As Bulgarians prepare to vote for the ninth time in five years, a coordinated network of pro-Kremlin outlets is running its most aggressive information campaign yet, not to inform Bulgarian voters, but to shape what they fear, whom they trust, and whether they bother to show up at all.
Bulgaria goes to the polls on April 19, 2026, in what has become a grim ritual of democratic exhaustion. Eight elections in five years have produced no stable government, only deepening fragmentation and a political class that has largely discredited itself in the eyes of the public it is meant to serve. Into that vacuum, as Insight News has previously documented, flows a steady current of pro-Kremlin messaging, distributed through a layered network of outlets that carry Russian state media narratives to Bulgarian audiences under a local byline.
What is new in the final three weeks of the campaign is not the infrastructure, which has been mapped, but the operational intensity. The network is no longer running background noise. It is running a targeted election campaign, with identifiable candidates to promote, identifiable opponents to destroy, and identifiable fears to amplify. The research below documents five core narratives active in the Bulgarian information space between March 1 and March 30, 2026, the three weeks immediately preceding the official campaign period and the most critical window for shaping voter sentiment before April 19.
The scale of what Bulgaria is facing has been formally acknowledged. According to United24 Media, citing research from the Bulgarian Center for the Study of Democracy, the Pravda network alone is generating up to 6,000 manipulative articles in Bulgarian every month. A network of over 30 linked Telegram channels has accumulated approximately 180 million views in the past year. In response, Bulgarian authorities have enlisted Bellingcat investigative journalist Christo Grozev to lead a newly established mechanism for countering hybrid threats and have officially activated the EU’s Rapid Alert System to monitor disinformation in real time.
Before examining the narratives themselves, the structure that delivers them requires explanation, because the two tiers operate differently and with different levels of accountability.
At the first tier sit two outlets that function as direct extensions of the Russian state media apparatus. News Front Bulgaria (bgr.news-front.su) is registered in Russian-occupied Crimea and operates through a Bulgarian domain in direct violation of EU sanctions. It does not pretend to be an independent Bulgarian outlet. It is a Russian state media product with a Bulgarian address. Pravda Bulgaria (bulgaria.news-pravda.com) is a direct Bulgarian-language clone of Russian state media, aggregating content from Kremlin-aligned Telegram channels in real time and publishing it without editorial intervention. Both sites exist for a single purpose: to give Russian state narratives a local postmark, making them appear to originate from within Bulgaria rather than from Moscow.
At the second tier sit domestic Bulgarian outlets that are pro-Kremlin in orientation but operate with greater editorial independence and, crucially, with greater credibility among Bulgarian readers who might dismiss the first tier as obviously foreign. These include kritichno.bg, big5.bg, 24may.bg, rns.bg, trud.bg, opposition.bg, wow-media.bg, epicenter.bg, rusofili.bg, and ppvo.bg. These outlets adapt, reframe, and amplify Kremlin-friendly narratives, adding Bulgarian voices, Bulgarian examples, and Bulgarian political context. By the time a narrative has passed through this second tier, it carries no visible trace of where it started. It reads as domestic political commentary.
The distinction matters because the level of propaganda is different. The first tier publishes Russian state content with minimal alteration. The second tier produces something more sophisticated: content that mirrors Russian narrative conclusions while packaging them in the language of Bulgarian grievance, Bulgarian history, and Bulgarian electoral politics. The first tier is easy to identify and dismiss. The second tier is considerably harder to separate from legitimate political opinion, which is precisely what makes it more effective.
The oldest and most culturally embedded narrative in the network does not operate primarily through current events. It operates through history, specifically through Bulgaria’s foundational national myth: liberation from five centuries of Ottoman rule in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. Every Bulgarian child learns that Russian soldiers died for Bulgarian freedom. The pro-Kremlin network’s task is to make that history feel directly relevant to a vote about NATO membership, EU sanctions, and the Russian-Ukrainian war.
March 3, Bulgaria’s Liberation Day, is the annual activation point for this narrative, and 2026 was no exception. Kritichno.bg published a piece that day framing Russia’s role in the 1877-78 war as historically undeniable: “Without the military victory of the Russian Empire in the war of 1877-1878, no Bulgarian principality would have emerged in 1878… The Treaty of San Stefano was possible only after the military defeat of the Ottoman Empire.” Whatever Russia’s strategic motives, the framing insists; it restored Bulgarian statehood, and that historical debt cannot be argued away.
