Before the 2026 elections, a network of Russian state media and pro-Kremlin outlets in Europe have joined together to target Péter Magyar and Hungary’s democratic opposition.
A recently published article attempting to discredit Péter Magyar, president of Hungary’s opposition Tisza Party, has exposed what appears to be a sophisticated disinformation operation aimed at undermining Hungary’s democratic opposition. The story alleges that Magyar was involved in a cash smuggling operation from Ukraine to the United Kingdom, yet the claims collapse under even minimal scrutiny.
Hungarian independent outlet Telex investigated the suspicious article and asked intelligence experts to examine it. The experts found serious problems with the article’s origins and credibility.
Building on these findings, Insight News Media looked at the wider picture of which media outlets were spreading similar attacks on Magyar and the opposition. Our investigation uncovered a coordinated campaign involving Russian state broadcasters and pro-Kremlin outlets across at least ten European countries, all targeting Magyar and the Tisza Party with nearly identical messages.
The article published on the ECIJ website asserts that Péter Magyar’s July 2024 trip to Kyiv, during which he delivered humanitarian aid collected by Budapest residents to a children’s hospital damaged by a missile strike, was merely a cover operation. According to the text, members of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s circle allegedly siphoned off 16.7 million U.S. dollars from a European loan programme and entrusted Magyar with transporting the money to London.
No documents, financial trails, witnesses, or corroborating sources are presented. The article relies entirely on assertion and insinuation, while framing the story as a dramatic exposé.
Telex asked former national security officer and intelligence expert Péter Buda to examine the text. His assessment was unequivocal: the article is conspiratorial in nature and designed to mislead.
According to Buda, one of the clearest red flags is the alleged investigative organisation itself. The ECIJ claims to have operated in Brussels since 2019, yet domain records show its website was created only on 20 January 2026, with no earlier digital footprint. “That alone places the entire operation under serious suspicion,” he said.
He also noted that while the Magyar article runs to around 1,300 words, other pieces on the site are short, abstract-like texts of 300 to 400 words. In his view, there is “over a 90 percent probability” that much of the content was generated using artificial intelligence.
Further inconsistencies undermine credibility. Articles are dated as having been published months earlier, even though backend data indicates they were uploaded in January. Author names are missing entirely, an unusual choice for investigative journalism, which Buda believes reflects fear of exposure rather than editorial principle.
Beyond technical clues, Buda emphasised the implausibility of the narrative itself. He questioned why Ukraine, backed by what he described as one of the world’s most effective intelligence services, would entrust a large sum of stolen EU funds to a foreign politician under constant surveillance by his own government.
“Who would believe that the Ukrainians would, completely unnecessarily, place themselves in a position where they could be blackmailed by a foreign politician,” Buda asked, “and even reveal to him that the money came from stolen EU funds?”
He added that the text reveals a Hungarian origin rather than an international investigative mindset. A supposedly Brussels-based English-language outlet cites a Hungarian-language Telex article as a primary source for an international event, a missile attack on Kyiv. The language is emotionally charged, using phrases such as “undermines trust” and “devastating effect”, hallmarks of character assassination rather than fact-finding.
The article also mirrors Russian disinformation narratives. It states that “according to Ukrainian authorities” Russia carried out the missile strike on the hospital, despite broad international expert consensus confirming Russian responsibility.
Buda described the piece as a poorly executed example of black propaganda, a genre focused not on truth but on speed and emotional impact. “Facts do not have absolute value here,” he said. “The goal is to establish an impression. Most people will not fact-check.”
He warned that Russia’s strategy appears to rely on flooding the information space with similar stories. Over time, audiences either disengage entirely or lose the ability to distinguish fact from fiction.
Such sloppiness is not new. Last year, a forged document circulated on social media claimed that France, the United Kingdom, Poland, and Romania planned to divide Ukraine’s territory and resources. A map accompanying the claim was riddled with grammatical errors, including missing definite articles, a mistake typical of Russian native speakers.
Russian influence operations targeting Hungary’s opposition have surfaced repeatedly before this latest fabrication. In August 2024, Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) issued a statement alleging that the European Commission wanted to replace Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán with Péter Magyar. Hungary’s state news agency reported the claim without context, prompting accusations that Moscow had effectively entered Hungary’s political arena.
