Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico made an unannounced visit to Moscow to meet with Russian ruler Putin, which was harshly criticized in Europe. According to him, the trip is a response to Ukraine’s intention to stop the transit of Russian gas to Slovakia on January 1, 2025.
Formally, Fico went to the Kremlin to resolve the issue of Russian gas transit to Slovakia. However, in reality, he should have done it in Kyiv, not Moscow. Furthermore, analysts say that Slovakia does not face a gas emergency, as its gas storage facilities are 90% full, allowing for diversification of gas supplies.
The Slovakian GTS operator, Eustream, makes money on transit, and their largest trader, SPP, makes profit on resale. The annual total earnings of these two companies from operations with Russian gas are $1.2-1.5 billion. This amount of money is significant for Bratislava, which is why the Fico government is making such a strong effort to secure it.
Are there still chances for transit to continue?
President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy made a proposal to Fico to preserve the transit of Russian gas. “If a European country is ready to receive gas and not pay money to Russia until the end of the war, we can think about it,” the Ukrainian president said.
It’s hard to take this idea seriously—Russia won’t pump gas without payment to protect the European market.
Zelenskyy’s statement is just a continuation of the central thesis of his speech: Ukraine will not agree to provide infrastructure so that Moscow can generate funds to wage war against Ukraine. Gazprom receives $6.5 billion annually from gas transit to Europe via the Ukrainian route.
Transit will stop on January 1, and there are no applications for reserving the capacity of the Ukrainian GTS to pump gas to Europe, including from entry/exit points on the border. There are also no substantive negotiations about the continuation of transit.
Why is Slovakia so interested in gas transit through Ukraine?
Throughout 2024, Slovakia has been actively lobbying for the preservation of gas transit, although it is not the only Gazprom customer in Europe. But Austria and Hungary, whose governments is friendly to the Kremlin, have certain geographical advantages over Slovakia.
Even after the closure of the Ukrainian route, Hungary will continue to consume Russian gas—from the south, via the Turkish Stream. Austria, whose oil and gas company OMV was contracted by Gazprom to supply natural gas until 2040, actually initiated its premature termination.
Vienna’s developed infrastructure made this step easier. The country has the largest gas hub in Europe in the city of Baumgarten. This summer, the government decided to expand the TAG pipeline connecting Baumgarten to Germany to reduce dependence on Russian gas.
Lack of diversification and financial gains from gas resale
Slovakia has also taken steps to diversify. In November, the local oil and gas company SPP agreed with Azerbaijan’s Socar on pilot gas supplies through the TANAP and TAP pipelines.
According to the Slovakian side, it also has agreements with other alternative suppliers that provide it with a 150% reserve cushion of customer consumption. Natural gas can also reach Slovakia via the Turkish Stream and the pipeline that runs from Germany through Austria.
However, the rejection of Russian gas may cost Bratislava more than other Central European countries that are closer to sources of alternatives to Russian fuel. SPP estimates that the complete loss of Russian gas and transportation from other countries will cost it an additional €140 million a year.
Slovakia’s dependency on Russian gas
Slovakia is more dependent on Ukrainian transit. The southern route from Azerbaijan to Slovakia passes through Georgia, Turkey, and all the Balkan countries. Each country’s GTS operator charges a fee for services. Given the long route, the logistics costs are significant. But unlike Austria, Slovakia has not made sufficient efforts to diversify until recently.
However, Slovakia can find ways to replace its annual gas consumption of 5 billion cubic meters. Experts say that the main reason for Bratislava’s high interest in preserving Ukrainian transit is the opportunity for its own financial gain.
First, Slovakia receives funds from Russian Gazprom for the reserve capacity (which is $600-700 million a year). Second, it earns money by reselling Russian gas to other European customers.
Slovakia’s gas dependence on Russia and transit through Ukraine is not absolute. However, Fico’s government has not sufficiently diversified its supplies to ensure the country’s energy security, despite the long-standing knowledge of the Russian war and the termination of the transit agreement. Therefore, Fico’s actions are not due to a lack of alternatives but rather to the actions of the Slovak government.
Pro-Kremlin stance
Fico has open sympathies for Russia and Putin personally; in late October, he even took part in a talk show hosted by the Kremlin’s prominent propagandist, Olga Skabeeva. This serves as an additional resource for the Kremlin, given that Fico is the second EU and NATO leader (after Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban) to actively promote Russian narratives within the EU.
These narratives include opposition to sanctions against Russia, opposition to the supply of weapons to Ukraine, and support for the continued purchase of Russian energy resources.
Zelenskyy slams Fico
Despite all efforts, the gas transit contract between Ukraine and Russia expires on January 1, 2025.
In general, the European Union is prepared to stop transit. The share of Russian gas in the EU has dropped to 6%, and the share of Russian gas going through Ukraine has dropped to 4%.
Ukrainian President Zelenskyy criticized Fico for his meeting with Putin, stating that Moscow provides him with “significant discounts,” but these are not free—Russia pays for them through its sovereignty or dubious schemes. “This should be of interest to Slovak law enforcement and intelligence agencies.”
He asserts that EU leaders have already observed Fico’s reluctance to engage in collaborative efforts toward energy independence or to find a substitute for Russian gas, preferring to assist Putin in generating revenue to fund the war and undermine Europe. “Fico refused compensations that would have eased the transition period and helped get rid of dependence. He is interested in Russian gas, which is worth $500 million a year,” Zelenskyy said.
Fico’s fragile government
However, the reason for Fico’s gas talks may be populism aimed at a domestic audience. Fico’s popularity rating dropped to 32% in early November, down from 45% in June. The pro-European opposition party Progressive Slovakia, which holds a rating of 22.6%, has overtaken the ruling Smer-SD party, which Fico leads, with a rating of 21.9%. Another party in the coalition, Hlas-SD, is in third place with 12.8%.
The government coalition in Slovakia is fragile, and the loss of just one vote can block decisions in parliament. In addition, there are significant differences in views between the center-left and far-right partners of Fico’s party. Thus, there is a risk of early elections and the resignation of the government.
Following the visit to Putin, the opposition, former prime ministers Igor Matovic and Eduard Heger, and Ukrainian refugees participated in protests in front of the government building in Bratislava on Monday. The participants plan to file a complaint against Fico with the Prosecutor General’s Office. In their opinion, Fico may have violated the law because he is cooperating with the aggressor state.
Will Fico take revenge?
The pro-EU Slovaks are critical of Fico because he is distancing the country from the Western world and pushing against the rule of law, independent media, and anti-corruption bodies. Fico faced accusations of three criminal offenses, but the prosecutor general closed the cases. But so far, he has not resorted to overtly anti-democratic actions or restrictions on human rights or civil liberties.
By making Ukraine’s refusal to continue gas transit to Slovakia look like a negative decision, Fico is shifting possible future economic problems for his country to Kyiv and provoking his voters to radicalize their attitudes toward Ukraine. Thus, Slovaks could accuse Kyiv of disregarding the interests of its assistance-providing neighbors.
Currently, Slovakia is supplying artillery shells and Zuzana howitzers to Ukraine through private manufacturing companies with EU funds. Will the Slovak government block these processes in order to take revenge on Kyiv? The likelihood is low, but if Fico does, it will be directly helping Putin’s troops and Russia’s aggression not only against Ukraine but also against all of democratic Europe.