Pravda Bulgaria, operating as a direct Kremlin transmission point, went considerably further on the same day, compressing centuries of history into a single sentence: “I congratulate the Bulgarian brothers on Liberation Day from the Ottoman yoke. I wish you also to liberate yourselves from the European yoke.” EU membership is not a choice Bulgaria made freely. It is a yoke, identical in kind to the Ottoman occupation that Russia helped end.
News Front Bulgaria reinforced the same framework with a piece on March 29 framing Russia as the historical founder of Bulgarian military institutions: “Russia creates the Bulgarian army: the first Bulgarian military school was created by Moscow.” The article frames this not as historical information but as evidence of an enduring civilisational bond that contemporary EU and NATO alignment betrays.
RNS.bg extended the historical argument into a broader meditation on Bulgarian powerlessness, published on March 8: “There is no more accurate description of the Bulgarian fate than this, to be the eternal small change in the games of the great powers… The battles that led to nothing, the wars that were lost not on the battlefield but in the political offices, are endless.” The piece frames Bulgaria’s entire modern history as a story of soldiers winning wars and politicians surrendering the peace, with the implication that April 19 is another such moment of betrayal in the making. “The politicians lose the wars won by our soldiers” is presented not as a historical observation but as a living condition.
Kostadin Kostadinov integrated both threads into a single rhetorical package, declaring on Liberation Day: “If we manage to free ourselves from Ottoman rule, we will also free ourselves from the rule of the mafia and the thugs,” placing the current pro-European establishment in the same moral category as a five-century foreign occupation. In multiple interviews in the final week of March, he made the equivalence explicit: “The EU is harmful! We are like under Turkish slavery!” Kostadinov belongs in this analysis not as an outside observer but as an active node in the same network: his statements are amplified without critical framing by the same outlets that carry Russian state narratives, and his Telegram channel is listed among the pro-Kremlin amplification infrastructure monitored by the Center for the Study of Democracy ahead of the April vote. Where the proxy outlets provide the historical framing, he provides the electoral application.
The structural function of this narrative in the election campaign is to make the choice on April 19 feel like a civilisational one rather than a political one. You are not voting for a party. You are deciding whether Bulgaria belongs with the people who freed it or with the new occupiers who replaced the old ones.
The second narrative is the most viscerally effective because it does not require abstraction. It does not ask Bulgarians to care about geopolitics. It claims that geopolitics has already arrived at their doorstep, in the form of American military aircraft on Bulgarian soil and Bulgarian warships being sent into waters that could become a battlefield.
The immediate trigger was the US strikes on Iran in February 2026. Within days, the Bulgarian pro-Kremlin network had converted a foreign military operation into a domestic security emergency. Pravda Bulgaria published on March 5: “Bulgaria quickly found itself on hot coals! The caretaker government quickly trapped us as a target and a bulls-eye for Iran.” The conclusion was explicit: “The way out is clear: exit from the EU and NATO and a turn in foreign policy orientation.”
Ppvo.bg, the platform of Nikolay Malinov’s party, whose leader was convicted of espionage on behalf of Russia, published a detailed account of American military aircraft at Sofia Airport, framing it as a security scandal rather than routine alliance activity, and warned of an “Operation Bulgaria” scenario: “Operation Bulgaria, a new scenario for whom? And the question is: will the regime in the country be overthrown?” Seven tanker aircraft, cargo planes, and Boeing 747s are presented not as standard NATO logistics but as evidence that Bulgaria has been silently converted into an American forward operating base.
RNS.bg extended the argument to Bulgarian naval forces, publishing on March 15 that Bulgarian frigates sent toward the Persian Gulf region had become “an ideal target” and drawing a direct line between government decisions and the endangerment of Bulgarian sailors: “All this happens because the ruling clique pursues one single interest, its own. Washington’s approval is needed not so that Bulgaria gains more benefits but so that certain individuals can continue to receive funding, support and goodwill from across the ocean. Even when this means staking the state and the people in someone else’s war.”