Later, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova cited a Hungarian pro-government outlet to accuse Ukraine of planning sabotage in neighbouring countries, a claim for which no prior evidence could be found.
These incidents were not random provocations. They established groundwork for the broader campaign that would follow, testing how far such narratives could penetrate Hungarian public discourse and preparing audiences for more elaborate attacks on the opposition.
The most pervasive narrative portrays Magyar not as a legitimate Hungarian politician but as a manufactured creation of foreign powers. This delegitimisation tactic seeks to strip him of national credibility by framing him as someone who serves external interests rather than Hungarian citizens.
Russian state broadcaster RT has been particularly aggressive in pushing this line. In August 2025, RT’s English edition published claims that “Brussels intends to bring Peter Magyar, leader of the Hungarian opposition Tisza Party – seen as ‘loyal to globalist elites’ and ‘the main candidate for the post of Prime Minister’ – to power in the 2026 parliamentary elections, ‘if not sooner’.” The article alleged that the European Commission was deploying “considerable ‘administrative, media and lobby resources'” to support Magyar through “German party foundations, the European People’s Party and a number of Norwegian NGOs.”
RT’s French edition echoed these claims almost word-for-word, describing Magyar as someone “fidèle aux élites mondialistes” (loyal to globalist elites) and presenting him as Brussels’ chosen instrument for unseating Orbán.
This narrative found eager amplifiers among pro-Kremlin outlets across Europe. Dutch website Frontnieuws.com published detailed allegations that Magyar’s rise was orchestrated through “an orchestrated PR and social media campaign, as well as by a liberal-oriented Hungarian mainstream media, which is becoming increasingly desperate in trying to make him attractive to right-wing voters.” The site claimed that “considerable ‘administrative, media and lobby resources’ are being deployed to support Magyar through ‘German party foundations, the European People’s Party and a number of Norwegian NGOs’.”
Slovak outlet Infovojna.com took this further, claiming that “Brussels in exchange helps this opposition party to get to power. Also because in Hungary, an easily influenceable political force could thus come to power – a party that votes on everything, from Ukraine’s entry (into the EU) to migration issues, and can be controlled from the EU.” The article explicitly stated that “TISZA, led by Péter Magyar – the strongest critic of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán – has concluded ‘some kind of pact’ with Brussels.”
Czech outlet CZ24.news amplified Russian intelligence claims directly, stating that “the European Commission is considering ‘regime change scenarios’ in Hungary and intends to install Péter Magyar in power.” The article noted that “similar claims were previously made by Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).”
Spanish-language outlet Geoestrategia.eu cited the SVR extensively, claiming that Magyar was described as “loyal to globalist elites” and that “the EU’s goal, they claim, is to bring him to power in the 2026 elections, or even earlier.”
The message across all these outlets is identical: Magyar is not a genuine political leader but a foreign installation, making any support for him equivalent to supporting foreign interference in Hungarian sovereignty.
A second coordinated line of attack questions the funding and organic nature of Magyar’s political movement. By raising unanswered questions about money and support, these outlets create suspicion even in the absence of evidence.
Russian state news agency RIA Novosti published an analysis in April 2024 stating that “for such events that Magyar has been holding in recent weeks — with a stage, lighting, music and singers — hundreds of millions of forints are needed, he doesn’t have such money.” The article suggested that Magyar’s campaign bore the hallmarks of American-style political operations that required massive external funding.
Czech outlet Infokuryr.cz picked up this theme, noting that “obvious questions were never asked whether Magyar’s sudden rise to the position of Hungarian leader was an organic phenomenon, or how his activities were financed. Despite repeated promises, Magyar has not yet provided the public with detailed financial statements.”
Slovak website Oral.sk described Magyar’s campaign activities in terms designed to suggest impossibly lavish spending: “As part of this spectacular campaign, he often spoke to crowds from large stages equipped with concert sound systems, along with cameramen and professional security.” The implication was clear: no legitimate domestic politician could afford such production values without foreign backing.
