After the US-Russia talks on ending the Russia-Ukraine war, Trump and his team’s controversial statements on Europe and the lack of condemnation of Russian aggression have prompted political observers to speculate that Trump is trying to restore US-Russia relations to disengage Russia from China (source 1, source 2), which he considers his main rival on the geopolitical stage.
The question is whether this scenario is realistic. Russia and China are closely linked by economic ties, and the EU and the US have often accused Beijing of supporting Russia’s military efforts against Ukraine. Obviously, this economic cooperation is beneficial to China.
Moreover, in the context of tensions between the Trump administration and the EU and especially Ukraine after the heated Trump-Zelenskyy meeting, the destabilization of the Western world is beneficial to Beijing.
China continues to use Russia as an appendage for cheap raw materials. What factors might lead Beijing to stop relying on Russia for raw materials? And what factors might lead Russia to reconsider selling energy resources to China?
After all, the Kremlin has lost the Western market because of sanctions that are only getting tougher. A brief overview of the trade and economic balance between Russia and China depicts how close their ties are.
Russia dodged Western sanctions shifting imports and exports to China
According to the online analytical portal Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC), in 2021, almost half of Russian exports went to European countries, including Belarus and Ukraine.
Energy carriers, primarily crude oil and gas, made up the majority. By the end of 2023, the picture has entirely changed.
Data recently published by the OEC shows that China and India have become the most important markets for Russia, accounting for almost half of all Russian exports.
China accounts for about 33% and India for about 17%. Before the invasion of Ukraine, in 2021, China’s share was just under 15% and India’s was less than 2%. The infographic from the OEC shows that the core of Russia’s exports consists of crude petroleum sold to China and India.
The OEC found that just over 14% of Russian exports were going to European countries in 2023, up from 48% two years earlier.
Although the OEC has not yet provided statistics for 2024, figures from other sources, such as the Russian Foreign Trade Tracker from the Bruegel think tank, suggest that this figure has not changed much compared to 2023, DW reported.
Therefore, they do not include the oil that Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet” delivers to China.
According to the Kyiv School of Economics (KSE), at least 70% of all Russian crude oil shipments by sea come from its “shadow fleet,” mostly worn-out and uninsured vessels, with India, China, and Turkey together buying 95% of this raw material.
Moscow’s reorientation of its export flows from 2022 is driven by two factors: the EU no longer buys Russian pipeline gas and oil directly, while Beijing and New Delhi are importing energy from Russia at an increasing rate. So, sanctions against Russia and Russia’s war against Ukraine greatly benefited the Chinese economy.
Oil supplies from Russia to the EU have fallen by 90% in three years. The EU is also reducing its gas purchases from Russia: if in 2021 it accounted for 40% of imports of this product, three years later it will account for about 15%. And these imports include dual-use technologies.
Recently, the European Union expressed serious concerns about the information that China is supplying Russia with components for the production of attack drones that the Kremlin is using on the battlefield against Ukraine. This was announced at a briefing in Brussels by EU Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Anouar El-Anouni.
The infographic from the OEC shows that the core of Russia’s imports consists of technical equipment, machinery, broadcasting equipment, vehicle, machines parts, electric heaters and other equipment purchased from China.
Is Russia now a vassal of China?
Russia’s relations with China have perhaps changed the most—both in trade and geopolitical terms, experts believe.
“Russia is now a vassal of China,” Elina Rybakova, an economist at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington, D.C., told DW.
In her view, China’s importance to Russian trade is now so unbalanced that Beijing has a giant influence on Moscow.
“China is Russia’s largest trading partner, while the Russian Federation accounts for only a small share of Chinese exports,” Rybakova said.
Because of Western sanctions, Moscow is increasingly dependent on Beijing for supplies of high-tech goods and manufacturing products.
At the same time, exports from China to Russia have also increased. Over half of all Russian imports in 2023 came from China, according to the OEC. This volume is twice as much as in 2021.
Supplies of Chinese goods have largely replaced imports from the EU to Moscow—in 2023, Chinese exports to Russia reached almost 105 billion euros.
About 40% of it was for machinery and components. About 20% were cars and trucks, tractors and spare parts, metals, plastics and rubber products, chemical products, and textiles.
