France

How the Kremlin Exploits Social Divisions and France Is Fighting Back

From vandalised synagogues to pig heads outside mosques, a series of incidents in France has exposed a network of foreign operatives linked to Russian intelligence. Serbian court judgements and leaked documents reveal how provocations are organised and amplified, while a new French law seeks to close gaps that have previously complicated prosecutions.

Russia-linked destabilisation operations in Europe are increasingly being carried out by foreign intermediaries recruited to stage provocations, provoke public outrage and exploit existing divisions within European societies.

The operations often appear to be isolated incidents of vandalism, religious hostility or anti-government protest. However, investigations in France and Serbia have exposed connections between several such incidents and Russian intelligence structures.

A November 11, 2026, analysis by Paul-Michel Manandiz of the European Center for Strategic Analysis (CEAS), published by European Pravda under the title “Vandalism on Demand: How the Kremlin Organises Hybrid Provocations and Why It Succeeds”, examines how these networks operate and why European legal systems have struggled to respond.

Manandiz’s analysis draws on court decisions, French investigations and documents disclosed by an international investigative consortium involving Delfi Estonia, the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) and Le Monde.

The findings indicate that Russia-linked operations can involve relatively small payments to perpetrators, followed by coordinated efforts to turn the incidents into political controversies.

The resulting problem for European governments is not merely identifying those responsible for vandalism. It is establishing the role of foreign sponsors and preventing individual provocations from achieving their intended publicity.

France, Germany and Poland face sustained Russian hybrid operations.

On May 27, 2026, Agnès Romatet-Espagne, director of international, strategic and technological affairs at France’s General Secretariat for Defence and National Security (SGDSN), addressed the French National Assembly’s Defence Committee.

She warned that Russian hybrid operations rely systematically on intermediaries who are not Russian citizens.

According to her testimony, France, Germany and Poland are particularly exposed because of their political and military support for Ukraine.

The use of foreign nationals allows organisers to distance themselves from the incidents and complicates efforts to establish responsibility.

Such operations may involve people recruited through online messaging platforms and paid to perform specific tasks. The physical action can be completed quickly, while the political and media consequences extend well beyond the perpetrators’ presence in the country.

Romatet-Espagne’s assessment provides the broader security context for a series of incidents in France that have subsequently been connected to Russian intelligence activities.

Paris attacks on synagogues and mosques revealed a coordinated network

Two operations carried out in Paris during 2025 illustrate the methods described by French officials.

During the night of May 30–31, three synagogues and the Shoah Memorial were targeted with green paint.

Several months later, during the night of September 8–9, nine severed pig heads were left outside mosques and Muslim cultural centres in Paris and its neighbouring suburbs.

Some bore the surname of French President Emmanuel Macron, written in blue ink.

At first, the incidents appeared to involve separate forms of hostility against Jewish and Muslim communities. Subsequent investigations established that a common network had participated in both operations.

In late December 2025, a court in the Serbian city of Smederevo convicted three Serbian nationals for their involvement in the attacks.

The judgements attributed instructions and financing to Russian intelligence structures.

The court’s findings were subsequently examined by Forum 18 journalist Felix Corley, who reported that the operations were intended to incite religious and national intolerance and to destabilise France and Germany.

The three men received sentences ranging from six months of house arrest to 18 months’ imprisonment. Other individuals remained under investigation.

The judgements established a Russian intelligence connection but did not identify which agency directed the operations.

That qualification matters. Manandiz notes that France has officially attributed the separate 2023 blue Star of David graffiti operation to Russia’s FSB. The Serbian judgements concerning the 2025 attacks do not establish FSB involvement specifically.

French investigators also examined a possible connection to Russian military intelligence, the GRU, according to reporting by Le Monde.

Leaked documents reveal how the provocations were organised

A major development came in May 2026, when an international consortium of journalists published leaked documents concerning Russian influence operations.

The investigation was conducted by Martin Laine and Marta Vunš of Delfi Estonia and Ilya Lozovsky of OCCRP, with contributions from partner publications including Le Monde.

The documents connected the Paris mosque attacks to an influence-operation ecosystem involving the Social Design Agency (SDA), a Russian public-relations company already sanctioned by Western governments, and officials within Russia’s presidential administration.

Among the files was a nine-page document titled “Report on Operation Pig’s Head.”

