For years, they appeared on Ukrainian television as “alternative voices”, commentators and journalists. Their broadcasts criticized Ukraine’s foreign policy, questioned cooperation with the West and promoted narratives that often aligned with Moscow’s interests.

Many of these figures built their careers within the media network associated with Viktor Medvedchuk, a Ukrainian politician, businessman and longtime associate of Russian leader Vladimir Putin, who controlled several television channels, including 112 Ukraine, NewsOne and ZIK. In 2021, Ukraine imposed sanctions against Medvedchuk and his media assets. The decision was based on findings by Ukrainian authorities that these channels were being used as instruments of Russian influence and information operations against Ukraine. The outlets were later taken off Ukrainian broadcasting networks.

Yet, for many journalists who worked within this media environment, the end of traditional television broadcasting did not mean the end of their journey. After 2022, some moved to Russia, some continued working from abroad, and others remained in Ukraine having shifted to digital platforms. But the narratives remained the same.

The following cases illustrate how Ukrainian-born media figures continue disseminating Kremlin-aligned messaging.

“Zelenkyy’s personal enemy” Diana Panchenko

Diana Panchenko became one of the most visible Ukrainian-born figures in Russia’s information system after the beginning of the full-scale invasion.

Before 2022, she worked for NewsOne, ZIK and other media projects linked to Medvedchuk’s network. Her programs regularly featured pro-Russian politicians and commentators who promoted narratives about Ukraine’s alleged internal divisions and the need for closer relations with Moscow.

After leaving Ukraine, Panchenko reframed her public image as an “independent journalist” allegedly persecuted by Kyiv.

She operates a Telegram channel with more than 400,000 subscribers and an English-language X account targeting international audiences. Her content increasingly relies on charged headlines, coordinated amplification and cross-promotion within pro-Kremlin online networks.

By emphasizing her background as a Ukrainian journalist, Panchenko presents Kremlin narratives as an “insider’s perspective” from someone who supposedly understands Ukraine from within.

Among the main narratives she promotes are:

• The Ukrainian government has “betrayed” its own citizens, particularly those living in territories occupied by Russia, portraying Kyiv as having abandoned them.
• The Ukrainian Armed Forces are responsible for attacks on civilian areas, repeating Kremlin claims that Ukrainian forces shell their own cities.
• Russian strikes on civilian infrastructure are portrayed as “forced” or “retaliatory” measures, shifting responsibility for civilian casualties away from Russia.
• Military resistance is presented as futile, while negotiations with Russia are framed as the only realistic path to peace, implicitly promoting the idea that Ukraine should accept Russian terms.
• Russia’s occupation of Ukrainian territories is normalized, with reports from occupied Mariupol and Donetsk portraying life under Russian control as stable and legitimate.
• The annexation of occupied territories is treated as an irreversible political reality, including through her books, which argue that continued resistance is hopeless and justify the incorporation of Ukrainian territories into the Russian Federation.

Another key element of Panchenko’s communication strategy is victimhood. She presents criticism and sanctions against her as evidence of “persecution of journalists”.

In January 2023, Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) introduced sanctions against Panchenko. The decision was based on her dissemination of narratives supporting Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and her activities within the Russian information space.

The European Union also later imposed sanctions on Panchenko, citing her role in spreading Russian propaganda and undermining Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

At the same time, her links to Russia’s state media ecosystem have become increasingly visible. She cooperated with RT, a Russian state-funded international broadcaster that has been sanctioned and restricted in multiple countries for its role in disseminating Kremlin narratives, interviewed Alexander Lukashenko and received Russian citizenship in 2024.

“Freedom of speech fighter” Olesya Medvedeva

Olesya Medvedeva became known through Strana.ua, a Ukrainian media outlet repeatedly criticized for spreading narratives favorable to Russia. After working with the political network of former Yanukovych ally Oleksandr Klymenko, she became the host of the YouTube show Yasno.Ponyatno, where she promoted Kremlin-aligned narratives on the Donbas, Ukraine’s language policy, and alleged threats to “freedom of speech.” Before 2022, Medvedeva also gained attention for reports from occupied Crimea, where Russian control over the peninsula was presented in a positive light.

After the full-scale invasion, she left Ukraine and continued producing political videos while keeping her location undisclosed.

