Our investigation traces how Germany’s Overton Magazin has become a recurring source of material for Russian state media, appeared in the Kremlin-aligned Doppelgänger influence operation, and provided editorial platforms to individuals associated with Russia’s propaganda infrastructure. Together, these connections reveal a German-language information channel through which narratives aligned with Moscow’s strategic interests gain visibility and legitimacy in Germany.
The German online publication Overton Magazin has emerged as a recurring source of political commentary and interviews used by Russian media and influence networks to reinforce narratives critical of NATO, Ukraine, European sanctions and Western governments.
Our research identifies three interconnected patterns: the documented dissemination of Overton content by the Russian-aligned Doppelgänger influence operation; the republication of its material by Russian outlets, including Sputnik, Lenta.ru, Rambler and International Affairs; and Overton’s sustained editorial engagement with figures associated with Russian state media or sanctioned by the European Union for activities linked to Russian hybrid threats.
At the centre of these connections is Overton editor Roberto De Lapuente, whose interviews and commentary have repeatedly featured politicians opposing Western support for Ukraine, former Russian state-media contributors and individuals challenging EU measures against Russian information operations.
The significance of these findings lies in how political narratives circulate between domestic German publications and Russia’s wider media environment.
Overton articles present criticism of Western foreign policy through German politicians, retired military officers, journalists and commentators. Russian outlets subsequently reproduce selected arguments, turning material originally published in Germany into supporting content for their own coverage.
The same content has also attracted the attention of covert influence networks seeking to shape German public opinion.
One of the most significant findings concerns Overton’s documented appearance in Doppelgänger, a Russian-aligned influence operation targeting Western public opinion.
Doppelgänger emerged in 2022 as an extensive information-manipulation campaign involving websites impersonating established news organisations, coordinated social media accounts and the systematic distribution of misleading political content.
Its activities have targeted several countries, including Germany, France, the United States and Ukraine.
In Germany, the operation circulated messages attacking government support for Ukraine, questioning NATO, exploiting domestic political disputes and undermining confidence in democratic institutions.
A February 2024 investigation by cybersecurity researchers SentinelLABS and ClearSky Cyber Security, subsequently updated in April 2025, identified Overton Magazin among the third-party publications whose articles were disseminated by the campaign.
The report, Doppelgänger: Russia-Aligned Influence Operation Targets Germany, documented a coordinated network of X accounts directing users to selected news articles through intermediary websites.
Researchers identified four major elements of the operation’s infrastructure: initial redirection websites, secondary redirectors, servers used for campaign monitoring, and destination websites hosting or presenting the selected material.
Overton appeared in the researchers’ technical indicators alongside other external publications, including Telepolis, Freie Welt and Deutschland-Kurier.
SentinelLABS classified overton-magazin.de as a third-party website whose articles Doppelgänger disseminated.
The finding establishes that the Russian-aligned operation selected Overton material for redistribution as part of its German-language influence activity.
The investigation highlighted the Overton article Der Wertewesten kommt, published in November 2023.
The article portrayed Ukraine’s integration with Western economic and political institutions as a process benefiting foreign corporations and investors.
Rather than treating Ukraine primarily as a country defending itself against Russia’s invasion, the article presented its Western orientation as an arrangement through which powerful external actors acquire economic advantages and political influence.
One passage argued that Ukraine had allowed itself to become a plaything of Western global interests in its efforts to preserve sovereignty.
SentinelLABS highlighted precisely this framing in its analysis of Doppelgänger’s propaganda content.
The narrative corresponds with a recurring theme in Russian information campaigns: Ukraine is depicted as an instrument of Western geopolitical and economic interests rather than an independent political actor.
The article’s emphasis on alleged Western profiteering also reinforces the argument that the United States and its allies benefit from prolonging the war, which was launched, in fact, by Russia.
Doppelgänger’s decision to circulate this material shows how an existing German publication can supply content for a foreign influence operation without the operation having to produce the original article.
The mechanism is particularly relevant because externally published German-language commentary can appear more credible to local audiences than messages originating directly from Russian government channels.
The Overton example demonstrates the role that third-party publications can play in extending the reach of narratives selected by coordinated influence networks.
Our research identifies multiple instances in which Russian media outlets reproduced, cited or promoted Overton material.
The examples involve Russian state-owned media, Russian-language news aggregators and other publications operating within Russia’s pro-government information environment.
A consistent feature is the use of German politicians, journalists or former military officials as authoritative external voices supporting arguments critical of NATO and Western strategy in Ukraine.