According to OCCRP, the report described six operatives arriving in Paris on September 7, conducting reconnaissance on September 8 and leaving the country after the attacks.

The document contained photographs taken during preparations and after the pig heads had been placed outside religious sites.

It concluded with a compilation of international media reports covering the incident.

The existence of such a document indicates that publicity was treated as a significant operational outcome, rather than an incidental consequence.

The reporting also uncovered details about the tenth pig head.

According to Manandiz’s column, the perpetrators purchased ten from a farmer in Normandy. Nine were deposited outside religious sites, while security personnel reportedly prevented the placement of the remaining one at a mosque in Saint-Denis.

This detail illustrates the level of planning behind an operation that initially appeared to be spontaneous vandalism. The specific account of the prevented placement comes from Manandiz’s column; it has not been independently confirmed here from the original operational document.

OCCRP cautioned that some leaked files lacked identifiable authors, making it difficult to determine whether individual operations originated directly with the SDA, the presidential administration or another organisation within the network.

Publicity is part of the operation

The leaked documents reveal a recurring approach: organise a visible provocation, generate images, trigger a public reaction and measure the resulting coverage.

Manandiz summarises the imbalance between European investigators and the organisers in a concise observation.

“The court deals with the perpetrator, while the client counts the reach.”

The distinction helps explain why relatively inexpensive operations can create significant security challenges.

The immediate perpetrators may face criminal prosecution. Those who commission the action can remain outside the jurisdiction of the targeted country, while the resulting images circulate across social networks and news outlets.

The first hours after an incident are particularly significant because photographs and claims about responsibility can spread before authorities establish what happened.

For example, attacks on Jewish or Muslim sites may initially be interpreted as evidence of hostility from other religious or political groups.

If an operation is designed to encourage that interpretation, the resulting controversy can serve the interests of its organisers even if the perpetrators are later identified.

The evidence does not establish that every such operation successfully changes public opinion. It does, however, show that media attention was an explicit consideration in the planning of at least some documented attacks.

Bulgarian and Moldovan cases reveal further difficulties for French authorities

The Paris mosque attacks were not the first suspected foreign-directed provocations to attract the attention of French investigators.

In May 2024, approximately 500 red handprints were painted on buildings in Paris, including the Wall of the Righteous near the Shoah Memorial.

On October 31, 2025, a Paris court convicted four Bulgarian nationals in connection with the operation.

According to Manandiz, the court treated the incident as hostile interference coordinated from abroad and intended to deepen existing divisions within French society.

However, the offence occurred before France introduced a new aggravating circumstance for crimes committed in the interests of a foreign power.

As a result, the court could not apply the later provision retroactively.

A separate series of incidents involved images of coffins and messages concerning French soldiers in Ukraine.

On June 1, 2024, five coffins covered with French flags were placed near the Eiffel Tower. Additional coffin-themed graffiti appeared on buildings in Paris later that month.

According to Manandiz, the perpetrators received relatively modest payments. French investigators suspected a Moldovan national, Aleksandr Grigorenko, of organising part of the activity.

The analyst describes Grigorenko as a supporter of Moldova’s pro-Russian Șor political movement.

However, French authorities had not officially established a Russian state connection in that case.

On April 16, 2026, seven defendants were acquitted of charges under an old provision concerning actions intended to demoralise the armed forces, although fines were imposed for other offences.

The prosecution had relied on legislation dating from 1940. The outcome illustrated the limitations of applying older criminal provisions to contemporary influence operations.

France’s 2024 law offers stronger penalties for foreign-directed crimes

France has since introduced legislation intended to address some of these difficulties.

Law No. 2024-850, dated July 25, 2024, created an aggravating circumstance for certain crimes committed to serve the interests of a foreign state or a foreign-controlled organisation.

The provision, incorporated into Article 411-12 of the French Criminal Code, covers offences including property destruction and damage, potentially encompassing certain forms of vandalism.

For offences ordinarily punishable by up to three years’ imprisonment, the maximum custodial sentence can be doubled.

For more serious offences, the law provides a graduated increase in maximum penalties.

A crime normally carrying a five-year maximum, for example, may carry a maximum of seven years when the aggravating circumstance is established.

The law therefore does not automatically double every prison sentence.

France’s Ministry of Justice has issued guidance explaining the scope of the provision and its application to criminal proceedings.

Manandiz argues that the change represents an important advance but came too late for some earlier cases.

