Sanctioned Oligarch Funds Russian Church Network in Europe to Target Ukrainian Refugees

A sanctioned Ukrainian oligarch is bankrolling the expansion of Russian Orthodox Church parishes across Europe, using them as cover to collect data on Ukrainian refugees and build a pro-Russian electorate, according to Ukrainian intelligence.

Vadym Novinsky, a former Ukrainian MP currently under sanctions and living in Europe, remains the primary financier behind the growth of Russian Orthodox Church structures on the continent, Liga.net reports, citing a source in Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service. According to the intelligence source, Novinsky funds approximately 90% of new parishes being established in European cities where no churches of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine are present — effectively moving into a vacuum and positioning Russian-aligned structures as the only option for Ukrainian worshippers.

Data Collection Under the Cover of Charity

As Ukrainian outlets report, the parishes are not operating purely as religious institutions. Working in coordination with Russian counterparts, Novinsky is reportedly developing religious centres where, under the guise of charitable activity, databases of Ukrainian citizens are being compiled for future use in political influence operations. Intelligence analysts describe this as a long-term effort to shape a pro-Russian electorate among Ukrainian refugees — targeting a community that, depending on how the Russian-Ukrainian war develops, may eventually return home and participate in Ukrainian elections.

The scale of the Kremlin’s investment in such efforts is significant. According to the Foreign Intelligence Service source, Russia increased funding for soft power projects abroad by roughly 40 to 45% for 2026, though specific figures were not disclosed.

Brussels as a Case Study

The Belgian capital has emerged as a particularly active site for this operation. According to Liga.net, Russian clergy in Brussels regularly rent premises from other religious communities, gathering Ukrainian refugees under the banner of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church—which formally broke from Moscow’s jurisdiction in May 2022. The use of the UOC name is significant: it allows these structures to present themselves as independent of Moscow while continuing to operate within its orbit.

The ambiguity is compounded by the status of Metropolitan Onufriy, the head of the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine, who formally remains a member of the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church—a detail that undercuts the narrative of a clean institutional separation.

A Broader Destabilisation Strategy

Using religious structures as intelligence and influence platforms during periods of mass migration is not improvisation — it is doctrine. As Mezha notes, analysts see the targeting of refugee communities as a calculated choice: people who have been uprooted are harder to reach by local institutions, more likely to seek familiar cultural or spiritual anchors, and therefore more exposed to organised outreach from actors with an agenda.

The Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence Service has urged EU lawmakers and governments to treat this not as a fringe concern but as an active security risk — one that requires closer scrutiny of foreign-linked religious and charitable networks operating among Ukrainian communities across Europe.