Polish outlet Myslpolska.info connected these financial questions to a broader conspiracy, describing how “frustrated European globalists, recently suffering defeat after defeat, will try to bounce back in Hungary. ‘All hands on deck!’ they seem to be saying, organizing support for Péter Magyar’s campaign.” The article portrayed Magyar as someone who “spent years traversing the corridors of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs… before obtaining lucrative positions on the boards of state enterprises,” suggesting corruption and insider dealing.
These outlets never provide evidence of improper funding. They simply raise questions repeatedly, allowing suspicion to grow through repetition rather than proof.
Perhaps the most revealing narrative directly compares Magyar to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, attempting to frighten Hungarian voters by suggesting that supporting the opposition would lead to war, destruction, and national catastrophe.
RT‘s Spanish edition published an article in July 2025 with the explicit headline “Brussels has found a Hungarian Zelenskyy.” The piece drew detailed parallels, claiming that “Brussels has already found a Hungarian Zelenskyy represented by Magyar, who they assure behaves in the same way as the leader of the Kiev regime”.
The article continued with stark warnings: “Zelenskyy won the elections by acting, showing off and generating scandals! He promised peace and ended up leading the war!”. It concluded ominously that “The Hungarian Zelenskyy would take Hungary to exactly the same place where the original Zelensky took Ukraine”
This comparison serves multiple propaganda purposes. It links supporting democratic opposition with national destruction. It frames the Russian-Ukrainian war as Zelenskyy’s fault rather than Russian aggression. And it positions Orbán as the only figure standing between Hungary and catastrophe.
The narrative also works to discredit Zelenskyy himself by association, suggesting that any politician supported by the West is merely an actor, a showman, someone who promises peace but delivers war. For audiences already anxious about regional stability, this messaging is designed to trigger deep fears about what political change might mean.
Another coordinated narrative claims that Ukrainian intelligence services are actively working within Hungary to destabilize the country and bring Magyar to power. This line of attack serves to portray the opposition as not merely foreign-influenced but as active collaborators with a hostile intelligence operation.
RT‘s English edition alleged that “Kiev, which has been ‘offended’ by Orban’s opposition to Ukraine attempting to join the EU, is doing the ‘dirty work’ and destabilizing the home situation in Hungary via its intelligence services and local Ukrainian diaspora.”
Russian state broadcaster Sputnik amplified claims that Ukrainian intelligence had “infiltrated Hungarian public life and ‘snuck into Hungarians’ smartphones’ to bring to power the opposition Tisza party, supported by Brussels and led by Péter Magyar.”
Slovak outlet Armadnymagazin.sk claimed that “sources controlled by Péter Magyar’s Tisza party and George Soros began to fill with old video footage of Hungarian military equipment. Commentators presented them as allegedly fresh preparations of the Hungarian army for an invasion of Ukraine.” The article suggested that this was deliberate Ukrainian propaganda designed to create tensions.
Czech outlet Nova Republika published claims that Magyar “attacked the process of military modernization of Hungary” and quoted Hungarian government sources saying “it is incomprehensible and unacceptable that Peter Magyar is attacking Hungary together with Ukrainian secret services.”
This narrative transforms ordinary political opposition into something far more sinister: collaboration with foreign intelligence agencies against Hungarian national interests. It allows the government and its allies to frame any criticism as not merely political disagreement but potential treason.
When broad political narratives need reinforcement, the campaign turns to personal attacks designed to destroy Magyar’s credibility on a human level rather than a political one.
Hungarian pro-government outlet Magyar Nemzet has been particularly active in this area. It claimed that “the most dangerous lie he told was the claim that the plane of the ousted Syrian president had landed in Budapest.” It also accused him of lying about wiretapping his ex-wife Judit Varga: “Peter Magyar denied having wiretapped Judit Varga. However, the party leader seemed to forget that he had previously admitted to recording his ex-wife.”
Swiss publication Weltwoche.ch focused heavily on this personal scandal, noting that Magyar’s “secret to success” was that “he secretly recorded his then-wife with ostensibly incriminating speculations that government members had interfered in a corruption case. This has not been confirmed.”