One of the clearest examples involves Sevim Dağdelen, a politician with the Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW).
On September 13, 2026, Overton published an interview conducted by De Lapuente under the headline Das BSW ist jetzt konsequent als Systemopposition aufgestellt.
Asked whether Germany should remain a NATO member, Dağdelen answered: “Deutschland muss aus der NATO austreten.”
She argued that Germany should become neutral and stop following US corporate and geopolitical interests.
She also described the Russia-Ukraine war as “NATO’s involvement in Ukraine as a proxy war against Russia” and called for closer economic relations with Moscow and the BRICS countries.
The interview was subsequently reported by Russian state propaganda outlets.
On September 13, Russian news website Lenta.ru, which is under EU sanctions for spreading Russian propaganda, published a report focusing on Dağdelen’s call for Germany to leave NATO in the interests of national self-preservation.
The Russian news platform Rambler also carried the story, identifying Overton as the original interview source.
Both examples illustrate how Overton-generated political content enters Russian news circulation.
The original interview supplied an identifiable German political voice. Russian outlets then selected its foreign-policy arguments for redistribution.
This evidence is particularly valuable for narratives depicting opposition to NATO as an increasingly prominent position within Germany itself.
Another documented example involves retired German General Harald Kujat.
In April 2024, Overton published an extensive interview with Kujat under the headline Es ist ein fataler Irrtum zu glauben, dass sich die Zukunftsaussichten der Ukraine verbessern, je länger der Krieg dauert.
Kujat argued that prolonging the war would not improve Ukraine’s prospects and warned of the consequences of a military defeat.
He advocated an early cessation of hostilities and negotiations between Russia and Ukraine.
On April 29, 2024, Russian state-owned Sputnik quoted Kujat’s Overton interview in an article presenting NATO’s continued support for Ukraine as a potentially fatal strategic mistake.
The Russian publication International Affairs, published by Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, also drew on Kujat’s statements.
Here, the original source’s professional status adds credibility to the reproduced argument. A retired senior German military officer becomes an external authority whose views Russian publications can invoke in their own assessment of the conflict.
The argument that continued Western assistance risks worsening Ukraine’s position is presented through a German military voice rather than through a Russian government spokesperson.
A further case involves the Overton article Was Medien und Politik des Westens über Russland nicht verstehen.
The article argued that Russian soldiers had become more motivated since the beginning of the full-scale invasion in February 2022.
It advanced the interpretation that Russian personnel increasingly see the war as a defence of their homeland against the collective West.
The article also presented countries of the Global South as supportive of Russia’s struggle against what it described as Western imperial arrogance.
On February 14, 2024, Sputnik published Debunking Myths: US $60Bln Handout Won’t Save Zelensky’s Dying Regime, incorporating material from the Overton article.
The overlap is direct: Overton’s assessment of Russian military motivation supported a Russian state-media narrative that emphasised Russian resilience and Western strategic miscalculation.
The combination of the three examples reveals a recurring circulation pattern.
Overton publishes material expressing views critical of Western strategy. Russian media then identify and redistribute those views, presenting German sources as corroboration for narratives already prominent in the Russian information environment.
Our research also identifies sustained editorial contact between Overton and Thomas Röper, operator of the German-language website Anti-Spiegel.
Röper lives in Saint Petersburg and publishes Kremlin-friendly propaganda commentary on Russia, Ukraine, Germany and Western foreign policy.
On May 20, 2025, the Council of the European Union placed Röper under restrictive measures targeting Russian hybrid threats.
The Council identified him among individuals involved in activities undermining democratic political processes in Germany.
Three days later, on May 23, Overton published De Lapuente’s interview with Röper, titled Erfahren habe ich davon, als Correctiv darüber berichtet hat.
The interview focused on Röper’s reaction to the sanctions and his allegations concerning European restrictions on independent journalism.
It provided a platform for his argument that EU institutions were using restrictive measures against critics of prevailing Western political positions.
Overton returned to Röper on December 8, 2025, with another extensive interview:
Die Sanktionen bestätigen mich darin, meine Arbeit nun erst recht fortzusetzen.
The second interview concentrated on the practical and political consequences of the sanctions and Röper’s determination to continue publishing.
Our research also identifies reciprocal circulation between the two websites; they share the same narratives for German audiences, and one of them is sanctioned for spreading Russian propaganda.
