical narratives form another flashpoint. The overview states that Russia “has created its own selective historical narrative, which it seeks to defend” — describing it as being “of utmost importance to Russia in communicating to its citizens and maintaining national unity.” When Finland raises historical facts that challenge this narrative, “it is seen in Russia as aggression towards it.”

NATO as the Central Target

A significant portion of Russia’s influence operations targeting Finland revolves around NATO membership. According to the overview, Russia describes NATO as “a threat to its security” and frames efforts to strengthen the alliance’s defence as aggression. The document notes that Russia emphasises NATO conducting exercises “close to the Russian border” — while omitting that “exercises have been carried out in the same areas for a long time”.

Civil preparedness and defence activities in Finland and other European countries are also weaponised in Russian messaging, presented as evidence of a Western military threat “even in the case of normal preparedness measures that have nothing to do with military exercises”, the overview states.

Since Finland joined NATO in April 2023, more than doubling the alliance’s land border with Russia, Moscow has treated Helsinki with the same hostility it directs at other alliance members. The overview also warns that “it is still possible that disinformation or misleading claims may be spread about Finland’s NATO policy or about NATO forces or structures in Finland”, noting this has already occurred in the Baltic states.

The Finnish Defence Forces have separately assessed that Russia “will likely increase the use of all hybrid methods as it seeks to cause disunity within NATO and the European Union”, including cyber operations and information influence activities.

Sanctions Narratives and Economic Pressure

Economic messaging formed another major pillar of Russia’s influence operations in 2025. According to the overview, claims that anti-Russian sanctions are harming Finland increased significantly over the past year. Russian media deliberately focuses on the economic difficulties of countries it considers hostile — a tactic the Finnish government describes as designed to redirect attention away from Russia’s own deteriorating conditions and the domestic costs of the war.

“A key objective of Russia’s information influence activities is thus to convince others that sanctions against Russia are more detrimental than beneficial,” the document states. The overview flags a growing internal vulnerability for Moscow: “Economic stability and livelihoods are very important themes for the Russian population. The discrepancy between the expectations of the population and the state’s economic challenges is expected to grow. This creates a significant vulnerability for Russia.”

Exploiting Western Divisions

Russia’s broader information strategy aims to exaggerate divisions between Europe and the United States. “The strategic objective of Russia’s information influence activities is to weaken its opponents’ alliances,” the overview states — while noting the irony that “Russia has been unable to maintain strong relations with its allies”.

The document also highlights Russia’s use of historical territorial arguments. Finnish wartime territorial concessions to the Soviet Union were cited in Russian media as a template for how Ukraine could resolve the current “conflict” — using Finnish history to normalise the idea of Ukrainian land transfers. “In justifying its wars and war crimes, Russia employs rhetoric about the feasibility and legitimacy of land transfers in the resolution of wars and conflicts,” the overview notes.

A Coordinated but Not Exceptional Threat

The Finnish government is careful to contextualise the scale of the threat. The overview notes that information influence activities targeting Finland are not exceptional in volume and that Finland is not Russia’s primary target — the same methods are applied across Western countries. What distinguishes Finland’s situation is geography and recent history. Finland shares a land border of more than 1,300 kilometres with Russia — a geographic reality that makes it a particularly vulnerable and strategically significant target for hybrid operations. 

Before NATO accession, Russian messaging toward Finland was largely persuasive, emphasising neighbourly relations and trade. After Finland joined the alliance, that tone shifted entirely. The March 2026 overview reflects a country that has moved from being courted by Moscow to being treated as an adversary – and is now documenting, systematically, exactly how that campaign operates. 

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