In his analysis, the timing of the legislation explains why perpetrators involved in incidents during the first half of 2024 could not be prosecuted under the new foreign-interference provision.

He also cites a later case involving three Serbian suspects arrested in Antibes after a synagogue was attacked with green paint. The prosecutors applied the new aggravating circumstance in that case.

The suspects had not yet been convicted at the time of his November 11 publication.

Why Manandiz wants common European criminal standards

Manandiz argues that national measures alone are insufficient because the networks responsible for these operations frequently operate across borders.

The same type of provocation may involve organisers in one country, perpetrators recruited in another and targets located in a third.

Differences between national criminal codes can complicate cooperation and create uneven consequences for similar conduct.

In his November 11 column, Manandiz proposes a common minimum European legal standard for offences committed in the interests of a foreign state.

The proposal reflects his assessment that European authorities need comparable legal tools to address coordinated foreign interference.

He also calls for a shared European register of cases involving suspected proxy operations.

Such a mechanism could allow investigators in Paris, Berlin and Warsaw to compare recruitment methods, payments, travel arrangements and communication networks.

The proposed register is an analytical recommendation, not an established EU system.

Its usefulness would depend on reliable evidence-sharing procedures and safeguards to distinguish confirmed foreign-directed operations from unrelated domestic crimes.

According to Manandiz, a recurring operational pattern involves recruitment through Telegram, payments in cash or cryptocurrency, and perpetrators leaving the targeted country shortly after completing the assignment.

Identifying these similarities could help authorities recognise when apparently unrelated incidents share a common organiser.

Analysis: Europe’s challenge is identifying the sponsors, not just the perpetrators

The main challenge of these operations is separating those who commission an action from those who carry it out.

The Serbian court judgements establish that Russian intelligence structures financed particular attacks in France.

The leaked documents examined by OCCRP provide additional evidence of an organised influence-operation network connected to Russian state structures.

The French proceedings illustrate a different problem: even when police identify perpetrators, the available criminal charges may not adequately reflect the foreign-directed character of the operation.

The cases also show that investigations can produce different levels of certainty.

In some instances, Russian intelligence financing has been established in court. In others, investigators suspect Russian involvement but have not demonstrated the connection sufficiently for judicial findings.

The strategic significance of the documented cases lies in their relatively low operational cost and their potential to create broader public consequences.

The attacks target sensitive symbols, including religious institutions, Holocaust memorials and issues related to support for Ukraine.

As a result, they can prompt political reactions and social tensions disproportionate to the resources used to organise them.

France’s strengthened legislation may improve the ability to prosecute foreign-directed offences. But the capacity to investigate cross-border networks, trace financial relationships and connect multiple incidents remains equally important.

The investigations into vandalism and religious provocations in France reveal a method of foreign interference based on outsourced activity, political symbolism and media amplification.

Serbian court judgements establish Russian intelligence involvement in attacks against Jewish and Muslim religious sites in Paris. Documents investigated by OCCRP and its partners connect the operations to a wider Russian influence ecosystem.

Paul-Michel Manandiz’s analysis identifies a central problem in Europe’s response: national courts frequently deal with individual perpetrators, while organisers and sponsors remain beyond their immediate reach.

France’s 2024 law has strengthened the criminal consequences for certain foreign-directed offences, but the experience of earlier cases demonstrates how legal timing, evidentiary limitations and cross-border activity can complicate prosecutions.

The cases support the argument for stronger international investigative cooperation and more consistent legal treatment of foreign interference, while leaving unresolved the full identities and responsibilities of some of the organisers.

Sources:

The article is based primarily on the following original analysis and investigations:

Paul-Michel Manandiz, European Center for Strategic Analysis (CEAS), European Pravda, November 11, 2026: Vandalism on Demand: How the Kremlin Organises Hybrid Provocations and Why It Succeeds.

Martin Laine, Marta Vunš and Ilya Lozovsky, Delfi Estonia/OCCRP International Investigation: Leaked Documents Reveal Russian Cognitive Strikes Against the West.

Felix Corley, Forum 18, April 27, 2026: Why Did an Intelligence Service Sponsor Attacks on French Places of Worship?.

French National Assembly, May 27, 2026: Hearing of Agnès Romatet-Espagne.

French Ministry of Justice and Légifrance: Article 411-12 of the French Criminal Code.

Michel

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