On Anti-Spiegel, Röper referenced his interview with De Lapuente in a 2025 article, Was für eine verrückte Woche, directing his readers to the Overton conversation.
The relationship consequently extends beyond a single interview.
Overton provided Röper with repeated access to its readership, while Anti-Spiegel promoted the exchange to its audience.
The result is an identifiable connection between two German-language information platforms covering Russia-related controversies and presenting EU sanctions as a threat to dissenting journalism.
The case of Alina Lipp adds another dimension to Overton’s engagement with Russia-related media figures.
Lipp is a German-born blogger known for her reporting from Russian-controlled parts of Ukraine and spreading Kremlin propaganda.
The European Union sanctioned her in May 2025 under its framework for addressing Russian destabilisation activities.
The EU accused Lipp of systematically disseminating disinformation concerning Russia’s war against Ukraine, delegitimising Ukrainian authorities and spreading narratives supporting the Russian military.
Our research identifies De Lapuente’s participation in a Berlin discussion on July 3, 2025, titled EU-Wahrheitsregime versus Pressefreiheit — EU Truth Regime versus Press Freedom.
The discussion concerned EU measures against Lipp, Röper and Hüseyin Doğru.
Participants identified in the event documentation included:
The event reportedly opened with video contributions from Lipp in Donbas and Röper in Moscow.
Its framing presented the sanctions controversy primarily as a question of press freedom and the European Union’s authority to determine acceptable public discourse.
Viewed alongside Overton’s interviews with Röper and its subsequent reporting on Doğru, the event illustrates a recurring emphasis on challenges to EU sanctions directed at individuals accused by European authorities of participating in Russian information activities.
Overton’s coverage of Hüseyin Doğru is among the clearest examples of how the publication frames European measures against individuals associated with Russia-linked information operations.
Doğru founded RED, a media platform operated through the Turkish company AFA Medya.
In May 2025, the Council of the European Union sanctioned Doğru and AFA Medya in connection with Russian hybrid threats.
On July 2, 2025, the German Foreign Office publicly addressed RED’s activities.
Its representative stated: “Es bestehen aber enge Verflechtungen mit dem russischen Staatsmedium ‘RT’.”
The ministry described close connections between RED and the Russian state-owned broadcaster RT.
It went further, stating: “Wir können heute verbindlich sagen, dass ‘red.’ von Russland gezielt zur Informationsmanipulation eingesetzt wird.”
The German government said this assessment resulted from a national attribution procedure based on analysis by German security authorities.
Despite this official assessment, Overton’s subsequent coverage focused on Doğru’s treatment as a journalist affected by European sanctions.
On March 26, 2026, De Lapuente published Hüseyin Dogru: Sanktioniert – und bald obdachlos?.
The article concentrated on the sanctions’ effects on Doğru’s livelihood and family circumstances.
It presented the financial restrictions as a form of pressure capable of destroying the social and economic foundations of an individual’s life.
The broader questions about RED’s documented connections to Russian state media were displaced by a narrative that centred on the personal consequences of EU measures.
In a second article, Dogru und keine Helfer, published on April 3, 2026, De Lapuente sharpened that argument.
He presented Doğru as a victim of politically motivated state action and warned other government critics that similar measures could eventually target them.
The article argues: “Dogru ist das Opfer von Hasskriminalität im Amt – und eines sollten regierungskritische Geister wissen: Der nächste Dogru bist du!”
The phrase transforms the sanctions case into a warning addressed to a much wider German audience.
A measure introduced by European authorities in response to alleged Russian hybrid activity becomes, in Overton’s presentation, an example of the political system persecuting dissent.
Another Overton article, Folterinstrument EU-Sanktionen, extended the criticism to the cases of Doğru, former Swiss intelligence officer Jacques Baud, sanctioned by the EU for spreading Russian propaganda, and political activist Nathalie Yamb.
The article discussed the social isolation, financial consequences and psychological pressure associated with sanctions.
It compared these consequences to forms of psychological torture and criticised human-rights organisations for their response to the cases.
The central rhetorical move is consistent across the coverage: individuals designated by European authorities under sanctions frameworks are portrayed as victims of political punishment, while the legitimacy of European institutions becomes the principal subject of attack.
This framing is significant because Russian information operations frequently portray European responses to Kremlin-linked activity as evidence that Western governments are abandoning democratic freedoms.
Overton’s coverage provides examples of the same argument appearing in German domestic political commentary.
