When the United States struck Iran’s nuclear facilities last month, triggering a rapid de-escalation between Iran and Israel, many expected a broader geopolitical reaction—especially from Iran’s declared partners: Russia, North Korea, and possibly China.
What followed was telling silence. Beyond muted diplomatic statements, there was no military, logistical, or even political support from Tehran’s so-called allies.
This moment of crisis revealed what many analysts have long suspected: the anti-Western “axis” of Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea is not a true alliance but a fragile bloc of transactional partners—convenient but not committed.
Russia’s Strategic Absence
By continuing the war of attrition in Ukraine, Russian dictator Putin has made confrontation with the West the cornerstone of his foreign policy. In this context, rapprochement with Iran and its partners in the “axis of evil” made sense, analysts at The Atlantic note. The two countries signed a strategic partnership agreement. Tehran supplied Russia with Shahed missiles and drones.
But what was initially a favorable dynamic for Russia quickly turned into a strategic headache. First, Israel destroyed Iran’s partners, Hamas and Hezbollah. Later, in 2024, Israel launched a retaliatory strike against Iran’s missile production and air defense, including Russian-made S-300 missiles.
Tehran likely anticipated support from Moscow in the form of air defense systems, intelligence, or logistical backing. But it did not arrive. According to diplomatic sources, Iran requested Russia temporarily store its enriched uranium and return Iranian missiles previously transferred to Russia—both requests were refused. Beyond rhetorical condemnations, Moscow did nothing.
The reasons are pragmatic. Russia is deeply entrenched in its protracted and failed war in Ukraine, launching waves of missiles and drones daily—some supplied by Iran itself. Logistically and politically, Russia is overextended. To divert resources to Iran would undermine its own military campaign.
The message from Moscow’s strategic absence in aiding its ally Tehran was clear: Russia’s alliance with Iran stops where its own war effort begins.
A Pattern of Abandonment
Iran is not alone in learning this lesson. Moscow’s pattern of strategic withdrawal is widening. It failed to support Armenia during the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh, reconquered by Azerbaijan in September 2023; did not help Assad’s regime in Syria, which finally was overthrown in December 2024; and now leaves Iran in the cold at its moment of need.
This pattern hasn’t gone unnoticed. Sergey Radchenko, a Cold War historian at Johns Hopkins University, put it bluntly in an interview with The New York Times:
“Putin is a cynical manipulator interested only in his strategic interests. If that means throwing Iran under the bus, he’s prepared to do it. The feeling is fully reciprocated in Tehran.”
The Illusion of the “Axis”
When people talk about the “axis of evil,” they are referring to three countries: Russia, Iran, and North Korea. China stands somewhat apart, being more cautious and unwilling to be associated with this axis but supporting each of the countries in one way or another.
This axis was clearly formed against the backdrop of Russian aggression against Ukraine. These four countries are united, first, by “anti-Westernism and anti-Americanism” and, second, by authoritarianism. Iran and North Korea supplied Russia with weapons, and Pyongyang even sent troops. While China was accused by the US and the EU of aiding Russia in its war with dual-use component exports.
In addition, “isolation, sanctions, and the need to survive” are pushing Russia, Iran, and North Korea to cooperate. This is an opportunity for each of the countries to stay afloat, develop economic relations, and receive military aid.
The Iranian regime works closely with Russia: it helps to circumvent sanctions and provides technology, while Moscow turned to Tehran for “shahids” during the full-scale war. The countries signed a 20-year partnership pact.
For years, shared anti-Western rhetoric created the impression of a rising geopolitical force—Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea aligned against the liberal democratic order. But ideological hostility doesn’t equal strategic unity.
As The New York Times reported, none of these countries offered meaningful support when U.S. forces bombed Iran’s nuclear sites. China and Russia issued only “pro forma denunciations,” with no action behind the words. Meanwhile, North Korea—despite its bluster—remained silent.
“Each of them is pretty selfish and doesn’t want to get embroiled in the wars of others,” said Alexander Gabuev, director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center. “These are very different wars and different conflicts. The countries don’t share the same structures and values like the U.S. and its allies do.”
This absence of mutual support exposes the core weakness of the so-called “axis”: when pressure rises, each state defaults to national interest.
China’s Calculated Caution
Despite being Iran’s largest trading partner and oil buyer, China also stood aside. President Xi Jinping waited four days before calling for de-escalation. Foreign Minister Wang Yi, in a conversation with his Israeli counterpart, avoided condemning Israel altogether.
Beijing’s caution is rooted in economic strategy. Iran exports 90% of its oil to China, but China receives only 13–14% of its total crude from Iran. More crucially, China relies heavily on stable trade with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Iran’s regional rivals. A destabilized Gulf region threatens Beijing’s energy security.
This pragmatism was evident when Iran’s parliament voted to close the Strait of Hormuz. China responded not with support but with a warning, stating that the Persian Gulf is the world’s “most important trade route” and urging all actors to avoid harming global growth.
In an article by The Atlantic, analysts argue that the so-called Russia–China–Iran axis is crumbling. Despite shared hostility toward the West, these nations lack formal alliances, shared values, or institutional commitments. Each acts unilaterally, prioritizing its survival and strategic interests.
“In calmer times, China, like Russia, is happy to use Iran as a battering ram against the U.S. But when tensions escalate, backing Iran looks like a far less sensible investment than preserving ties with the West.”
No Shared Values, No True Alliance
The deeper problem is structural. These four regimes—a theocracy, a one-party communist state, and two post-Soviet autocracies—share almost nothing in terms of governance, ideology, or security doctrine. Iran’s revolutionary clerical leadership sits uneasily alongside China’s atheist centralism and Russia’s Orthodox nationalist revival.
Even among authoritarian regimes, contradictions matter. China and Russia are also rivals in influence in Central Asia. North Korea remains an outlier, more destabilizing than strategic.
While they undermine Western influence, these regimes do not offer an alternative political model, nor do they trust each other enough for collective defense.
Conclusion: The End of Illusions
The Iran-Israel war delivered a moment of clarity. The “axis of convenience” may function in diplomacy and trade, but it collapses in crisis. These nations cooperate when beneficial—but none is willing to risk strategic capital for the other.
For Iran, the lesson is harsh but long overdue. It stood alone during a military confrontation with two nuclear powers, while its supposed allies calculated risks and backed away.
For the West, the implications are complex but encouraging. The authoritarian bloc remains a challenge, but not a cohesive threat. Their lack of ideological cohesion, mutual defense, or long-term vision makes them vulnerable to pressure and internal friction.
What binds them—anti-Westernism—is insufficient when the costs become real.