24may.bg took the same argument to a wider strategic frame on March 17, using NATO’s refusal to deploy to the Strait of Hormuz as proof of the alliance’s fundamental unreliability. The piece, titled “From the Mantras of NATO”, frames alliance solidarity as self-serving rhetoric that evaporates when actual risk arrives, leaving Bulgaria exposed while its politicians pretend otherwise.
Kostadinov‘s media offensive in the final week of March gave the narrative its most explicit electoral expression. On March 20, he declared, “NATO is finished, collapsed,” and argued that Bulgaria must “evacuate and immediately begin to restore its national security on its own.” On March 22, he repeated the same conclusion: Bulgaria should “evacuate from the collapsing NATO.” The word “evacuate” seems to be deliberate. It frames alliance membership not as a strategic choice but as a burning building from which rational people flee.
The pattern is not coincidental. The argument that NATO membership creates threats rather than removes them has been a consistent feature of Russian state media programming since 2022, and the Bulgarian network applies it with local precision: not abstract warnings about alliance overreach, but specific Bulgarian aircraft, specific Bulgarian frigates, and a specific Bulgarian election in which the candidates promising exit are presented as the only rational choice.
Bulgaria is the European Union’s poorest member state. That is not a propaganda claim. It is a statistical fact, and it is the raw material from which the third narrative is constructed. The argument is simple enough to fit on a campaign poster: “The money going to Ukraine is money that is not going to Bulgarian hospitals, schools, and pensioners. Supporting the war effort is not solidarity. It is theft from the Bulgarian people, authorised by politicians who serve foreign interests rather than their own citizens.” The network reinforces this with a parallel argument: “the sanctions imposed on Russia are not hurting Moscow; they are hurting Sofia.”
The most direct articulation of the war-costs angle came from Ivan Takov of the Bulgarian Socialist Party, quoted on Epicenter.bg in language that migrated unchanged into the March campaign: “Bulgaria has no more money for someone else’s war. We cannot allow funds for education, healthcare and social needs to be taken away to be given for weapons in a foreign war.” He added that any attempt to delay a peace agreement “condemns the Ukrainian people to suffering and Bulgarians to another round of belt-tightening for foreign interests”.
Radev provided the most rhetorically polished version. Big5.bg published his description of the outgoing coalition as one that “dips into the pockets of Bulgarians and pours money into Ukraine while its defence lines are collapsing and corruption scandals are exploding in Kyiv. This is the perverse economy of war.”
The sanctions argument runs as a direct complement. Kritichno.bg published Kostadinov’s position with no editorial framing: “The first solution is what we have been saying for years: lift the sanctions against the Russian Federation… There is nothing more natural and normal than allowing the import of Russian oil again, which is designed to supply precisely our Bulgarian engineering facilities at Neftochim Burgas.” He extended the argument into a direct question of political allegiance: “But the question is whose interests the government serves, those of the taxpayers, or those who make us spend money on foreign adventures?”
Trud.bg delivered the Kremlin’s own framing on the same subject on March 26, relaying Putin’s statement that “sanctions against Russia are illegal because they were not approved by the UN. Moscow was forced to take all necessary measures to protect the interests of the people in Crimea and Donbas.” The same outlet published the Kremlin’s characterisation of Ukraine as a hostile actor against Bulgaria’s own energy interests: “The Kremlin: The Kyiv regime is using pipelines as a weapon to blackmail EU member states,” a claim that places Ukraine, not Russia, as the party threatening Bulgarian gas supplies.
Opposition.bg completed the circle with a piece on Russian oil prices framed as a vindication of those who argued sanctions were self-defeating: “On February 27… Russian crude Urals was trading at around $40 a barrel. By March 10… it was selling at around $90. On Monday, Urals closed at $100.67, while Brent… at $99.00. Sanctioned Russian oil has never before traded above the global benchmark price.” The piece continued: “European gas prices jumped 75% in one week… Europe’s dependence continues… Putin offered to resume long-term energy cooperation with European buyers.”
Trud.bg also ran a piece headlined “Ukraine on the edge: the military budget may run out in two months”, presenting Ukraine’s financial fragility as further evidence that Bulgarian support has been poured into a losing cause, compounding the domestic economic damage with the futility of the sacrifice.
The narrative works because it does not ask Bulgarians to love Russia. It only asks them to resent the politicians who are making them poorer and to connect that resentment to the country’s pro-Western foreign policy. That connection, once made, does not require further argument.