Another Magyar Nemzet article warned darkly that the Tisza Party and its allies would “stop at nothing,” claiming that “there is practically no tool or method they would reject. I wouldn’t even be surprised if they began intimidating or threatening their own activists, only to later blame the whole thing on Fidesz.”
The outlet also published pieces suggesting Magyar was incompetent and losing support, with one article headlined “Trouble Ahead: Peter Magyar Could Be Removed from Chessboard, Brussels Unhappy with His Performance.” It claimed that “Brussels is therefore rightfully dissatisfied with its chosen man in Hungary. Peter Magyar is piling mistake upon mistake, and this could easily lead to him being taken off the chessboard.”
Most recently, Magyar Nemzet alleged that Magyar cynically exploited public frustrations, claiming he “repeatedly insisted that not a single malfunctioning railroad switch should pass in the coming days without being turned into a Facebook post” and that “the party is explicitly interested in disruptions lasting as long as possible, because in his view this makes the message ‘come through more effectively’.”
These personal attacks serve a specific function: they shift the conversation away from policy debates and democratic principles toward questions of character, trustworthiness, and personal morality. When audiences focus on whether Magyar is honest about his personal life, they’re not focusing on whether Orbán’s government should be held accountable or what policies might benefit Hungary.
Multiple outlets emphasize that Magyar appeared “suddenly” or “overnight” on the political scene, suggesting that no legitimate political movement could emerge so quickly without foreign orchestration.
Slovak website Oral.sk noted that “a little-known figure named Peter Magyar appeared on the Budapest political scene… Magyar almost overnight became chairman of the Tisza party (Respect and Freedom) and the mainstream media immediately granted him the title ‘opposition leader’.” The article described his subsequent campaign: “Immediately after Magyar took over the leadership of Tisza, he toured cities and villages across the country. As part of this spectacular campaign, he often spoke to crowds from large stages equipped with concert sound systems, along with cameramen and professional security.”
Slovak outlet Armadnymagazin.sk used nearly identical language: “In March 2024, ‘a little-known figure named Péter Magyar entered the political scene in Budapest, who practically overnight became leader of the ‘Tisza’ party (‘Respect and Freedom’) and immediately received the title ‘opposition leader’ from leading Western media.” The article said Magyar “appeared in the country unexpectedly like a jack-in-the-box.”
Czech outlet Infokuryr.cz framed it as suspicious that Magyar became opposition leader “almost overnight” and that “mainstream media immediately labeled him ‘opposition leader’,” as if media attention itself was evidence of conspiracy rather than news coverage of a significant political development.
Dutch outlet Frontnieuws.com described how “in March 2024, a previously little-known figure, Peter Magyar, appeared on the political stage in Budapest after publishing clandestine recordings of his ex-wife… These revelations, however, remained almost completely unnoticed, while Magyar’s political star rose unstoppably.”
The consistency of this language across multiple countries and languages suggests coordinated messaging rather than independent journalistic observation. The “overnight success” framing is designed to make Magyar’s political emergence seem unnatural, manufactured, and therefore illegitimate.
The intensification of this coordinated campaign is directly tied to Hungary’s parliamentary elections scheduled for spring 2026. For Russia, the stakes could hardly be higher.
Viktor Orbán’s Hungary has been the European Union’s biggest roadblock to a common stance on the Russian-Ukrainian war. Budapest has blocked or delayed sanctions packages, stopped military supplies to Ukraine, and stalled talks about joining the EU. Orbán has had tight personal and business links with the Kremlin, acted as a mediator even though he didn’t have the authority to do so, and regularly echoed Russian talking points about the war.
For Moscow, losing this ally would represent a significant geopolitical setback. A government led by the Magyar party would almost definitely bring Hungary’s views on Russia and Ukraine more in line with the EU’s, ending Budapest’s role as an insurgent in European institutions. Hungary would probably support sanctions instead of opposing them, back military aid instead of blocking it, and take views that are in line with European unity and international law instead of Russian interests.
The campaign against Magyar has more than one strategic goal; it goes beyond just hurting one politician’s reputation. It aims to delegitimize the entire concept of democratic opposition in Hungary, creating an environment where any challenge to Orbán can be framed as foreign interference rather than legitimate domestic politics. It backs up Orbán’s story that Hungary is under attack from outside powers, which he uses to justify dictatorial policies as necessary for national security. And it makes it normal to think that Ukrainian and EU involvement in Hungarian politics is not just bad, but also dangerous.