Her main narratives focus on:

• Shifting responsibility for the war onto Ukraine, portraying Kyiv as the initiator of violence in Donbas.
• Reinforcing Kremlin disinformation surrounding the events immediately preceding the full-scale invasion.
• Normalizing Russia’s occupation of Crimea by presenting annexation as an accomplished fact and emphasizing the peninsula’s alleged “development.”

From broadcaster to criminal suspect: Maksym Nazarov

Maksym Nazarov (real name Diorditsa) followed a trajectory similar to other former presenters from Ukraine’s pro-Russian television landscape. He worked for NewsOne (2015–2018), later becoming a host on Nash, the channel owned by pro-Russian politician Yevhen Murayev. 

Following Russia’s full-scale invasion, Nazarov launched his own YouTube channel and continued building an audience on Telegram through his channel Naglyi.

In January 2025, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) notified Nazarov of suspicion of justifying Russia’s armed aggression against Ukraine. According to the investigation, he repeatedly invited pro-Russian commentators, including individuals living in Russia and figures listed in Ukraine’s Register of State Traitors, to present narratives favourable to the Kremlin. A court ordered him into pre-trial detention with bail initially set at UAH 12 million (around $267,000) , later reduced to UAH 8.5 million, which was subsequently paid.

His broadcasts consistently promoted several recurring narratives:

• Russia’s military build-up was portrayed as a response to Ukraine’s actions, including claims that Kyiv’s NATO aspirations had “provoked” Moscow.
• The war in Donbas was framed as an internal Ukrainian conflict, while Russia’s direct military involvement was questioned or denied.
• Russian proxy authorities were legitimized, including by giving airtime to representatives of the self-proclaimed “DPR/LPR” and presenting them as legitimate negotiating parties.
• Recurring Kremlin narratives about “Nazism”, discrimination against the Russian language and “Russophobia” were amplified to portray Ukraine as an intolerant state.
• Western support for Ukraine was depicted as the real driver of the war, while Russia’s actions were presented as defensive or inevitable.
• Pro-Russian experts were presented as independent analysts, including commentators who justified Russia’s invasion or repeated official Kremlin narratives.

Restriction-evading network

The closure of television channels ended one chapter of Russian influence operations inside Ukraine, but the system has adapted. These personalities are amplified through a network of state media, mirror websites, proxy outlets and occupation-run media designed to sustain the reach of Kremlin narratives despite sanctions and platform restrictions.

Research by the Institute of Mass Information (IMI) shows that Russian propaganda media continue to rely on a relatively stable set of narratives, regardless of the platform or target audience. Throughout 2025, the dominant themes included Russia facing an external threat, glorification of the Russian military, and portrayal of Ukraine’s armed forces as weakened or failing. 

One example is Strana.ua, the outlet where Olesya Medvedeva continues to publish. Following Ukrainian sanctions and access restrictions, the publication did not cease operating. Instead, it adopted a sanctions-evasion strategy by creating a network of mirror domains, including ctrana.one, strana.today, ctrana.media, strana.news, stranaua.media, strana.one, ctrana.online and strana.best. 

Russian state-controlled media also play a role in amplifying Ukrainian-born commentators. Ukraina.ru, a Russian state media outlet focused on Ukraine, is regularly cited by European websites positioning themselves as “alternative” or “independent” media. Rather than quoting Russian officials directly, proxy platforms frequently republish or reference articles from Ukraina.ru. Examples include Réseau International in France and Nová Republika in Czechia, both of which have reproduced or referenced content originating from Russian state media.

Architecture of propaganda in occupied territories

The same model has been replicated in occupied Ukrainian territories. Research by Insight News Media documents how occupation authorities have constructed parallel information systems in occupied Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions. In Kherson, the network combines Tavria TV with websites such as herson.news, bloknot-herson.ru, newskherson.ru, kherson-news.ru and the recently launched nash-kherson.news. These outlets work alongside Telegram channels and occupation administration resources to replace Ukrainian news with Kremlin-controlled reporting. Similar multi-layered structures have been documented in occupied Zaporizhzhia.

According to Ukraine’s Center for Countering Disinformation (CPD), this information infrastructure serves several complementary purposes: legitimizing the occupation authorities, portraying Russian governance as stable and effective, isolating residents from Ukrainian media, and systematically discrediting Ukrainian state institutions.

The monitoring project maintained by Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (HUR) demonstrates that these personalities are not isolated actors. They are part of a broader network of sanctioned propagandists, media managers, bloggers and commentators whose content frequently overlaps, cites one another and is redistributed through the same media infrastructure.