The EU’s decision to sanction Euromore and Pravfond reveals something beyond policy enforcement: a layered system of influence that has been quietly operating within Europe’s own political and informational space.
The European Union has imposed sanctions on the media platform Euromore and the Foundation for the Support and Protection of the Rights of Compatriots Living Abroad (Pravfond) for spreading Kremlin disinformation and Russian propaganda. The EU Council announced the decision on April 21. This is not just about media or messaging. It is about infrastructure, networks, and intent. The decision reflects a deliberate move to dismantle interconnected propaganda channels rather than isolated actors.
Mapping the Targets: Euromore and Pravfond
The sanctions target Euromore, a Russian-language platform the EU considers part of a pro-Kremlin information network. According to EU institutions, it spreads disinformation tailored for European audiences and justifies Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, while repeatedly publishing content that challenges the legitimacy of EU institutions. Euromore is based in Belgium and was sanctioned by the United Kingdom in December 2025.
Restrictions also target Pravfond, which the EU describes as an instrument of Russian influence abroad. Its operations are linked to the promotion of Kremlin narratives, including claims of “persecution of Russian speakers”, the alleged “Russophobia” of European states, and the supposed “nazification” of Ukraine.
Euromore: A Platform Built for Narrative Recycling
Euromore was identified by the EU Council as part of a pro-Kremlin information network, designed to amplify and recycle narratives aligned with Russian state interests. Its content consistently challenges the legitimacy of EU institutions while justifying Russia’s war against Ukraine, positioning itself as an alternative voice for Russian-speaking audiences in Europe.
What makes this particularly notable is its operational base. Euromore is not hidden or offshore. It operates from Brussels, sharing its address and phone number with Golos.eu, another pro-Kremlin outlet, as documented by Kharon. Embedded at the heart of the EU’s political capital, the platform emerged as a direct substitute following EU restrictions on RT and Sputnik after 2022, filling a vacuum in the Kremlin’s controlled information channels. According to leaked internal Pravfond documents obtained by the Guardian and Danish public broadcaster DR, Euromore was explicitly designed to “create its own significant alternative” once those outlets were blocked. The platform’s domain, registered in 2017, now redirects to a site called Euroview Media, which republishes content from RT and Sputnik directly.
The platform also hosts figures with documented Kremlin ties. Latvian MEP Tatjana Ždanoka, who has faced espionage accusations in the European Parliament for alleged links to Russian intelligence, maintains a blog on the site.
The adaptive logic is clear: this is a replacement mechanism, not a collapse of influence.
Pravfond: Financial Engine Behind Influence Operations
If Euromore represents distribution, Pravfond represents funding, coordination, and structural depth.
Founded by presidential decree in 2012 and backed by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Rossotrudnichestvo, Pravfond operates under the guise of supporting Russian compatriots abroad. Leaked internal documents and intelligence assessments, obtained by a consortium of European journalists including the Guardian, describe it as an influence operation active across 48 countries, financing propaganda platforms and legal campaigns. Its head, Alexander Udaltsov, has called it a “unique element of Russian soft power.” Udaltsov has been under EU sanctions since 2023 for actions undermining Ukraine’s territorial integrity.
The scale is significant. Millions of euros have been channelled into media projects, legal defences, and advocacy efforts reinforcing Kremlin narratives. These are not random themes; they are consistent pillars of Russian strategic communication.
Among the platforms Pravfond bankrolled is Golos.eu, an online portal operating out of a post-office box in Brussels that primarily amplifies criticism of Ukrainian leadership, including President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his military advisers. When contacted by the Guardian, Golos deputy editor Yuri Andriychenko denied any link to Pravfond, suggesting that someone had applied for grant funding using the site’s name without its knowledge. The denial followed a familiar pattern: distance without explanation, and no accounting for how the site’s name appeared in Pravfond’s internal budget documents. According to the same internal documents, Pravfond also directly funds Euromore, making the two sanctioned entities not merely parallel targets but financially connected parts of the same operation.
Investigations Reveal Deeper Intelligence Links
The sanctions gain further weight when viewed alongside investigative findings that expose the operational backbone of Pravfond.