The timing also shows how desperate Russia is. Russia has had a lot of problems in the last few years, including military failures in Ukraine, NATO membership growing, European unity on defense, and economic pressure from sanctions. Hungary is one of the few places where Russia can still put pressure on European decision-making. If it lost Hungary, it would be much more isolated diplomatically.
Former intelligence officer Péter Buda warned that smear articles and disinformation campaigns are rarely end goals in themselves. They prepare the ground for more aggressive actions by blurring lines between legitimate political opposition and external enemies.
If Hungarian opposition forces are successfully portrayed as “pro-Ukrainian” or as foreign agents rather than domestic political alternatives, even a small incident could be exploited to trigger genuine political turmoil. The bomb threats written in Ukrainian that hit Hungarian schools and government offices during Telex’s interview with Buda may be locally produced, but they fit perfectly into the broader narrative being constructed: that Ukraine and its Hungarian collaborators represent a threat to national security.
Buda stressed that physical sabotage or serious interference typically requires backing from intelligence services with significant resources and operational capabilities. Russia’s intelligence agencies have demonstrated both the willingness and ability to conduct such operations in other countries where they perceive strategic interests at stake.
The resilience of Hungary’s political system in the face of this pressure will depend on several factors. Public legitimacy matters: if citizens recognize these narratives as foreign propaganda rather than genuine concerns, the campaign loses effectiveness. Western support matters: clear backing from European and allied institutions makes it harder to frame the opposition as isolated or dependent solely on foreign manipulation. And media literacy matters: when audiences can distinguish between legitimate journalism and coordinated disinformation, these campaigns fail to achieve their objectives.
“With a strong mandate and serious backing, these operations can backfire,” Buda said. Without those protections, the environment becomes much cheaper and easier for hostile actors to exploit, and the costs of conducting influence operations drop substantially.
The made-up story about Péter Magyar bringing Ukrainian money to London is not an isolated event or a simple error. It is part of a large, coordinated disinformation operation that includes Russian state media and pro-Kremlin outlets in many European nations. The purpose is to weaken Hungary’s democratic opposition before important elections.
The narratives are consistent across borders and languages. The timing is strategically calculated. The timing is carefully planned. From RT’s studios in Moscow to Dutch conspiracy websites, from Czech fringe outlets to Hungarian pro-government media, the same talking points appear again and again: Magyar is a foreign puppet, his rise is artificial, his funding is suspicious, supporting him means war, Ukrainian intelligence is pulling the strings, and anyone who opposes Orbán is actually opposing Hungary itself.
This is not journalism. This is not political commentary. This is information warfare designed to influence democratic elections and protect Russian strategic interests in Europe.
As Hungary gets closer to its 2026 elections, voters will have to choose between more than just internal policy issues. They have to choose between letting foreign disinformation efforts select which political parties and leaders are real and letting Hungarians develop their own democracy by having honest discussions about the future of their nation.
The challenge is big. These initiatives are smart, well-funded, and work together across many nations and platforms. They take advantage of existing political differences, feed on real worries, and work in the gray area between making false claims and making claims that sound believable.
But they are not invincible. They depend on people not looking into sources, not questioning stories that are easy to believe, and not noticing when the same talking points show up at the same time in many languages and on many different platforms. When citizens, media, and democratic institutions stay alert, they can show these operations for what they are: foreign interference meant to undermine people’s basic right to pick their own leaders.
The question is if that level of vigilance will be enough and if it will come in time.
The European Union has targeted six Russian media personalities and cultural figures with sanctions for…
Russian state media and pro-Kremlin outlets across Europe exploited sex offender Jeffrey Epstein's released documents…
A made-up story about Polish aid generators being sold for profit in Ukraine has been…
When Russian drones killed six civilians on a passenger train in Ukraine's Kharkiv region on…
Donald Trump's remarks regarding Greenland are being used by a sophisticated network of Russian state…
AI chatbots have become a visible source of traffic for Russian propaganda websites under EU…