Our research identifies an earlier professional relationship between Overton editor Roberto De Lapuente and Gert Ewen Ungar, a German journalist associated with Russian state broadcaster RT DE.
The relationship developed through the German alternative media project Neulandrebellen.
De Lapuente established Neulandrebellen with Tom J. Wellbrock in 2017. Ungar joined the project in February 2022, and the two subsequently worked together.
This background provides another documented professional connection between Overton’s editor and a figure associated with the Russian state-media environment.
The relationship later deteriorated.
On May 28, 2026, De Lapuente published Deutscher RT-Journalist fordert Bombardierung Deutschlands.
The article criticised Ungar for his statements regarding potential Russian military attacks on Germany.
De Lapuente wrote: “Den Journalisten Gert Ewen Ungar gibt es nicht mehr – aus ihm ist ein Propagandist geworden, der sich um journalistische Mindeststandards wenig schert.”
The criticism provides an important insight into the relationship between Overton and the Russian state-media environment.
The two journalists had previously collaborated, but De Lapuente publicly broke with Ungar after what he characterised as an abandonment of basic journalistic standards.
The episode reveals both the existence of professional connections across these media environments and the tensions that can develop within them.
Another example concerns Ivan Blagoy, a correspondent for Russia’s state-owned Channel One.
On December 1, 2024, Overton published De Lapuente’s interview with Blagoy under the headline Propaganda? Ich kann nur empfehlen etwas zurückhaltender zu sein.
The interview followed a dispute over the departure of Russian journalists from Germany and the reciprocal expulsions affecting German ARD correspondents in Russia.
Overton justified the interview on the grounds that German media had insufficiently represented the Russian journalists’ perspective.
The publication introduced the exchange by arguing that an accurate understanding of the events required hearing both sides.
Blagoy used the interview to criticise German reporting on Russia, challenge allegations of Russian propaganda and condemn German military assistance to Ukraine.
He invoked the historical memory of Nazi Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union when discussing German weapons supplied to Ukraine.
In response to criticism of Russian journalism, Blagoy presented accusations of propaganda as politically selective.
The interview gave a journalist employed by a Russian state-controlled broadcaster direct access to Overton’s German readership and an opportunity to contest accusations concerning the credibility of Russian media.
This example illustrates a distinct channel of narrative circulation: Russian state-media personnel appearing directly in a German publication, rather than their statements being reproduced through secondary Russian coverage.
Our research identifies repeated Overton interviews with German journalist and author Patrik Baab.
Baab became the subject of controversy after travelling to Russian-occupied eastern Ukraine in September 2022, during the period of Russian-organised annexation referendums.
His trip prompted disputes with academic institutions where he had been involved in teaching journalism.
Overton subsequently provided Baab with multiple opportunities to discuss both his experiences in Ukraine and his criticism of Western media.
Overton published Herr Baab, Sie bekommen hier kein Bier!, an interview with Baab about his dispute with Kiel University and a court decision in his favour.
The interview framed the dispute around academic freedom, professional independence and the treatment of journalists who challenge the coverage of Russia’s war.
Baab used the exchange to accuse German media and academic institutions of being intolerant towards dissenting perspectives.
Overton returned to Baab in Wenn Sie das einmal gesehen haben, sind Sie von solch dümmlicher Propaganda-Presse geheilt.
The interview focused on his travels in Ukraine and Russian-occupied territories, the conflict and his criticism of Western reporting.
The discussion offered Baab an extended opportunity to promote his interpretation of developments on the ground.
In a third interview, Ein Journalist muss Konflikte suchen, he addressed German public broadcasting and the professional obligations of journalism.
Across these three interviews, Overton repeatedly presented Baab as a journalist challenging leading media reporting and defending an alternative approach to coverage of Russia’s war against Ukraine.
The recurring editorial relationship reinforces a broader pattern: the publication devotes substantial attention to journalists who present themselves as critics of Western reporting and political consensus.
The relationship between Overton and Sevim Dağdelen extends beyond the September 2026 interview subsequently reused by Russian media.
Our research identifies a series of interviews conducted by De Lapuente between 2024 and 2026, alongside Dağdelen’s regular contributions under the title Dagdelen direkt.
Her recurring themes include opposition to NATO, criticism of US geopolitical influence, rejection of German arms deliveries to Ukraine, opposition to sanctions against Russia and support for diplomatic engagement with Moscow.
The documented interview sequence includes:
April 8, 2024 — Die übrigen NATO-Mitglieder unterwerfen sich der geopolitischen Kontrolle der USA.