More than 40 internal documents, obtained from a European intelligence source, reveal that Pravfond’s leadership includes individuals directly linked to Russian intelligence services. Vladimir Pozdorovkin has been identified by European intelligence sources as an SVR agent and served as Pravfond’s curator for Nordic and Baltic operations. Anatoly Sorokin, also an SVR member, oversees its Middle East, Moldova, and Transnistria division. Sergey Panteleyev, head of the Institute of the Russian Diaspora and Pravfond’s listed “project implementer”, has been sanctioned in EU countries as a member of a Russian military intelligence unit specialising in psychological warfare.
This convergence of legal structures and intelligence personnel suggests that Pravfond is not merely supportive infrastructure. It is integrated into a broader state strategy.
Russian intelligence expert Andrei Soldatov described Pravfond as a “classic soft-power effort”, noting that ties between intelligence services and compatriot organisations were “well documented”. He pointed specifically to Andrey Milyutin, deputy head of the department of operative information of the fifth service of the FSB, who sat on the government committee overseeing compatriots abroad, as a clear illustration of the structural overlap between diaspora outreach and intelligence operations.
Estonian security services reached the same conclusion in their 2020 national security report, labelling Pravfond a “pseudo-legal protection system” that is “in reality an influence operations fund”, and stating that the FSB uses such groups to recruit collaborators abroad, including among supporters of Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea.
Legal Campaigns and Strategic Cases
Pravfond’s activities extend into legal domains that intersect directly with geopolitics. The foundation financed the defence of Viktor Bout, the convicted arms trafficker later returned to Russia through a prisoner exchange with the United States, and Vadim Krasikov, an alleged FSB agent sentenced to life in Germany for the 2019 assassination of Chechen commander Zelimkhan Khangoshvili in Berlin. Documents show that lawyer Robert Unger received €60,000 from Pravfond’s budget in 2021 for Krasikov’s defence, approved by Udaltsov directly. A 2014 Pravfond budget document also recorded significant sums allocated to the legal defence of Konstantin Yaroshenko, a convicted drug trafficker who likewise returned to Russia through a prisoner exchange with Washington.
Pravfond also funded fringe publications across Europe focused on criticising Ukrainian leadership and promoting narratives aligned with Russian foreign policy.
Financial Flows and European Vulnerabilities
One of the more troubling aspects of the investigation concerns European public money. Public data shows that some local partners associated with Pravfond received subsidies from European states, creating a situation where public funds may have indirectly supported entities linked to a foreign influence operation. This raises uncomfortable questions about oversight mechanisms, particularly where legal, cultural, and informational initiatives overlap.
At the same time, Pravfond invested heavily in websites and campaigns framed around defending the Russian language and combating “Russophobia”. These narratives, while appearing cultural, function as entry points for broader political messaging.
The Strategic Context: Hybrid Threats in Practice
The EU’s sanctions framework, introduced in October 2024, was specifically designed to counter hybrid threats, and this case illustrates its purpose clearly.
Hybrid operations combine media, finance, legal systems, and intelligence into a single strategy. Euromore and Pravfond, when viewed together, form a coordinated ecosystem: content creation, narrative amplification, funding, and operational support. The sanctions include asset freezes and a prohibition on EU citizens and companies providing financial resources to the targeted organisations. In total, 69 individuals and 19 entities are now listed under this framework.
Yet influence networks adapt. Euromore’s shift to Euroview Media, completed before EU sanctions were formally applied, illustrates that capacity precisely. They evolve, reconfigure, and reappear under different names.
A Quiet Battle Within European Borders
These operations were not distant or abstract. They were active within European societies, interacting with local actors, shaping narratives, and exploiting institutional gaps from a Brussels office address through European legal systems and, in some cases, with European public subsidies.
Propaganda is often imagined as something loud and obvious. This is quieter, more insidious, almost administrative in its execution. The EU’s response is not just about punishment. It is about recognition: that information warfare is no longer external. It is embedded, layered, and, at times, hiding in plain sight.
