Summit of War Beneficiaries: will SCO states push for peace en Ukraine?

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit held in Tianjin at first glance looked like a ceremonial gathering of world leaders, complete with handshakes, banquets, and a routine declaration.

However, a subtle shift was revealed during the meeting: the very states that have benefited from Russia’s war in Ukraine are now expressing their preference for an end to the conflict.

The absence of direct mention of Ukraine in the final communiqué was deliberate—designed not to spook members who have gained from Moscow’s geopolitical and economic setbacks. However, the speeches and bilateral exchanges indicate that the Global South is losing patience with the war.

Beneficiaries of War

Since 2022, Russia’s war in Ukraine has reshaped power and profit flows across Eurasia:

  • China has effectively reduced Russia to a junior partner, exploiting its isolation and gaining access to cheap energy and strategic leverage.
  • India has imported millions of tons of Russian crude at steep discounts, refined it, and re-exported fuel to Europe.
  • Turkey and Kazakhstan have earned large commissions serving as transit hubs for sanctioned goods flowing into Russia.
  • Azerbaijan leveraged Moscow’s distraction to reclaim its lost territories in Nagorno-Karabakh.

On paper, the war has boosted SCO members’ energy security, geopolitical influence, and trade revenues. But appearances deceive. The summit revealed their deeper concern: that an uncontrolled war threatens the stability they need to safeguard those very gains.

India and China Send Signals

The clearest message came from Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who met Vladimir Putin directly to urge “an accelerated end to the conflict” and support for international mediation efforts. This was India’s sharpest diplomatic nudge to Moscow yet.

China’s stance was more opaque. No official record exists of Xi Jinping pressuring Putin, but the logic of Beijing’s recent moves suggests quiet frustration. China had tacitly green-lit the invasion in 2022, believing Moscow’s promises of a short war. Instead, Beijing finds itself entangled in defending an open-ended conflict that undermines its global ambitions.

Xi’s Independence Day greetings to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in August 2025 underscored this shift. By recognizing Ukraine’s sovereignty and stressing “long-term cooperation,” Xi sent a signal to Kyiv—and a warning to Moscow.

The Chinese-Brazilian Peace Proposal Revisited

China’s fatigue with the war first became visible in May 2024, when Beijing and Brasília released a six-point plan urging a ceasefire, protection of civilians, and an international peace conference. Kyiv rejected it at the time, fearing a trap.

However, some argue that the move was a lost opportunity: even if Russia had blocked its implementation, Ukraine could have positioned itself as a peacemaker, contrasting Putin’s intransigence.

Why Beneficiaries Now Want Peace

The irony is stark: those who profited most from the war are now pushing hardest for peace. The reason is strategic self-preservation.

  • Economic dividends are at risk: Prolonged instability jeopardizes trade flows and investment climate, especially as sanctions tighten enforcement.
  • Geopolitical leverage peaks in stability: Only in peacetime can India, China, and others press for UN reforms that expand the Global South’s role.
  • Global South unity requires credibility: Endless war undermines their calls for a “new world order” rooted in sovereignty and development.

Thus, the SCO declaration’s focus on reforming global institutions was not mere rhetoric. It was a statement of intent, requiring a calmer international environment to pursue.

What Comes Next: Pressure on Moscow

Should Beijing and New Delhi intensify their pressure on the Kremlin, it could potentially signal a more significant shift than Western sanctions. Both hold critical levers: markets for Russian oil, diplomatic cover in international forums, and reputational legitimacy in the Global South.

For Moscow, this presents a dilemma: prolonging the war risks alienating partners that cushioned its economy, while conceding undermines its narrative of strength.

For Kyiv, the opportunity lies in amplifying these rifts—ensuring that India, China, and other SCO members see an end to the war as both in their own interests and consistent with their global ambitions.

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