Serbia

Why Did Serbia’s Pro‑Russian President Choose to Visit Ukraine?

Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, long viewed as Moscow-aligned, made waves by travelling to Odesa on June 11 to attend the Ukraine–Southeast Europe Summit—his first-ever visit to Ukraine in 12 years as president, coming just one month after a controversial trip to Moscow for Russia’s Victory Day parade.

His appearance in Odesa was widely interpreted as a calculated effort to rebalance perceptions of Serbia’s geopolitical stance—countering criticism from Brussels following the Moscow visit and reaffirming Belgrade’s declared neutrality in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict.

Although Vučić publicly reiterated Serbia’s commitment to Ukraine’s territorial integrity and international law, he abstained from signing the summit’s joint declaration condemning Russia and calling for further sanctions—an act reflecting Serbia’s persistent hedging between East and West.

Serbia relies heavily on Russia for energy—Gazprom controls its oil refinery—and has refused to join EU sanctions, even while expressing support for Ukraine in UN votes. Vučić’s visit thus symbolized diplomatic balancing: a gesture of rapprochement with Kyiv while preserving ties with Moscow.

This strategic dualism stems from Serbia’s long-standing “multi-vector diplomacy,” a foreign policy framework that allows Belgrade to engage concurrently with Western powers, Russia, and China.

Under this doctrine, Vučić has facilitated Russian influence—granting preferential access to energy privatization—while simultaneously courting European economic ties, such as arms purchases from France and lithium extraction deals with Germany.

Serbia maintains strategic flexibility and protects itself from pressures from both blocs through its balancing act. In this context, the Odesa visit served as a necessary step in preserving diplomatic symmetry after the backlash triggered by his public appearance in Moscow.

Deeper Motives Behind the Visit

From Kyiv’s perspective, inviting Vučić to Odesa was a pragmatic gesture. Ukraine formally is aware of Serbia’s complex loyalties but also sees potential value in keeping diplomatic channels open. Recent allegations by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service accusing Serbia of supplying ammunition to Ukrainian forces—via intermediaries in the Czech Republic, Poland, and Bulgaria—were categorically denied by Belgrade.

Analysts suggest Kyiv may be leveraging Belgrade’s ambiguous positioning to secure continued access to military supplies—particularly ammunition—that it increasingly needs amid shifting support from international partners.

Odesa Summit and Symbolism of the Balancing Act

Hosted in the Black Sea port city during a period of renewed Russian drone and missile attacks, the fourth Ukraine‑Southeast Europe Summit addressed regional security, reconstruction, trade, and demining efforts. One by one, participating leaders from 11 Southeastern European countries signed a declaration condemning Russia’s aggression and calling for enhanced financial support to Ukraine. Vučić alone abstained.

He justified the decision as preserving Serbia’s independent diplomatic course without betraying historical ties, even as he pledged assistance in rebuilding Ukrainian towns and reaffirmed support for Kyiv’s sovereignty.

Meanwhile, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy welcomed Vučić’s presence, emphasizing the importance of witnessing the war firsthand and discussing Serbia’s role in post-war recovery.

Why This Visit Matters

Vučić’s trip underscores Serbia’s increasingly precarious positioning between competing geopolitical powers. While publicly upholding neutrality, efforts to cultivate EU accession are ongoing, and Brussels clearly views overt alignment with Russia—such as Vučić’s participation in the Moscow parade—as a political liability.

By visiting Ukraine, Vučić has sought to reset diplomatic optics, signal willingness to engage with Kyiv, and maintain Serbia’s multi-vector strategy without fully alienating Moscow. For Ukraine, opening space for dialogue—even with nonaligned states—could support pragmatic goals like steady ammunition supply and eventual reconstruction partnerships.

Ihor Petrenko

I'm a passionate journalist based in Ukraine, specialising in covering local news and events from Ukraine for the Western audience. Also, I work as a fixer for foreign media. Whether I write an article, report from the conflict zone or conduct interviews with political leaders and experts, I'm focused on delivering informative, engaging, and thought-generating content.

Recent Posts

How Propaganda and Cash Bonuses Feed Russia’s War Machine Despite High Losses

Russia’s war in Ukraine increasingly runs on a blunt exchange: money up front, myth on…

4 hours ago

“You Don’t Need to Pay Influencers in Serbia”: Fact-Checker Ivan Subotić on How Russian Propaganda Thrives for Free

Ivan Subotić is the editor-in-chief at the Serbian portal FakeNews Tracker and collaborates with the…

8 hours ago

Two Norwegian Sites, One Kremlin Script: Derimot.no and Steigan.no Under the Microscope

Pro-Russian propaganda in Norway rarely looks like a bot swarm or a shadowy “state channel”.…

4 days ago

Pro-Kremlin outlets weaponize Russia’s Oreshnik strike on Ukraine to intimidate Europe, justify aggression

A coordinated propaganda campaign across Central and Western Europe portrays Russia's Oreshnik missile strike on…

6 days ago

How a Russian Fake Nearly Reignited Ukrainian–Hungarian Tensions, and Why Pro-Orbán Media Took the Bait

In recent years, Viktor Orbán has earned a reputation as the most openly anti-Ukrainian leader…

7 days ago

Russian “Z-Nuns” in Sweden: How Churches Became a Channel for Espionage and War Financing

What began as a seemingly harmless act of charity in Swedish churches has turned into…

1 week ago