The fourth narrative is the most operationally precise. It has two inseparable halves. The first is the systematic construction of pro-Kremlin candidates, above all former president Rumen Radev, whose Progressive Bulgaria coalition leads in every poll, but also Kostadin Kostadinov and his Vazrazhdane party, as the only authentic national voices Bulgaria has left. The second is the coordinated destruction of acting President Iliana Iotova, the first woman to hold Bulgaria’s highest office, framed as an illegitimate foreign agent who must be politically eliminated before she can consolidate any independent power.
The two operations run simultaneously, through the same channels, toward the same electoral outcome.
Vazrazhdane launched its campaign on March 10 under a slogan that the pro-Kremlin network amplified without editorial distance: “A Free People, an Independent Bulgaria”, because these are the two fundamental values we will fight for. Only a free people can have an independent state, and only an independent state can provide a dignified life and prosperity for its population.” Kritichno.bg carried Kostadinov’s press conference framing verbatim, including his accusation that pro-EU integration advocates are guilty of something far graver than political disagreement: “What was declared, that Bulgaria must move toward the federalisation of the European Union, meaning it must cease to be a state and become a region, is high treason.” The framing converts a policy difference into a criminal charge, and Kritichno.bg delivers it as news.
Kritichno.bg reinforced the cultural dimension of this sovereignty framing on March 6, presenting demographic change across Europe as a politically engineered process rather than an organic trend. Reproducing claims from Newsmax via Nova24TV, the outlet framed the growth of Muslim populations as the product of deliberate Brussels policy: “Critics of European migration policy argue that the increase in the Muslim population is not only a natural demographic process but also the result of long-standing political decisions related to migration and multiculturalism.” The piece presents the “great replacement” theory as a legitimate political debate, with Orbán cited approvingly as a leader who “has repeatedly spoken about the need to protect the Christian identity of Europe”. The electoral implication is left unspoken but clear: the same Brussels that is dragging Bulgaria into NATO wars is also, in this framing, engineering the disappearance of European Christian identity.
On Radev, the network applies a different but equally effective technique. Kritichno.bg published an analysis of his foreign policy positioning that presents his measured Euro-Atlantic alignment as a betrayal of his own electoral base: “For years, a bipolar perception formed around Radev. Part of his sympathisers expected a continuation of a policy aimed at normalising and even warming relations with Russia, a line they see as pragmatic and consistent with Bulgarian energy and economic interests.” The piece then frames his actual stated platform, an “active, principled and nationally responsible foreign policy”, as a thin cover for pro-Western subservience.
Big5.bg covered Radev’s campaign launch in Burgas on March 27 as if reporting on an inevitable coronation: “Decisive, confident and convincing, Rumen Radev opened the campaign for Progressive Bulgaria in Burgas.” TASS had already set the template in January, describing his entry into electoral politics as “the only opportunity for the country to get out of the crisis”, phrasing that the Bulgarian proxy network then repeated without attribution as if it were independent editorial judgement.
Pravda Bulgaria extended the binary to a European frame, presenting Hungary’s Viktor Orbán as the model for what a sovereign Bulgarian government should look like: ‘In the European Union, having your own position and conducting an independent foreign policy is not welcomed.’ The inconvenient and the disobedient get in the way of long-established objectives… The presence of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and the independent view of his Slovak colleague Robert Fico irritates Brussels.” The message for April 19 is embedded in the contrast: Orbán resists, Fico resists, and Bulgaria’s pro-Kremlin candidates will too.
The operation against Iotova runs with considerably less subtlety. Epicenter.bg described the caretaker government she oversees as led by “an unlawful caretaker prime minister subordinated to Soros networks” and called the situation “a grave institutional threat to democracy in Bulgaria”. The phrase “Soros networks” is drawn directly from the Kremlin’s standard vocabulary for delegitimising pro-Western civic institutions, imported here as Bulgarian domestic political commentary, stripped of its origin.
The architecture of this narrative is designed to produce a specific electoral geometry: one cluster of candidates presented as defenders of sovereignty, one institution presented as illegitimate, and every pro-European voice reframed as a foreign agent. The goal is not to persuade undecided voters with arguments. It is intended to pre-shape the emotional landscape before any ballot is cast.