Moscow’s shift in key trading partners also reflects the transition to a multipolar world order, which the Kremlin is persistently striving for. Putin might find this path convenient as it aligns him with China and other nations in a multipolar world. However, it assumes that such dependence makes Russia vulnerable.
Key factors
Russia has become economically dependent on China. Trade between Russia and China reached a record $240 billion in 2024 (up 26% from 2023), and China has become a key buyer of Russian oil and gas. Russia also depends on Chinese technology and dual-use goods for warfare. This dependence is deep: China provides up to 70% of the imports of electronics and components for the Russian military-industrial complex. It will be difficult to break these ties with economic handouts from the United States, as Trump’s proposal must outweigh China’s benefits.
Russia’s strategic interests are paramount. Putin views China as a counterweight to the West, especially the United States. The alliance with Beijing gives Russia geopolitical weight and protection from isolation. Trump may offer trade or investment, but Russia does not want to lose China as an ally that does not impose conditions on human rights or democratic reforms, unlike the West. In addition, Russia has already invested in infrastructure (e.g., gas pipelines to China), making a pivot to the United States less attractive.
China’s reaction. China will not remain passive. Beijing may increase economic pressure on Russia (e.g., by reducing energy purchases or raising commodity prices) to keep it in its orbit. In addition, China has its plans for Ukraine—control over its resources and markets—and will not allow Trump to easily redraw the geopolitical map. Analysts suggest that China may even play the role of a “peacemaker,” but only on its terms.
Can the US trust Russia? Russia has repeatedly violated international agreements. The Kremlin adheres to agreements only when they are beneficial to them at a particular moment. Putin sees concessions as weakness. If Trump makes compromises, Russia will see it as a victory and demand more. Trusting Russia in such a scenario is a risk, as the Kremlin will use any agreement to strengthen its position, not to build long-term peace.
What are the chances to disengage Russia from China?
Is Trump trying to restore US-Russian relations to disengage Russia from China? How realistic is this scenario? What is the extent of Russia’s dependence on China?
These data show that Russia is too dependent on China in the context of isolation from the West due to the war in Ukraine. And it’s not just about the economy or circumventing sanctions, but about geopolitical priorities and projects. After all, Russia is trying to strengthen its position in the BRICS, which is a counterweight to the Western world, and hosted the organization’s summit. Thus, Trump’s efforts to win Russia over to the US look illusory.
This plan has low chances of success. US-Russia may be interesting for Moscow, but not enough to outweigh the strategic alliance with China. Russia will probably accept what Trump offers (sanctions relief, trade deals) but will not cut ties with Beijing. Pressure on Ukraine to surrender would play into the hands of the Kremlin and China rather than split their alliance.
In this situation, Ukraine should avoid making concessions and seek support from Europe and other allies, as dependence on the Trump deal could lead to a loss of sovereignty without real security guarantees.
Trump, on the other hand, if he seriously wants to split Russia and China, needs pressure, not handouts, for example, through sanctions or support for Ukraine as a counterweight to both.
Trump is probably also moving closer to Russia to fulfill his loud promise to end the war in Ukraine quickly (first in 24 hours, then in a month and six months). But China is not averse to taking the opportunity to show itself as a peacemaker.
Earlier, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that for three years it had been actively promoting “peace and dialogue” and now sees a “window of opportunity” to resolve the situation in Ukraine. Beijing emphasizes that it will continue to support a “political settlement of the Ukrainian crisis.” According to the press service of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Minister Wang Yi, during an interview with Chinese journalists after a ten-day trip to the EU, the US, and South Africa, said that China had allegedly contributed to the peace process in Ukraine.
Meanwhile, The Hill writes that Donald Trump has enough power to free Ukraine from Russian aggression. In addition, he can strike at the hybrid war waged by Kremlin leader Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping against the West.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated that Kyiv is ready to accept any help from China to stop the war with Russia. If Beijing is ready to provide weapons, Ukraine will consider it.
Since the focus is now on resolving the war between Russia and Ukraine, it is time for the geopolitical leader to play the role of peacemaker and achieve a ceasefire, but without making painful concessions to Russia, which is the aggressor in this war. Moreover, it does not seem realistic to separate Russia from China by making concessions to the Kremlin.