The discussion focused on NATO’s internal power structure and Dağdelen’s argument that European members remain subordinate to US strategic interests.
June 17, 2024 — Es ist putzig, wie der Kanzler so tut, als hätte er in der NATO was zu sagen.
Dağdelen challenged NATO’s self-presentation as a defensive alliance and criticised Germany’s position within it.
February 18, 2025 — Sevim Dağdelen: Die Brandmauer-Politik ist krachend gescheitert.
The interview examined German domestic politics and the BSW’s position on other parties.
October 21, 2025 — Sevim Dağdelen: Der Spannungsfall ist fast schon Kriegsrecht.
Dağdelen discussed German security policy and the potential domestic consequences of military escalation.
January 22, 2026 — Desinformation ist ein Kampfbegriff der Herrschenden.
The discussion centred on the political use of the term disinformation and on the criticism of institutions claiming authority to identify misleading information.
September 13, 2026 — Das BSW ist jetzt konsequent als Systemopposition aufgestellt.
Dağdelen again called for Germany’s withdrawal from NATO, advocated neutrality and criticised the confrontation with Russia.
This sequence shows that Overton’s engagement with Dağdelen is sustained rather than occasional.
Her foreign-policy positions receive repeated exposure through the outlet, and selected statements have subsequently travelled into Russian media.
The September 2026 example demonstrates how a position developed within German political debate can be redistributed internationally through Russian outlets seeking authoritative German criticism of NATO.
Another documented connection involves Florian Warweg, a German journalist who formerly worked for Russia Today DE (German edition).
After leaving RT DE in 2022, Warweg worked for NachDenkSeiten and subsequently moved to the Ostdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung.
On February 17, 2026, Overton published De Lapuente’s interview with Warweg, titled “Ossis können auch Zeitung!”.
The conversation addressed the creation of a new newspaper focused on eastern Germany, media representation and dissatisfaction with established German journalism.
Warweg’s career illustrates movement between Russian state media and German alternative news platforms.
The broader relevance is the intersection of media criticism, foreign-policy commentary and debates over the legitimacy of restrictions on Russia-linked information sources.
Warweg also participated in the July 2025 Berlin discussion concerning EU sanctions and press freedom, alongside De Lapuente and other journalists.
His appearance in both contexts places him within the same circle of public discussion about Russian media, German journalism and European information policy.
Our research additionally identifies contributors whose professional publishing histories overlap with Russian state-owned media.
Rüdiger Rauls has contributed material to Overton and to Sputnik, a Russian state-owned international media outlet.
Ulrich Heyden has contributed to Overton and published work for RT DE.
These examples are relevant because they document overlapping author networks between German alternative publications and Russian state-media outlets.
Cross-publication authorship creates pathways through which journalists, sources and interpretations can circulate between different media organisations.
When the same contributors write for German alternative outlets and Russian state-controlled publications, audiences in those environments may encounter similar political perspectives, themes and arguments.
The presence of such contributors complements the direct republication examples involving Sputnik and the interviews with figures such as Röper, Blagoy and Warweg.
Together, they show that Overton’s relationship with the Russia-related propaganda media environment operates through several forms of contact: publication of articles, interviews, shared contributors, professional histories and subsequent redistribution.
A recurring narrative: Russia as a response to Western aggression
The examples reveal recurring patterns in Overton’s coverage of Russia, NATO and Ukraine.
One is the presentation of NATO and the United States as principal drivers of European confrontation.
This appears in Dağdelen’s interviews, where NATO is described as an instrument of American geopolitical control and Western involvement in Ukraine is characterised as a proxy war.
A second is the portrayal of Ukraine as strategically dependent on outside powers.
The November 2023 article selected by Doppelgänger depicted Western economic interests as beneficiaries of Ukraine’s vulnerability and suggested that the country’s sovereignty was being compromised through its relationship with the West.
A third is the emphasis on Russian strength and Western miscalculation.
The article reproduced by Sputnik in February 2024 portrayed Russian soldiers as increasingly motivated by a perceived confrontation with the collective West.
The Kujat interview similarly provided arguments questioning the sustainability of Ukraine’s military position and the rationale for continued Western support.
A fourth concerns the presentation of European sanctions and measures against Russian information operations as instruments of political repression.
This argument appears in Overton’s repeated coverage of Röper and Doğru, the July 2025 sanctions discussion involving Lipp and other participants, and the April 2026 article comparing the effects of sanctions with psychological torture.