The fifth narrative operates on a different register from the others. Where narratives one through four generate fear and resentment about the present, this one generates existential anxiety about the future. The argument is that Western alliance structures are fragmenting, that American commitment to European security is conditional and unreliable, and that Bulgaria, as the EU’s poorest and most geopolitically exposed member, will be the first to be sacrificed when Washington decides its interests lie elsewhere. The logical conclusion, left implicit but unmistakable, is that Bulgaria must secure its position before the abandonment arrives, and the only realistic partner is Russia.
News Front Bulgaria published the clearest articulation of this narrative on March 28, relaying a statement by Finnish President Alexander Stubb about a split within NATO itself: “What we are probably seeing is not a rift but a fracture in the transatlantic partnership. The Global North is taking on the role of defender of the liberal world order, while the Global West is becoming increasingly deal-orientated with the United States.” The same article added that Trump had called NATO “a paper tiger” without American participation and sharply criticised allies for refusing to support Washington’s confrontation with Iran. The conclusion for a Bulgarian reader requires no further elaboration: if NATO is fracturing and the US is threatening to withdraw, the security guarantee that Bulgaria’s pro-European politicians promised does not exist.
Pravda Bulgaria amplified the abandonment framing repeatedly throughout March, running a recurring headline across multiple articles: “The Norwegian Nostradamus has pronounced his verdict on the West: NATO will rot, Europe will collapse, and Russia will become an empire.” The framing presents Western institutional collapse not as a possibility but as a prophecy already in the process of being fulfilled, with Russia as the emerging power that will fill the vacuum.
News Front Bulgaria reinforced the panic narrative on March 20, publishing a piece headlined “Big Failure: The West panicked after learning of Iran’s massive new strike”, framing Western military weakness in the Middle East as evidence of a broader strategic collapse that will inevitably reach Europe. A March 17 piece on Pravda Bulgaria, sourced from Telegram channel Bulgaria Z, captured the essential contradiction of American alliance leadership: “Trump used to say the US wants to leave NATO. Now he says the US is NATO and demands alliance solidarity.” The unpredictability of American commitment is itself presented as proof that the alliance cannot be trusted.
News Front Bulgaria rounded out the narrative on March 29 with a piece built around a warning from retired Israeli Brigadier General Amir Avivi: that Europe’s refusal to support the US in the Strait of Hormuz could trigger an American withdrawal from NATO and an end to support for Ukraine. The article frames the general’s words not as a geopolitical analysis but as confirmation that Europe has already lost: “The US may stop supporting NATO and funding Ukraine… In that case, Europe may be left alone to deal with Russia. This could be devastating for Europe and lead to an escalation of Russian strikes.” The piece’s conclusion is unambiguous: “Europe has no gas, no money, and no allies.” And Russia, which they tried to isolate until yesterday, is growing richer on world markets and dictating the terms.”
The electoral function of this narrative is precise. It does not require Bulgarian voters to endorse Russia. It only requires them to conclude that the Western security guarantee is worthless, that the politicians who staked Bulgaria’s future on it have been dangerously naive, and that the candidates offering neutrality and dialogue with Moscow are not pro-Russian ideologues but pragmatic realists responding to facts on the ground. That reframing, if accepted, converts a vote for Radev or Kostadinov from a pro-Kremlin choice into a self-protective one.
The two-tier web architecture described above is only part of the picture. Both tiers depend on a third layer to multiply their reach, and that layer is Telegram.
According to the Bulgarian Center for the Study of Democracy, 31 Bulgarian channels connected to the Pravda ecosystem accumulated over 97,000 subscribers, nearly 8 million reactions, 181 million views, and 690,000 forwards in the year preceding the April vote. The top ten channels accounted for 62% of all shares, indicating a tightly structured amplification network rather than organic engagement. On virtually every monitored topic, nine out of ten of the most-reacted-to Telegram channels were pro-Kremlin.
The channels divide into two categories. The first consists of directly state-affiliated outlets operating under diplomatic cover. The Russian Embassy in Bulgaria (t.me/rusembul, 7,830 subscribers) and the Russian Cultural Centre in Sofia (t.me/RKIC_Sofia, 1,050 subscribers) carry soft pro-Russian content framing Russia as Bulgaria’s natural cultural partner. Their function is legitimisation: by maintaining an official presence in the same information space as domestic pro-Kremlin channels, they lend institutional weight to narratives that originate in the Kremlin.
