A sophisticated scheme of Russian sanctions evasion has been uncovered through a recent investigation by InformNapalm, revealing how Russian military aircraft, particularly Su-30SM fighters, continue to be serviced using high-tech French avionics from companies like Thales and Safran.
Despite the EU’s sanctions following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, documents show that Kazakh intermediaries, specifically the ARC Group, have been facilitating repairs and servicing of these critical systems on Russian warplanes.
This article delves into the evidence, mechanisms, and implications of these operations, as exposed by the #ThalesLeaks investigation.
Kazakh-Russian sanctions evasion scheme
At the heart of this scheme is the partnership between Kazakhstan’s ARC Group and Russia’s Rosaviaspetskomplekt.
Despite the sanctions explicitly prohibiting such transactions, the investigation details how Kazakhstan became a key conduit for maintaining Russian Su-30SM fighter jets, which rely on sophisticated French avionics, including the SMD55S and SMD66S multifunctional displays, TLS2020 landing system, and SIGMA 95NAA navigation system, among others.
These systems are integral to the aircraft’s operation, making their maintenance critical for Russian military operations, including bombardments of cities and military positions in Ukraine.
Documents acquired by InformNapalm through multiple sources, including a whistleblower from Kazakhstan, outline the methods used to bypass these restrictions.
As early as 2021, ARC Group began entering contracts with Rosaviaspetskomplekt to repair and maintain these French-made systems. Despite Thales and Safran’s contractual terms prohibiting the transfer of their technology or services to third parties, particularly Russia, the Kazakh firm had a corresponding contract with the Russian company, as the leaked documents show.
ARC Group’s role in providing maintenance to Russia’s SU aircraft
Founded in 2014 by the young entrepreneur Aldanazar Saginbek, ARC Group quickly became a critical player in this scheme. Though it positioned itself as a consulting firm, the company’s official scope extended far beyond, including the acquisition, sale, and servicing of military equipment.
Since 2016, ARC Group has established a direct business relationship with Safran Electronics & Defence, serving as its exclusive distributor in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
However, behind this seemingly legitimate facade, ARC was acting as a middleman, facilitating the transfer and repair of French avionics for Russian military use.
Notably, ARC Group sent its engineers to France for certification at Thales, obtaining the necessary expertise to repair these systems.
The company then conducted maintenance and repairs on Su-30SM fighters at Russian facilities, particularly at the Irkutsk Aviation Plant.
This arrangement allowed Russia to keep its aircraft combat-ready by regularly dispatching French-trained Kazakh specialists to Russian sites under the pretense of servicing Kazakhstani aircraft.
Did Thales and Safran know?
This investigation has raised a critical question about Thales and Safran’s knowledge of the illicit use of their technology.
While the companies had clear restrictions against servicing Russian equipment, the investigation raises concerns about how these contracts were allowed to continue despite the obvious risks.
In some instances, it appears that Russian and Kazakh companies signed contracts retroactively, attempting to disguise their true nature after the full-scale invasion and the tightening of sanctions.
A key point of evidence is a letter from Rosaviaspetskomplekt to ARC Group in August 2022, detailing plans to repair 13 units of onboard equipment worth €1.45 million, with an additional 88 units slated for repair in 2023.
The timing of this correspondence, well after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and subsequent sanctions, suggests that the contracts may have been signed with full awareness of their illegal implications.
This revelation has far-reaching implications, not only for the companies involved but also for global efforts to maintain the integrity of sanctions regimes.
The fact that Russia has been able to continue maintaining its air force despite comprehensive sanctions underscores the challenges of enforcing these restrictions.
While Kazakhstan has played a central role in this particular case, it is likely that similar schemes exist in other countries aligned with Russian interests.
For Thales and Safran, these findings could lead to significant consequences. French authorities are now urged to investigate the extent of the companies’ involvement and whether they exercised adequate oversight over their international partners.
The documentation disclosed by InformNapalm not only exposes this particular scheme but also serves as a warning for other nations and companies about the risks of inadvertent complicity in Russia’s war machine.