The framing redirects attention towards European institutions and their exercise of power.
Taken together, these themes correspond with recurring narratives in Russian state-media coverage: Western responsibility for the conflict, Ukraine’s alleged dependence on Washington, the strategic resilience of Russia and the supposed erosion of democratic freedoms in Europe.
Our investigation identifies how these narratives appear in a German publication and, in several cases, subsequently enter Russian media or coordinated influence networks.
The evidence reveals a media circulation system operating across national and institutional boundaries.
At one end, Overton publishes German-language articles, interviews, and political commentaries. At the other are Russian state media, Russian news platforms and coordinated information operations selecting material for further distribution.
Overton occupies an intermediary position in this process.
Its German-language content can be used to reinforce claims that opposition to NATO, scepticism towards Ukraine and criticism of European sanctions are grounded in the views of German politicians, military officers and journalists.
That function is especially apparent in the republication of interviews with Dağdelen and Kujat.
Both cases provide Russian outlets with identifiable German speakers whose positions support arguments prominent in Russian foreign-policy messaging.
The Doppelgänger case demonstrates a different form of amplification.
There, a coordinated Russia-aligned operation selected material from Overton and other third-party websites for distribution through a network of social media accounts.
The article’s origin in a German publication allowed the operation to circulate a narrative through existing local media content.
The relationships with Röper, Doğru, Lipp, Blagoy, Warweg, Baab and contributors associated with Russian state media show another dimension: the sustained exchange of interviews, commentary and professional perspectives across the German alternative media environment.
These connections collectively create opportunities for narratives to move between publications and audiences.
Particularly significant is Overton’s treatment of sanctions.
European authorities describe the measures against figures such as Röper, Lipp and Doğru as responses to Russian destabilisation and information-manipulation activities.
Overton’s coverage instead frequently foregrounds restrictions on the sanctioned individuals’ personal rights, professional activities and political expression.
This establishes a recurring contrast between the European authorities’ security framing and Overton’s presentation of the same measures through the language of political persecution and press freedom.
The publication’s critical treatment of former collaborator Gert Ewen Ungar also shows that its relationships with Russian media figures contain disagreements. Yet the documented patterns of republication, editorial access and narrative convergence remain central to understanding its wider role.
The broader mechanism is one of cross-border narrative amplification.
A viewpoint published in Germany can acquire legitimacy through its local origins. Once cited by Russian media or circulated through an influence operation, it reaches audiences beyond its initial readership and can reinforce the political arguments of those redistributing it.
This process makes domestic media ecosystems relevant to the study of foreign information influence.
Our investigation identifies Overton Magazin as a recurring source of German-language material used by Russian state media and a documented content source for the Doppelgänger influence operation.
The evidence extends across several years and multiple forms of interaction.
SentinelLABS recorded Overton among the third-party websites distributed by Doppelgänger. Sputnik reproduced Overton material addressing Russian military morale and quoted retired General Harald Kujat. Lenta.ru and Rambler reported Sevim Dağdelen’s call for Germany to leave NATO, originally expressed in an Overton interview.
Overton’s editorial archive also documents repeated engagement with EU-sanctioned commentator Thomas Röper, extensive coverage defending Hüseyin Doğru against sanctions, participation in discussions involving Alina Lipp, and interviews with Russian state-media personnel and journalists whose careers intersect with Russia Today and Sputnik.
Its recurring contributors and interview subjects reinforce a set of narratives centred on Western responsibility for the war, criticism of NATO, Russian strategic resilience and distrust of European institutions.
The findings illustrate how Russian information networks can draw on material produced within Germany’s own political and media debates.
Overton’s significance lies in this combination of editorial output, recurring professional connections and demonstrable redistribution of its material through Russia-linked propaganda channels.
The resulting circulation gives selected narratives multiple points of entry into public debate, moving them between German alternative media, Russian state-controlled publications and coordinated influence operations.
In March 2022, the European Union imposed restrictions on RT and Sputnik, two of the…
For years, they appeared on Ukrainian television as "alternative voices", commentators and journalists. Their broadcasts…
France's decision to deport Xenia Fedorova, the former editor-in-chief of RT France, marks one of…
The European Union is preparing to deny short-stay visas to people who fought for Russia…
Reports of hate crimes targeting Ukrainians in Poland rose sharply during the first half of…
The EU says Medinsky, who has led Russian delegations in talks with Ukraine, supported Kremlin…