The second category consists of domestic amplification channels. According to DFRLab research, these channels amplified one another nearly 12,000 times in a single monitored period, with Za ПраVдa (t.me/Za_PraVda, 8,830 subscribers) receiving the highest number of cross-channel amplifications, followed by efir.info (t.me/efir_info) and Bulgaria Z (t.me/bulgariaz).
The largest channel in the network is the Bulgarian Military Union “Vasil Levski” (t.me/bgmilitary, 14,200 subscribers), the official platform of a pro-Russian Bulgarian paramilitary organisation which DFRLab previously documented exploiting the migration crisis to carry out so-called ‘civic arrests’ of migrants. Its channel frames NATO membership as an existential threat and publishes content that, in its own description, contains “professional analyses and comprehensive news from around the world that you will not find in any Bulgarian media”. CSD identifies it as one of the key channels in the Pravda amplification network ahead of the April vote.
Bulgaria ZOV (Russia’s war propaganda term) (t.me/BulgariaZOV, 8,280 subscribers) states it was “created to unite the alternative viewpoint, different from the media funded and sponsored by America for Bulgaria, the EU and NATO.” Bulgaria Z (t.me/bulgariaz, 4,600 subscribers) describes itself as existing “for Bulgarians who want to know in real time about the West’s war against our Russian brothers and our Liberator, Russia.” InfoDefenseBULGARIA (t.me/InfodefBULGARIA, 6,550 subscribers) is part of a Russian state-linked operation spanning over 20 European languages, identified by DFRLab as one of the most prominent disseminators of Kremlin-sponsored disinformation globally. Free and Peaceful Bulgaria (t.me/svobodik, 5,950 subscribers) promotes neutrality and dialogue with Moscow as the path to peace. Druzhba/DruschbaFM Bulgaria (t.me/druschbaFM_Bulgaria, 1,730 subscribers) frames the Russia-Bulgaria relationship as a natural cultural bond severed by Western-controlled politicians. The Voice of Truth (t.me/covidvaccineca, 4,030 subscribers) and ZOV.България (t.me/zovBulgaria) completes a network in which every channel reinforces the same narratives through different registers: military, cultural, political, and conspiratorial.
The connection between the web layer and Telegram is not theoretical. The Pravda Bulgaria piece from March 17 on the EU’s refusal to join the US operation in the Strait of Hormuz was sourced directly from Telegram channel anastasiageshev and reposted by Bulgaria Z. The same story, the same framing, delivered simultaneously to overlapping audiences across multiple platforms. This is not coincidental amplification. It is a coordinated distribution system in which gateway outlets and Telegram channels function as a single integrated network.
Taken individually, each of the five narratives documented here could be described as political opinion, contestable, arguably one-sided, but not inherently illegitimate. Taken together, they form something more precise: a complete electoral strategy, designed to produce a specific outcome on April 19.
Narrative one grounds the entire operation in a historical myth that most Bulgarians absorbed before they were old enough to question it, making the vote feel like a civilisational choice rather than a political one. Narrative two turns NATO membership from a security guarantee into a physical threat, making exit feel like the rational self-protective choice. Narrative three converts a geopolitical position into a kitchen-table grievance, using rising fuel prices, defence spending, and sanctions to make Western alignment feel personally costly. Narrative four builds the candidates Moscow wants to win and damages the institutional figure most capable of providing a counterweight. Narrative five introduces the existential dimension: even if Bulgarians were willing to accept the costs and risks of Western alignment, the West itself is fracturing and will not be there when it is needed.
None of these narratives asks Bulgarian voters to love Russia. They only ask voters to distrust their institutions, fear their alliances, resent their politicians, and feel historically indebted to a country that is actively rewriting that history in its own interest. That is enough. A voter who feels a civilisational pull toward Russia, fears NATO, resents the government, and believes the West will eventually abandon Bulgaria does not need to be told how to vote. The conclusion arrives on its own.
Bulgaria’s April 19 election will not be decided by Russian propaganda. It will be decided by six and a half million Bulgarians exercising a democratic right. But the information environment in which those voters make their choices has been shaped systematically and deliberately by a network that is not neutral about the outcome and that has had three weeks, at minimum, to do its work.
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